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Summary of thesis:
While much of Nāgārjuna’s writings are aimed at deconstructing fixed views and views 
that hold to some form of substantialist thought (where certain qualities are held to be 
inherent in phenomena), he does not make many assertive propositions regarding his 
philosophical position. He focuses most of his writing to applying the prasaṅga method 
of argumentation to prove the importance of recognizing that all phenomena are śūnya
by deconstructing views of phenomena based on substance. Nāgārjuna does, however, 
assert that all phenomena are empty and that phenomena are meaningful because 
śūnyatā makes logical sense.1 Based on his deconstruction of prevailing views of 
substance, he maintains that holding to any view of substance is absurd, that 
phenomena can only make sense if viewed from the standpoint of śūnyatā. This thesis 
grapples with the problem that Nāgārjuna does not provide adequate supporting 
arguments to prove that phenomena are meaningful due to their śūnyatā. It is clear that 
if saṃvṛti is indiscernible due to its emptiness, saṃvṛtisatya cannot be corroborated on 
its own terms due to its insubstantiality.   But how does viewing phenomena as empty 
make them meaningful? Scholars who base their understanding of how meaning is 
established in Nāgārjuna’s thought based on Candrakīrti’s interpretation of his two-
truths formulation, which grants both paramārtha and saṃvṛti truths their distinctive 
truth-values, tend to  prove the distinctive truth of saṃvṛti in terms of its linguistically-
based, conventional status.2 I am critical of this approach and argue, instead, that an 
explanation of how phenomena are meaningful due to their emptiness is found in the 
Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra’s (PPM)’s use of metaphoricity. Rather than seeing the two truths 
as distinctive, I argue that saṃvṛtisatya and paramārthasatya both make sense based 
on their metaphorical relationship in that they are both śūnyatā and that phenomena 
point to, or are metaphors for, the all-inclusive śūnyatā of reality akin to understanding 
of ākāśa in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras which although experienced cannot be 
cognitively grasped.
Key terms: Nāgārjuna, śūnyatā, saṃvṛti, paramārtha, Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra,
metaphoricity, ākāśa, pratītyasamutpāda.
                                                          
1 MK 24: 14 (cited in McCagney 1997:201);  VV 70 (cited in Westerhoff 2010:130).
2 Garfield (Chapter 2: 23-38) and Tillemans (Chapter 9;151-166) (in Westerhoff et al, 2011) 
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1List of Abbreviations
VV – Vigrahavyāvartanī
MK –Mūlamadyamakakārikā 
Rgs –Ratnaguņasaṃucayagāthā
PPM –Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra 
Aṣṭa - Aṣṭasāhasrikā   
Rt –Ratnakūta
SS –Śūnyatāsaptati
Note on Translations used
I have used primarily Nancy McCagney’s translation of the MK (1997) in Nāgārjuna and 
philosophy of openness and Jan Westerhoff’s translation of the VV (2010) in The 
dispeller of disputes: Nāgārjuna’s Vigrahavyavartani. Where  not otherwise stated these 
two translations serve as my primary texts for translations on Nāgārjuna’s writings.
2Chapter One
Introduction
1. The central problem
While much of Nāgārjuna’s writings are aimed at deconstructing fixed views and views 
that hold to some form of substantialism or svabhāva (where certain qualities are held to 
be inherent in phenomena), he does not make many assertive propositions regarding 
his philosophical position. He devotes most of his writing to applying the prasaṅga
method of argumentation to prove the necessity of recognizing that all phenomena are 
śūnya by deconstructing views of phenomena based on substance. Nāgārjuna does, 
however, assert that all phenomena are empty and that phenomena are meaningful 
because śūnyatā makes logical sense.1 Based on his deconstruction of prevailing views 
of substance (see parenthesis above explaining substantialism), he asserts that holding 
to any view of substance is absurd, that phenomena can only make sense if viewed 
from the standpoint of śūnyatā. This thesis grapples with the problem that Nāgārjuna 
does not provide adequate supporting arguments to prove that phenomena are 
meaningful due to their śūnyatā. It is clear that if saṃvṛti (conceptual or conventional 
                                                  
1 MK 24: 14 (cited in McCagney 1997: 201);  VV 70;  (cited in Westerhoff 2010: 130).
3knowledge) is indiscernible due to its emptiness, saṃvṛtisatya (conceptual or contextual 
truth) cannot be corroborated on its own terms due to its insubstantiality.   But how does 
viewing phenomena as empty make them meaningful? Scholars who base their 
understanding of how meaning is established in Nāgārjuna’s thought based on 
Candrakīrti’s interpretation of his two-truths formulation, which grants both paramārtha
and saṃvṛti truths their distinctive truth-values, tend to prove the distinctive veracity of 
saṃvṛti in terms of its linguistically-based, conventional status.2 I disagree with this 
approach and argue, instead, that an explanation of how phenomena are meaningful 
due to their emptiness is found in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra’s (PPM)’s use of 
metaphoricity. Rather than seeing the two truths as distinctive, I maintain that 
saṃvṛtisatya and paramārthasatya both make sense based on their metaphorical 
relationship in that they are both śūnyatā and that phenomena point to, or are 
metaphors for, the all-inclusive śūnyatā of reality. The two clearest statements of 
Nāgārjuna’s assertion that phenomena make sense due to their emptiness are:
All things prevail for him whom prevails this voidness. Nothing prevails for 
him for whom voidness does not prevail.3
sarvaṃ ca yujyate tasya śūnyatā yasya yujyate/
sarvaṃ na yujyate tasya śūnyaṃ yasya na yujyate//
and
For whom there is emptiness, there is [the clarity of] all things. For whom 
there is no emptiness there is nothing what soever.
If śūnyata does not work, then everything does not work ….4
                                                  
2 Garfield (Chapter 2: 23-38) and Tillemans (Chapter 9;151-166) in Westerhoff et al, 2011 
3 VV 70 in Westerhoff (2010: 41).
4prabhavati ca śūnyatéyaṃ yasya prabhavanti  tasya sarvāthāh/
prabhavati na tasya kiṃcin na prabhavati śūnyatā yasya//
The use of yujyate in MK 24:14 and prabhavati in VV70 suggest that phenomena are 
experienced as immediate (yujyate) and engagingly (prabhavati) related and when 
śūnyatā is fully understood. Both these terms allude to meaningful encounters with 
phenomena due to their emptiness. Nāgārjuna’s understanding of śūnyatā, therefore,
does not imply that his philosophy is nihilistic.  My thesis will demonstrate why this is so.
In particular, in the Vigrahavyāvartanī, (VV) Nāgārjuna was at pains to defend his 
argument against criticisms of nihilism. But in both Mūlamadyamakakārikā (MK) 24:14 
and VV 70, śūnyatā is presented, not as a critique of phenomena, but, rather, as an 
integral part of their presentation. Śūnyatā in these verses is not an experience of 
unmitigated voidness, but rather of causal flux. But, in making his defence of śūnyatā
against the charges of nihilism from his opponents, Nāgārjuna introduces meaning in 
order to bolster his argument. He suggests that without a correct understanding of 
śūnyatā nothing makes sense. Unfortunately he does not offer an argument as proof for 
this claim. Instead, he relies on the experience of śūnyatā in bhāvāna.5 In Chapter 2 I 
argue, following Nancy McCagney’s assertion, that śūnyatā, as Nāgārjuna uses the 
term, conceptually corresponds to ākāśa;  the yogic experience of śūnyatā is mediated 
by a yogic experience of space as described in the in the PPM.6
                                                                                                                                                    
4 MK 24: 14 in McCagney (1997: 201).
5 MK25: 24 (in McCagney 1997: 210).
6 McCagney (1997: 22).
5In grappling with the problem of making sense of Nāgārjuna’s claims regarding meaning 
I will focus specifically on MK 24:14 and VV 70. In these verses Nāgārjuna attempts to 
establish a clear view of reality by undoing the confusion arising from mistaken 
attribution of own-being or svabhāva to phenomena (a substantive object). He shows 
that the only way a thing can display own-being is via its activity, as ably demonstrated 
by the Abhidharmikas.7 But this association between activity and substantive essence 
obscures the correct perception of a thing-in-itself (to borrow Kant’s phrase) in that 
activity is confused for objective reality.8 If one ascribes essence to activity, phenomena 
are granted power to act because their defining activity is seen to provide them with a 
degree of autonomy.
Nāgārjuna moves to establish a clear view of reality by basing his argument on causality 
– a shrewd rhetorical move, which ensures him his opponents’ attention, since they 
would also look to causality to understand how phenomena establish a certain sensory 
impression. But Nāgārjuna proves to be a highly astute argumentative adversary in this 
instance. From the first chapter in the MK, he shifts the argument away from the 
anticipated focus on dynamic causal relations to delusion. He achieves this by adopting 
the prasaṅga method of argumentation to show the absurdity of believing in 
autonomous action. If we doubt that activity possesses essence, we will then try to 
explain how conditions arise through claiming that phenomena are dependent on one 
another. But in the Humean sense, how can one ever be sure that conditions are the 
                                                  
7 Williams (2000: 92 and 115). 
8 MK 1: 6 (in McCagney 1997: 138). 
6result of certain causal activity?9 Nāgārjuna is aware of this problem and holds that as 
long as the error of perception is maintained, the correct understanding of phenomena 
will be overlooked.10 I maintain that his argument in MK 24:14 and VV70 corresponds to 
certain phrases and concepts in the PPM which incorporate metaphoricity in its logic. A 
good example is found in Ratnaguņasaṃucayagāthā (Rgs) 20 13 & 14:
Having taken hold of the two parachutes of skill in means and of wisdom, 
Considers dharmas as empty, signless and wishless.11
In this verse meaning is described, through the metaphor of two parachutes, as skilful 
means and wisdom. Knowledge of śūnyatā is dependent on the ability to combine the 
skill of acting in the world with Wisdom. The result of this combined knowledge is the 
awareness of śūnyatā, which is described in the PPM in akasic terms, i.e. apratīhistita
(not settling down), anālaya (nothing to settle in) and anāgrahā (nothing to grasp). I 
explore these akasic connotations in detail in Chapter Two.
Similarly, Nāgārjuna’s   deconstructive analysis of causal conditions and effects leads 
him, at the end of Chapter One in the MK, on the one hand, to a contradictory and 
confusing set of assertions about conditions and, on the other hand, to beg for a 
semantic solution that is neither object-related nor conceptually bound. Phenomena and 
conditions are akasic in character, as described in the PPM in the terms apratīhistita
(not settling down), anālaya (nothing to settle in) and anāgrahā (nothing to grasp):
                                                  
9 Scruton (1996: 124); Hume (1910: 3).
10 MK 1: 4 (in McCagney 1997: 138).
11 Conze (1990: 46).
7Verse 11
The effect is not in the conditions either separately or together.
How could that which is not in conditions be from conditions?
Verse 12
Moreover, if the effect, nonexistent in those conditions, is set in motion
From those conditions, why is it not set in motion from no conditions?
Verse 13
The effect is created by conditions, but the conditions are not created by 
themselves.
How can an effect created by conditions be from what is not created by 
itself?
Verse 14 
The effect is created neither from conditions nor from no conditions. 
How can an effect be obtained from nonexistent conditions and no 
conditions?12
It seems that Nāgārjuna is attacking consistency as a basis for truth-claims by showing 
that conditions are erroneously conceived causal relationships and are hence 
perceptual delusions. The only logical position, then, is to hold that phenomena are 
indeterminate in nature, neither derived from other conditions nor from non-conditions.13
If Nāgārjuna holds to this position of indeterminacy, he would not be able to make his 
final assertion that phenomena work or make sense because of śūnyatā. If phenomena 
are indeterminate in nature, they must be meaningless. The root of the confusion lies in 
the contradictory assertion that the truth of phenomena is that they are true but 
meaningless.  This leads to the question of how phenomena work or make sense due to 
śūnyatā. Nāgārjuna implies that phenomena are true and meaningful because they are 
śūnyatā in the sense that they work and can be logically accounted for. Therefore, what 
                                                  
12 McCagney (1997: 139).
13 Garfield argues that questions such as, “why can we see in the room at night?” are explained due the dominant 
condition “because the light is on”. He argues that the explanation using the dominant condition does not require 
causal substantiation (1995: 5). I believe that such an argument falls short of what Nāgārjuna is claiming about 
understanding phenomena when śūnyatā is understood in that if meaning is derived from the dominant condition 
meaning would only have relative value. 
8is delusional is not the existence of phenomena, but the imposition of own-being onto 
phenomena. These issues are explored in Chapter Three, where I demonstrate that 
concepts, objects and statements always evade clear identification of fixed meaning 
and are, therefore, always relatively interpreted and indeterminate. Meaning, for 
Nāgārjuna is, therefore, a consequence of pratītyasamutpāda (dependent origination). 
In other words if meaning is contingent on śūnyatā the verb/process element prevails 
over the nominative function of language.14
Chapter Four argues that, in identifying śūnyatā with pratītyasamutpāda, Nāgārjuna 
makes the necessary logical move to establish phenomena as meaningful and 
reasonable. He does this by reflecting the logic utilised in the PPM, where finite objects 
are used to reflect the infinity of śūnyatā, specifically through connecting śūnyatā with 
the experience of ākāśa. This logic utilises the literary technique of metaphoricity in the 
PPM, where phenomena are metaphors for śūnyatā, rather than being indeterminate 
objects:  phenomena are not necessarily based on ignorance but rather, are actual 
expressions of śūnyatā. MK 16:10 offers a good example of this metaphoric logic,  
reminiscent of that used in the PPM:
Neither is nirvāṇa only saṃsāra nor is saṃsāra removed away. Where 
there is nirvāṇa, there is saṃsāra. Which is falsely discriminated from 
which?
                                                  
14 McCagney (1997: 19).
9In order to approach the problem I have outlined in this section, I will first outline my 
conceptual and theoretical approach to Nāgārjuna. Second, I will explain the 
methodological approach used in the thesis.
2. Theoretical and conceptual approach
My approach in this thesis is primarily philosophical.  Its objective is not so much to 
contextualise Nāgārjuna’s writings in order to understand their meaning, but rather to 
read them philosophically. I do not mean to ignore the importance of historicity and 
historicisation. I, however, want to avoid the argument that limits ideas to certain 
historical moments, common to Foucauldian approaches to knowledge.15 Such an 
approach runs into the logical paradox that all knowledge is contextual, even the 
argument that ‘all knowledge is contextual’.  In contrast, I aspire to disrupt the narrowing 
influence of a contextualising hermeneutic; to break open the conditioned interpretations 
of the texts; and finally, to see the texts’ meaning as offering a transhistorical challenge 
to the reader. Such an approach does, however, require sensitivity to the prevailing 
mindset or historical traditions of the epoch.  In this thesis, the Indic and Buddhist 
mindset is centrally relevant. Used in this way philosophy is akin to mythology because 
both mythology and philosophy force their audiences to look at their objects afresh, 
untethered from received interpretations and open to the ancient questions posed about 
                                                  
15 Foucault (1980: 197). In The Order of things Foucault argues the épistemes define the conditions of possibility of 
knowledge within a particular epoch.
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reality.16 If a text is read purely as an historical document, it only exists for the reader in 
relation to other texts in its close contextual vicinity. But, if a text is read primarily in 
terms of its attempts to communicate wisdom and meaning, it is able to abide, to some 
extent, in its own free space, reflecting itself in relation to insight and its pursuit of 
wisdom, which, to some extent, transcends time and language. Such a philosophy can 
be evaluated in terms of whether its logic provides meaningful assertions to the reader.
My approach is, therefore not primarily historical, although I am interested in highlighting 
the broad Indian mentality that influenced Nāgārjuna’s thought. Nāgārjuna’s writings 
may have earned him the title of “Father of Mahāyāna Buddhism”. This claim is, 
however, not easy to defend because Mahāyāna predates his writings. Certain 
scholars, nevertheless, assert that he was a champion of the Mahāyāna tradition.17 But 
he does not deliberately align himself with any school of thought. It is for this reason that 
his writings are of such interest. Although completely Buddhist in their expression and 
approach, Nāgārjuna’s writings keep counsel with no factions or individuals and yet 
pronounce a philosophy so influential that it remains, in importance, second only to the 
Buddha’s teachings in the Mahāyāna tradition. He is critical of certain ideas, which 
seem to be akin to the ideas of the Abhidharmists including the Sarvāstivādins:  yet he 
offers no conspicuous thesis in response. 
                                                  
16 In the process of attempting to read Nāgārjuna using this philosophical approach, I will not consider his 
commentators in detail, such as Buddhpālita, Bhāviveka or Candrakīrti, although I am critical of Candrakīrti’s 
interpretations and his subsequent followers’ commentaries, such as Tsong Khapa. The philosophical approach 
that I am employing requires a close reading of the texts themselves. Bhāviveka’s commentaries require 
substantial critiques in themselves, which this thesis does not allow for. My explanation of the philosophical 
approach in this paragraph is influenced by Breyten Breytenbach’s response to the contention that reading needs 
to guard against being constricted by contemporary hermeneutics and recover its elementary force (2008: 152).
17 Walser (2010: 2 & 3); Warder (1980: 352).
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Recent studies highlight the difficulty of the historical approach when applied to 
Nāgārjuna.18 Most prominently, the challenge is that the historical figure of Nāgārjuna is 
so hard to pin down.  In the following pages, I will tackle this problem in Nāgārjuna 
studies.  
Establishing the historical conditions within which Nāgārjuna lived is unfortunately not 
an easy task. Nāgārjuna scholars are reticent to offer dates for Nāgārjuna’s life.19  Not 
only is there a paucity of information available about Nāgārjuna’s life (most of which 
appears mythical), but also there is the more prevailing difficulty of piecing together the 
timbre of the period from recorded oral fragments and memories. Nevertheless, 
concerning Nāgārjuna’s historical context, Walser (along with Lamotte20) argues that 
Nāgārjuna lived in the third century CE. This assertion is based on evidence found in 
Dharmarakṣa’s translation of the Daśabhūmikaśātra by Nāgārjuna dated between 265 
CE and 313 CE and Kumārajīva’s writings, which refer to a  date of death for Nāgārjuna 
in the third century, by mentioning that, one hundred years after the death of Nāgārjuna, 
Kamārajīva lived at Ch’ang-an between 401-13 CE .21  
Walser argues that Nāgārjuna’s benefactor was a Sātavāhana king. He therefore would 
have lived during the Sātavāhana Dynasty, who reigned over most of Southern and 
central India for about 400 years, from 230 BCE until about 220 CE.22 But there are 
                                                  
18 Walser (2010); Schopen, in Williams (2000: 104).
19 Walser (2010: 59).
20 Lamotte (1988).
21 Walser (2010: 62).
22 Wolpert (1993: 75).
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many conflicting references to where he lived. Candrakīrti places him in southern India, 
the Jain tradition locates him in Gujarat and the Siddha tradition mainly at Nālanda in 
the North.23 It is for this reason that Mabbet argues (echoed by Lamotte concerning the 
many Nāgārjuna legends and stories) that Nāgārjuna “is an enigma”, with many theories 
about his dates and habitats but no reliable proof as to their veracity.24
There are also many mythical accounts of Nāgārjuna’s life that form part of his 
hagiography. The earliest legends about Nāgārjuna were compiled by Kumārajīva and 
translated into Chinese in about 405 CE.25 Walser argues that these legends serve a 
literary function: giving Nāgārjuna credibility or legitimation for his audience. Seen in this 
light, the diversity of legends about Nāgārjuna’s life  speak to different audiences, 
including the Mahāsāṃghika, Abhidharmika, Sthavirvāda etc.26 the legend about his 
relationship with the Nagas and the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra (PPM), as recorded by 
Kumārajīva, is aimed at establishing the profound connection between Nāgārjuna’s 
thought and Prajñāpāramitā Sutra (PPM), which goes beyond legitimation or edification. 
This legend is of central importance to my thesis, which, in a similar vein  emphasises  
the similarities between Nāgārjuna’s thought and the PPM. It argues that reading 
Nāgārjuna is enriched by an awareness of the PPM tradition. culture. In order to 
appreciate the correspondences between Nāgārjuna’s texts and the PPM we need to be 
aware of the emerging philosophy in the PPM of the akasic nature of experience and 
phenomena and how this resonates with Nāgārjuna’s understanding of the identity of 
                                                  
23 Walser (2010: 66 & 67).
24 Walser (2010: 60 & 67).
25 Walser (2010: 66).
26 Walser (2010: 67 & 68).
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śūnyatā and pratītyasamutpāda . Foremost in this emerging tradition of thought in the 
PPM is the idea that all reality is śūnya and symbolised by akasic experience, which is 
characterised by indeterminacy. The use of symbolism in connecting ākāśa to śūnyatā
in the PPM is useful in understanding Nāgārjuna’s thought. Conze argues that 
Nāgārjuna’s thought is a philosophical articulation of the PPM.27 This assertion invites a 
symbolic reading of Nāgārjuna’s work, particularly in relation to his two-truths 
formulation. Although Nāgārjuna only mentions the two truths in two verses in the 
Mūlamdahyamikākarikā (MK), I argue that his formulation of the two-truths idea makes 
sense in terms of the metaphoric logic in the PPM, where visual and experiential objects 
are used to point to the inexpressible truth of śūnyatā.28 This thesis uses symbolism, in 
the sense which Joseph Campbell states that the “first function of a mythology is to 
reconcile waking consciousness to the mysterium tremendum et fascinans of this 
universe as it is”.29 Symbols do not function as similes or perform an allegorical 
purpose. Instead they operate along the lines described by the Romantic poet, Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge, who maintained that the symbol participates in reality with that which 
“it renders intelligible”.30 Symbols are not contrived connections between signs and their 
referents.  Rather, as Goethe avers,
There is a great difference, whether the poet seeks the particular for the 
sake of the general or sees the general in the particular. From the former 
procedure there ensues allegory, in which the particular serves only as a 
illustration, as example of the general. The latter procedure, however, is 
                                                  
27 Conze (1967).
28 MK 24: 9 and 10 in McCagney (1997: 200-201).
29 Campbell (1976b: 4).
30 Abrams (1988: 185).
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genuinely the nature of poetry: it expresses something particular, without 
thinking of the general or pointing to it. 
Allegory transforms the phenomenon into a concept, the concept into an 
image, but in such a way that the concept always remains bounded in the 
image, and is entirely to be kept and held in it, and expressed by it.
Symbolism (however) transforms the phenomenon into idea, the idea into 
an image, and in such a way that the idea remains always infinitely active 
and unapproachable in the image, and even if expressed in all languages, 
still would remain inexpressible.31
Coleridge’s and Goethe’s concepts of symbolism where the phenomenon points to that 
which is inexpressible within itself informs my understanding of the level of 
metaphoricity that Nāgārjuna tacitly applied to his writing, based on the metaphoric logic 
in the PPM, in arguing that phenomena at the saṃvṛti view share the same śūnya with 
ultimate śūnyatā from the paramārtha view.
In order to expose the way Nāgārjuna uses a similar form of logic as in the PPM, I show, 
via the application of philosophy of meaning and analytical reasoning,32 that Nāgārjuna’s
propositional claims in MK 24:14 and VV 70 make sense when read in the context of the 
metaphorical logic of the PPM. Meaning theory explores how the symbolic function of 
words and sentences converge with experience to provide understanding,33 while 
analytical theory assesses consistency of conceptual understanding between the 
predicate and the subject.
                                                  
31 Abrams (1988: 186).
32 Flew (1983: 12 and 225).
33 Scruton (1996: 101-111 and 251-270). The philosophy of meaning has to incorporate theories of truth. Similarly, 
the idea that words and sentences need to correspond to experience has to incorporate notions of truth. To this 
end I will consider the Correspondence and Coherence theories of truth in this thesis.
15
When approaching meaning as a philosophical question it is crucial to be aware of the 
debates that have taken place, mostly in the field of theory of language. To begin with, 
Frege connects language and truth on the basis on three conclusions:
1. The unit of meaning is the sentence, which expresses a complete 
thought,
2. A sentence has a truth-value; and truth-value is the ‘preferred value’ of 
every meaningful sentence.
3. The thought expressed by a sentence is given by its truth-conditions: 
these are the conditions which determine when it is true.34
Following Frege, Stevenson, Grice, Searle, Davidson, Putman and Kripke (to name a 
few) have grappled with these ideas. But, as Scruton suggests, the question of truth “is 
less fundamental than ‘assertibility’” due to the fact that language cannot grasp or verify 
a transcendent notion of truth, therefore meaning could refer to a lesser claim of 
assertibility.35 Scruton does, however, make an interesting point when he asserts that 
the debates surrounding Frege’s philosophy of language do not consider the function of 
language beyond literal meaning. He argues:
Metaphors, for example, introduce a wholly new dimension of meaning. A 
metaphor does not describe a connection so much as create it. It may be 
full of contradictions, and yet mean all the more on account of it:
I have no spur
To prick the sides of my intent, but only
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Vaulting ambition, which o’erleaps itself
And falls on the other side
The concentration of meaning in that tumble of equestrian images goes far 
beyond the sense and reference of the terms.36
Following these claims, I argue that Nāgārjuna’s assertion about meaning in MK 24:14 
and VV70 is better understood if viewed within framework that utilises metaphoricity in 
the form used in the PPM. My application of the philosophy of meaning and analytical 
reasoning, however, does  take cognisance of the fact that Nāgārjuna lived and worked 
within an Indian philosophical framework. Indian philosophy is founded on the 
understanding that knowledge and truth are experienced. Indian philosophy gives 
primacy to experience, with regard to the non-Āryan /Vedic traditions.37 In these 
traditions, and consequently in Nāgārjuna’s writing, Truth is not represented as an 
abstract or conceptual condition and therefore cannot be approached purely from a 
Rationalist point of view.
Based on his Indic assumptions, Nāgārjuna argues in MK 24:14 and VV 70 that 
conceptual phenomena or mental phenomena imposed with conceptual meaning make 
sense due to the experience of phenomena as śūnyatā/pratītyasamutpāda. In Chapter 
Two of this thesis, I argue that his notion of śūnyatā can only be understood from the 
perspective of the PPM, where śūnyatā is likened to the experience of ākāśa.  But he is 
not merely arguing that truth is experienced. As a result of equating śūnyatā and 
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pratītyasamutpāda, the experience of emptiness leads to a semantic understanding of 
empty phenomena. In Chapters Three and Four I employ analytical philosophy and 
philosophy of meaning (as explained above) in order to establish whether MK 24: 14 
and VV 70 make rational sense in terms of  Nāgārjuna’s combining the meditational 
experience of śūnyatā with an understanding of pratītyasamutpāda. Nāgārjuna applies 
prasaṅga reasoning to show that purely conceptual reasoning (i.e. reasoning that does 
not employ metaphoricity) is absurd. But he claims in MK 24: 14 and VV 70 that 
conventional or conceptual truth ( truth based on fixed sign to object relations) makes 
sense if viewed in relation to non-conceptual/paramārtha truth without offering reasoned 
argument in support. This thesis therefore assesses Nāgārjuna’s claims about 
phenomena making sense in terms of śūnyatā in terms of analytical reasoning and the 
symbolic functioning of meaning in relation to experience.
In applying the functioning of experience with reasoning to understanding Nāgārjuna’s 
thought it is necessary to draw on the Indic understanding of experience. Western 
thought tends to conflate experience with perception.38 The Indian view of experience, 
by contrast, separates experience and perception. Perception is associated with belief 
                                                  
38 A good example of the conflation of experience and perception is seen in the writings of Hume, such 
as: 
For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some 
particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or 
pleasure, colour or sound, etc. I never catch myself, distinct from some such perception. 
(2000) . 
Some Western philosophical schools, such as Phenomenology, have gone some distance in 
correcting this mistaken confluence of experience with perception.
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in Indian thought, particularly in Buddhist philosophy. When perceptions of experience 
become fixed in the mind, an incorrect belief about the experience develops. 
Nevertheless Indian philosophy is certainly not immune from such a mistaken 
confluence. In Chapter Four, I delve into a similar error, made by the Abhidharmists  in 
confusing the perception of a thing’s function with its nature. I argue that a significant 
part of Nāgārjuna’s philosophy of establishing meaning is devoted to correcting the 
mistaken perceptions of phenomena that were being promulgated in early Buddhist 
traditions.
3. Contribution to existing research
Nāgārjuna scholarship falls generally into three categories: historical, translation-
commentary and philosophical. These three broad categories are not discrete; in fact, 
most Nāgārjuna scholarship contains elements from all three categories, with only the 
emphasis leaning either toward historical contextualization, translation-commentary or 
philosophical analysis. Most recently, the historical approach is exemplified by Joseph 
Walser, Nāgārjuna in context: Mahāyāna Buddhism & early Indian culture. 39But 
Walser’s impressive book comes in the tradition of many other historical studies of 
Nāgārjuna, for example, Mabbett40 and Vetter.41 This scholarship has performed an 
important role because it establishes the contemporary philosophical issues within 
Buddhism, of which Nāgārjuna would have been aware and would have referred to. 
                                                  
39 2010.
40 1998.  Mabbett provides a useful contextual reading of Nāgārjuna, while also comparing him to poststructuralist 
and postmodern thinkers, such as Derrida.
41 1992.
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They provide a valuable resource for reading translations and commentaries of 
Nāgārjuna‘s texts, such as Garfield,42  Inada,43 Kalupahana,44 Lindtner45 and 
McCagney.46  Often a particular translation and commentary will carry the interpretive 
shadow of the translator’s philosophical leanings, such as Garfield who writes with a 
Tibetan influence. Historical approaches can alert us to areas of sectarian, theoretical or 
epoch-related interpretation, along the lines of Schweitzer’s study into the historical 
Jesus.47 However, historical contextualization can limit our understanding of a text by 
limiting the text to its temporal arena. Such a method may lead the results of the study 
to be situated in purely temporal terms, thereby attenuating the value of the text outside 
a narrowly circumscribed context.48This is particularly relevant in the case of Nāgārjuna, 
where the quiddity of the text is focused on insight into the nature of reality. Although it 
is a polemic against rival philosophical views, its primary focus is soteriological and 
therefore it grapples with fundamental ontological questions. Its purpose is far broader 
than winning doctrinal debates. The philosophical depth of the MK is diminished if it is 
read solely in relation to other contemporary Indian philosophical texts and sects. In 
addition, the MK should be read as a text with  a specific relationship to the foundation 
of Indian thought, in particular its questions about the nature of reality. Heidegger49
makes a telling remark in this regard: “Man’s nature,” we read, “is to be founded in 
relation to something else … to comprehend man one must transcend the specifically 
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48 As Schweitzer concludes in Quest for the historical Jesus, the historical Jesus is a mystery to the contemporary 
reader (1931: 478).
49 Heidegger, 1964: 20 & 22.
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and merely human, the subjective.” Modern applied sciences have disenabled and 
stripped us of meaning or, more accurately, what he terms the “ground of meaning” 
because their method emphasizes practical value to the detriment of speculation and in 
the process we have become alienated from our deepest experience of Being.
My study is historical in the radical sense in that it delves into the root ideas, which, I 
believe, informed Nāgārjuna’s thought.  I do not merely contextualize his usage of terms 
such as śūnyatā. I aver that historical and contextual approaches should identify 
specific relations with other related texts, but must also explore aspects that appear only 
as traces,  spectral glimpses,  only vaguely discernible in the text,  which may have 
almost faded from textual view, for example  MK 26:10, which deploys  a form of 
symbolic logic reminiscent of the PPM. In addition, I apply an analytical approach to 
inquire into the consistency of Nāgārjuna’s logic. Even though analytical philosophy is 
not reducible to logic or visa versa, the analytical approach is a useful tool, particularly 
at a propsitional level, to examine the function of logic.50 It is for this reason that this 
thesis participates, primarily, in the philosophical body of literature on Nāgārjuna.
Early philosophical approaches to Nāgārjuna, for example Murti51 and Ramanan,52  
attempted to achieve a broad understanding of his philosophy. For example, this is well 
exemplified by Murti when he explains the two main currents of Indian philosophy, one 
                                                  
50 In following an analytical approach I do not distance myself from the evidence a mystical 
element in Nāgārjuna’s writings particularly where he acknowledges the limits of conventional 
concepts (MK 15: 10) 
51 1955.
52 1978.
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having its source in the ātma-doctrine of the Upaniśads and the other in the anātma-
doctrine of Buddha. These currents conceive of reality in two distinct and mutually 
exclusive patterns. The Sāṃkhya and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, both holding the Veda as 
sacred, adhere to ātma-doctrine, which can be termed the substantive view of reality. 
Buddhists, on the other hand, advocate a doctrine of no-soul (anātman) and 
impermanence (anitya).53  With this broad brushstroke through the history of Indian 
thought, Murti indelibly draws his line on the canvas and sets his context. It is a context 
that other scholars have also used unproblematically, namely Raju.54 In opposition to 
such approaches, I ask whether it is meaningful to separate Buddhist and Vedic 
thinkers into two distinct camps. Can we safely assume that Nāgārjuna knew nothing of 
the Vedic tradition, that he had never studied or even heard any of the Upaniśads
recited? Did Buddhism not emerge within Indian philosophy out of the rejection of the 
Vedic tradition by the Upanisadic movement? Even if Nāgārjuna had rejected the notion 
of sat, can we say with absolute certainty that he was not in any way influenced by any 
idea or nuance in the Upaniśadic or Vedic tradition? A similar question can be posed 
about broad distinctions between Mahāyāna and Theravāda, as Schopen has 
highlighted.55 Garfield underscores this point when he states that the four arguments for 
causality mentioned by Nāgārjuna in MK 1:1 and 1: 2 are pretty standard in Indian 
thought, including Buddhist explanations.56
MK 1:1 Neither from itself, nor from another,
Nor from both,
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Nor without cause,
Does anything whatever, anywhere arise
MK1:2 There are four conditions efficient condition
Percept-object condition; immediate 
condition;
Dominant condition, just so
There is no fifth condition57
Indeed Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Cārvākas, Jains and Sāṃkhya, for example, all grapple with 
the same issues pertaining to causality and the relation between arising entities.
Some Indologists adopt a softer approach to Buddhist scholarship in general and 
Nāgārjuna studies in particular and do not make sweeping divisions between traditions. 
De Wijesekera 58 and Jennings,59 for example, examine Buddhist realizations against 
the backdrop of the knowledge from which it emerged and which Nāgārjuna would have 
been aware of. Cohen60 questions the distinct categorisation of Theravāda and 
Mahāyāna in Buddhist studies. Cohen and Schopen base their argument on the 
appropriate historical claims of Mahāyāna and Theravāda monks living in the same 
monastery. Similarly, if one can establish a context for the overlapping of Vedic and 
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non-Āryan/Buddhist ideas, then those claims are appropriate. Stafford Betty,61 Sprung62
and Tola & Dragonetti63 examine the MK in relation to the wider context of Indian Yoga. 
Critics in this category, using less rigid categories based on historical evidence, would 
no doubt be critical of philosophical approaches to Nāgārjuna that make comparisons 
between Deconstruction Theory and Buddhism in general, and Nāgārjuna in particular.  
They would complain that such analysis ignores too much of the culture of thought in 
order to establish a meaningful context in which to make comparisons. These
deconstuctionist scholars attempt to establish the human condition in a world liberated 
from metaphysics as a common context. They ask the questions that Heidegger urged 
us to address: those pertaining to the meaning of being and the search for the ground of 
being. They are daring and creative in their sweeping cross-cultural comparisons — a 
welcome relief from the constricting categorisation mentioned earlier. Their attempts, 
however, falter in the end because the insights of deconstruction differ markedly from 
the conclusions of  Nāgārjuna’s philosophical process. The reason for their differing 
results is that their cultural assumptions differ markedly from Nāgārjuna’s. 
Some of these comparisons fall into the category of Buddhist-Christian dialogue, for 
example Corless;64 but the majority participate in broader East-West philosophical 
dialogues and focus specifically on comparing deconstructive thinkers and Mahāyāna
Buddhists. The body of writers that make comparisons between Buddhist and 
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poststructuralist thought is numerous, including Magliola,65 Loy,66 Coward,67 Mabbet,68
Glass69 It is my contention that such comparisons are inappropriate because they 
conflate terms without regard for the cultural worlds from which they originate. 
Deconstruction’s founding position is one where subject and authors are fragmented 
into a multiplicity of conflicting voices. It is a landscape of radically relativized and 
nomadic concepts. Nāgārjuna’s conceptual landscape, by contrast, is grounded on 
pratītyasamutpāda. Though devoid of an experiencing subject, its coordinates are 
orientated towards  the pursuit of insight through yoga.
In the MK Nāgārjuna deconstructs any position that is grounded in substantial or 
premises based on own-being. Any position that attempts to classify reality in a 
grounded or absolute way is questioned, but equally, any attempt to advocate a position 
of non-existence, arbitrary meaning or nihilism is dismissed. Nāgārjuna’s ‘middle path’ 
advocates a mental state – achieved through meditation – of non-clinging or non-
classification, termed either pratītyasamutpāda or śūnyatā. This ‘middle path’ is not so 
much a ‘ fixed view’ as the advocacy of a mentally fluid capacity to perceive co-
dependent arising as pre-eminent in the chain of causality. In order to experience 
‘things’ as arisen in a co-dependent manner we need, according to Nāgārjuna, a 
realization of their emptiness or non-essential nature.  Nevertheless, at a conventional 
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level ‘things’ or phenomena exist due to their classification as things. They exist in this 
way because they are co-dependently arisen. Finally, Nāgārjuna states that the 
conventional and the ultimate levels are equivalent, both ungrounded and 
conventionally existent.
On the surface poststructuralist writers, such as Glass,70seem to be offering similar 
ideas. They offer a non-grounded or non-substantive view by deconstructing assumed 
hierarchical values within language by unpacking the dyadic structure of language and 
highlighting the repressed term.  Deconstructionists aim to show that Western 
philosophy since Plato has always favoured the dominant term in a dyadic opposition. 
Once truth is established, the repressed term is silenced. Deconstructionists, such as 
Derrida, want to show the relation between the terms. The consequence of 
deconstruction’s project is a milieu where Truth, completion and presence are denied. 
To admit truth would be to grant one signifier a privileged position.
Nāgārjuna’s project is to deconstruct any form of substantialization in the form of mental 
clinging. The distinction between deconstruction and Nāgārjuna’s philosophy is a subtle 
one. For deconstruction, where there is presence there is substantialization, but 
Nāgārjuna was also aware that, where non-presence is advocated, there is mental 
clinging, which inevitably leads to substantialization. Where deconstruction foregrounds 
the constant deferral of meaning within language, Nāgārjuna exhorts us not simply to 
accept concepts, but to understand the set of relations that have conditioned each 
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concept into what it has historically become. In this sense Deconstruction is a product of 
post-Nietzschean Western thought, while Nāgārjuna is firmly entrenched in the Indian 
thought world of the second century, which emphasized yoga and its relation to 
understanding of the nature of reality. Coward writes,
For Buddhists, and Nāgārjuna in particular, language (including scripture) 
expresses merely imaginary constructions (vikalpa) that play over the 
surface of the real without giving us access to it.71
This is misleading because play in Nāgārjuna’s terms is not born from a dyadic 
opposition but, rather, a consequence of the co-dependent arising of all phenomena. 
For Nāgārjuna no phenomena arise at the expense of others.
Could a similar criticism be levelled against scholars using the philosophical approach 
who analyse Nāgārjuna ‘s writing using Western analytical tools of reason, such as 
Garfield,72 Siderits73 and Westerhoff74? The assumption made by these scholars is that 
both Buddhist and Western texts are written within a rubric of the strictures of rational 
argument and these strictures afford them their meaning. Nāgārjuna, in the MK for 
example, uses an Indian form of reasoning (prasaṅga) which appears to contradict the 
imagined dialogic partner. But this does not make him a rationalist or an ‘analytical’ 
philosopher. In this I agree with Jayatillike’s position that the Buddha was not a 
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rationalist philosopher.75  Nāgārjuna, however, does apply prasaṅga reasoning and 
criteria, thus unwittingly providing Western philosophers who are interested in Buddhism 
comparable substance to work with.  Garfield, Tillemans and Mario D’Amato76 offer a 
new development in the analytical approach to Buddhist philosophy, including 
Nāgārjuna scholarship, in observing that
A great deal of the most fruitful cross-cultural engagement has involved 
western philosophers generally regarded as analytical in bent attending to 
Buddhist philosophy, and scholars of Buddhist philosophy finding much of 
use in contemporary western philosophy written by those often 
donominated analysts. We will not speculate as to why this might be the 
case, but we do note that this engagement has been broad, encompassing 
work in logic, the philosophy of language, metaphysics, epistemology and 
ethics.77
One fruitful area of cross-cultural sharing lies in the fact that Nāgārjuna’s theory of 
causality (pratītyasamutpāda) offers interesting and useful ideas for Western analytical 
philosophy.  For instance,  Nārgārjuna’s use of the catuṣkoṭi in asserting that a 
phenomenon can simultaneously exist, not exist, both exist and not exist and neither 
exist nor not exist remains one of the most creative approaches to contradiction in either 
Western or Eastern traditions of philosophy.78 Garfield and Priest79 take the approach 
further when they explain that Nāgārjuna is doggedly analytical in his approach and 
therefore the fact that he asserts glaring contradictions is seen as evidence that he is 
committed to rationality.  They do not claim that Nāgārjuna  had explicit views about 
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logic. They do, however, think that Nāgārjuna’s views can be rationally reconstructed. 
They maintain that, while a cornerstone of Western rationality is consistency, certain 
Western thinkers, namely, Kant, Hegel, Heidegger and Derrida also incorporate 
contradiction as a methodological device to ease the weight brought to bear on thought 
by the demands of consistency.80 Nevertheless, other analytical philosophers, for 
example Westerhoff81 and Siderits,82 assess Buddhist philosophy, including Nāgārjuna’s 
thought, in terms of Western philosophical methods in an attempt to analyse the level of 
consistency in Buddhist thought.83 My methodological approach in this thesis finds most 
affinity with the latter. By contrast, Newland,84 Garfield85 and Dreyfus,86 for example, 
read Nāgārjuna by combining the Western analytical approach with a Candrakīrti and 
Tibetan reading of his work. These scholars are influenced by studies in the 1990s, 
which looked at the influence of Candrakīrti on early Indian Madhyamaka87  My thesis 
takes issue with this approach, which shifts the interpretation away from what I see as 
PPM-influenced assumptions in the text towards more Tibetan ones. Most importantly, 
the use of ākaśa in the PPM as a description of śūnyatā conceptually allows the claim in 
MK 24:14 and VV 70 that phenomena make sense in terms of śūnya to be understood 
as dependently related to the two-truths assertion in MK 24:8. Candrakīrti’s argument 
that the two truths represent different cognitive natures does not allow MK 24:14 and VV 
70 to be understood in relation to MK 24:8.
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4. Methodology
As stated above, Nāgārjuna does not only write within a Buddhist mindset:  his 
assumptions and conceptual framework occur within the broad Indic metaphysical and 
epistemological setting of his day. In order accurately to apply analytical reasoning and 
the philosophy of meaning, a method of reading his texts will be employed that is 
sensitive to the broad ambit of influences that impact on each text. For this reason my 
argument draws most on the work of the scholars I enumerate in the following section. 
Research on Nāgārjuna tends to take the form of studies concerning, for instance, his 
logical method or interpretations of chapters or verses in the MK, which highlight 
particular complexities or elucidations in his thought.88 Intrinsic to many of these studies 
is an emphasis on history and context.89  I believe, however, that Huntington90 is right 
when he utilizes De Jong and Reugg to argue that Western Buddhologists have been 
too concerned with historicization and too little with the Buddhist mentality. He writes 
that the nineteenth-century method of studying Buddhism continues into the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries by way of history, which attempted to understand the 
development of Buddhist thought by linking it to events, facts and historical data. He 
makes the point that Western academics place too much importance on what he calls 
‘historical dimensions’.  The problem with this approach is that  India’s  spiritual life 
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cannot be so easily compartmentalized  within historical contexts.91 The reason for this
historical approach is difficult to find, other than arguing that a cultural study requires 
sensitivity to difference and plurality. In this light  the Western mode of temporal 
analysis cannot be unilaterally used for the study of other cultures. The anthropologist 
Johannes Fabian, in his work, Time and the Other, makes the point that the 
anthropologist tends to deny the discrete uniqueness of the other and perceives others 
as synchronous with the researcher’s perceptions and emphases, thereby creating the 
impression of  “a common, active, ‘occupation’, or sharing, of time”.92 I would extend this 
argument to suggest that no one method of studying culture can be utilised uniformly for 
the study of all cultures, for this would be committing the offence against which Fabian 
warns us of denying the others’ cultural and ideational space. In a similar vein De Jong 
avers that Buddhologists need to study the “Buddhist mentality”.93 This is a possibility (if 
the Buddhologist happens to be Western) due to the communicability between different 
cultural ideational forms because all philosophers  share similar reasoning categories.94  
Nevertheless certain ideational forms exist within Buddhist thought and are found 
radically, that is at a root level within Indian culture, rather than within specific historical 
contexts. What I mean by radical history is an approach which operates from a far wider 
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ambit of understanding than the specific historical context, i.e. that of conditionality. The 
conditions which come to bear on events or a text are not only specific conditions, but 
rather interrelated causal effects, some specific and regional while other influences may 
be broader, fitting into more generalized cultural mindsets. Krüger,95 working from the 
naturalist/empiricist philosophical lineage of Hume, Whitehead, Jung and William 
James, argues that individual, society and Nature (Cosmos) are continually 
interpenetrating each other. Reality is a constantly changing network of interrelated 
factors. Individuals are indelibly connected to this interplay. Their shared sensory and 
intellectual experience is always a fluid reciprocal process. Krüger96 terms this process 
‘conditionalism’ because he believes that world-views and subjective views participate 
in a ‘dynamic interplay of interdependent, mutually conditioning forces and relations’. 
Cultures and philosophies are loosely identifiable systems that emerge from the fluid 
interaction between the three levels of the individual, society and Nature. Any attempt at 
understanding cultural or intellectual systems must, therefore, take into account the 
complex interpenetrating of factors which condition life-worlds and thought forms. The 
focus is on the regional aspect of the text or individual, rather than the tracing the exact 
processes of interaction of inter-regional and inter-cultural movement. Here  
Heidegger’s use of the terms `horizon’ and `field’ are useful because they confine the 
locus of study to what is empirically apparent; but Heidegger radicalizes the 
examination of a region by drawing attention to the multiplicity of factors which condition 
and form our scholarly perception of it.97 With this in mind, I will explore the Buddhist 
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mindset that informed Nāgārjuna‘s thought, but in order to do so I will gather influences 
from yogic that is pre- and non-Aryan thinking that helped condition his thought. I will 
examine one of these thought-forms in India, namely the two-tiered structure of gross 
and subtle mental states, and explore how this thought pattern assisted in conditioning 
Nāgārjuna’s philosophical texts. In this light I will draw from the understanding of 
reciprocity in Huntington’s work. Although Huntington equates De Jong’s and Reugg’s 
methodological approaches, I think Reugg improves De Jong’s argument when he 
suggests that there is ‘no hard and fast dividing line ... between the philosophical and 
religious in either India or Tibet, for instance a term such as dharma is found in both 
Buddhism and Hinduism which is a foundational term in both Hinduism and 
Buddhism’.98 To extrapolate on Reugg’s point, our examination of thought forms such as 
the gross-subtle formulation or the two-truths formulation should not focus only on the 
Buddhist mentality, but should also take cognizance of  a looser, less rigidly confined 
Indian Yoga mentality, with its roots in non-Aryan culture, which in itself is constantly 
subject to change and dynamism due to its relationship with other cultures and thought 
forms. 
A text’s identity, positioning and relevance are established both consciously and 
unconsciously by drawing elements from its thought culture. All texts must remember 
and pay homage to its larger thought-world culture in order reside within the horizons of  
cognate discourse.
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Krüger99 introduces the helpful metaphor of collages to describe what I mean by 
cognate textuality.
The internal conditionalistic pluralism of a group includes the collage 
character of its ideas, practices and forms of organisation: they form a 
collection, with components deriving from various sources. Groups borrow 
(and steal) if an item appears to be necessary, useful or attractive. In a 
conditionalistic perspective, real, historical, concrete religions are 
composites, putting-together from various sources. Technically speaking, 
they are all syncretistic. This makes for heterogeneity as far as the 
collection as a whole is concerned, and for ambiguity as far as the 
constituent items are concerned. They may form a pleasing whole to their 
adherents or a jarring jumble to their detractors. Meaning is con-text.100
These collages are, according to Krüger, developed from ‘complex whirlwinds’.  He 
writes:
[t]he multi-factoral interaction between groups adds up to more than a 
jumble of events. As much as individual groups would insist on their own 
identities and would insist on their own identities and would take pains to 
appear and to be different from others, there is also a mutual attraction, a 
collective constitution of a shared world, a mutual interpenetration, a larger 
‘identity’ in some stage of being in the making or of breaking up.101
These whirlwinds, I argue, are conditioned consciously and unconsciously by the mind 
to appear ‘real, concrete and historical’ and what results is an ostensible thought-world 
culture.  If we view this narrowly, it will appear ordered, but it will appear increasingly 
chaotic the broader our view becomes. Herein lie the two most important elements of 
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thought-worlds: their conditioned existence, contrived through perception and the 
complex interplay between coherence and chaos manifested as contradiction.
5. Conclusion
In looking at parallels between the PPM’s use of ākāśa and Nāgārjuna’s identification of 
pratītyasamutpāda with śūnyatā in this thesis, I will assess the consequence of 
indiscernibility of concepts and phenomena on his assertions and the need to 
incorporate the PPM’s use of metaphoricity to clarify the failings of indiscernibility in his 
thought to produce meaning.
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CHAPTER TWO
Ākāśa in Nāgārjuna’s thought
1. Introduction
In the previous chapter I set out the central problem of the thesis, namely that 
Nāgārjuna asserts in MK 24: 14 and VV 70 that all phenomena are meaningful if one 
understands śūnyatā, but unfortunately does not explain how he reaches this 
conclusion. I indicated that Edward Conze’s argument regarding Nāgārjuna’s 
philosophical connection to the PPM is helpful in finding a solution to this problem, 
despite the problem of establishing an historical link between MK and the PPM, 
because he points convincingly to the similarities between the PPM and Nāgārjuna’s 
thought. Nancy McCagney develops Conze’s argument by arguing that the meaning 
of ākāśa as experiential openness in the PPM corresponds with Nāgārjuna’s use of 
śūnyatā in the MK. My argument is that ākāśa, as used in the PPM, provides a basis 
for understanding Nāgārjuna’s assertions in MK 24: 14 and VV 70, using 
metaphorical logic, that the experience of the indeterminacy of phenomena points to 
the akasic aspect of śūnyatā.
This chapter is concerned with a sub-problem that emerges from the central problem 
of Nāgārjuna’s paucity of explanation regarding why an understanding of śūnyatā 
makes phenomena meaningful. The sub-problem is: if phenomena make sense with 
a clear understanding of śūnyatā, under what conditions does a clear understanding 
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of śūnyatā emerge? In this regard I follow McCagney’s argument that śūnyatā
described as ākāśa is founded on experiences in meditation. Hence, my theoretical 
solution to this particular problem is that a clear understanding of śūnyatā occurs in 
meditation with the experience of meditational objects (or the experience of 
observing phenomena during meditation). In this regard I will focus on certain  
aspects of Nāgārjuna’s use of the term śūnyatā that suggest a description of 
meditative experience akin to the PPM’s use of ākāśa denoting the immeasurable 
and boundless state of mind where there is nothing to settle in (anālaya) and nothing 
to grasp (anāgrahā)1 to describe the akasic experience of immeasurability and 
boundlessness. 
Most of Nāgārjuna’s writing takes the form of logical arguments against the 
Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas, who maintained that certain experiences of 
elements of phenomena (or dharmas) reflect the reality of those phenomena. 
Nāgārjuna maintained that their arguments exhibited the flaw of imposing svabhāva
onto phenomena, which ran contrary to the Buddha’s teachings of insubstantiality as 
encapsulated in the notion of anattā. He follows the Mahāyāna trend of elevating 
śūnyatā to Absolute reality (although it could be argued that for Nāgārjuna emptiness 
is not an absolute): but, for him, śūnyatā becomes paradoxical.  It implies contrasting 
senses as change, no change, no origination, no cessation, no coming, no going, 
neither self nor no-self.2 Nāgārjuna is not merely arguing that all phenomena are 
empty of own-being, he is making a profound point – despite the contradictory nature 
of śūnyatā, phenomena make sense due to their indeterminacy. Yet for Nāgārjuna 
                                                
1 See Conze’s translations of Rgs 15: 8 (1990: 37) and The Questions of Suvikarantavikrāmin (1973: 
38).  
2 MK 1 gives a clear outline of these paradoxes.
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this claim is unexplored.
This chapter argues that Nāgārjuna’s claim that phenomena makes sense due to an 
understanding of śūnyatā is gleaned from the meditative experience of 
indeterminacy and supported by rational analysis of phenomena.3 Such an argument 
resembles the PPM’s logic, which is founded, not on reason, but on the meditative 
experience of akasic boundlessness. While his writing is presented as dialectical 
argument against his opponents, scholars such as Conze and McCagney argue that 
his motivation is to explain the doctrine of the PPM.4 It is difficult to prove this claim 
and, as a consequence, the historical links made between the PPM and Nāgārjuna
are purely speculative. But what Conze and McCagney do by highlighting the 
similarities between the PPM and Nāgārjuna’s thought is to establish  that both offer 
a view of Buddhist thought so sufficiently different from early Buddhism to warrant an 
explanation and inference of non-Buddhist influence. But this is not the concern of 
the present thesis. Significant for the philosophical issues of this thesis is that both 
the PPM and Nāgārjuna claim that phenomena are identical or equivalent to śūnyatā
and that this realization is based on meditational experience.5 In Nāgārjuna’s 
thought, for example, there are aspects that seem not to form part of a logical 
argument and seem to be descriptive of a meditative state of mind of non-
discriminating open spatiality. The most obvious of these statements are those made 
in the MK that describe a state where nothing occurs, where things both exist and do 
                                                
3 Conze writes that the neglect of the importance of meditating on emptiness in Madhyamaka by 
writers such as Murti presents an inaccurate belief that  Nāgārjuna derived his thought from 
philosophical reasoning, “when in fact they derive from meditational experience” (1967; 22).
4 McCagney (1997: 22).
5  Harvey (2005: 97-98 and 103).
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not exist and whereof nothing can be stated6. But he does not offer instructions for 
meditative practice that resemble Buddhaghosa’s VisuddhiMagga in texts ascribed 
to him. He does, however present a way of viewing phenomena that requires yoga 
(practice and discipline), and that, he claims, results in peace of mind.7 This chapter 
explores the description of objects of meditative experience, in Nāgārjuna’s writings, 
as a set of complex (non-linear), fluid and interrelated ideas. I argue that his 
representation of meditative objects in his writing establishes the condition for 
meaning for the correct understanding of reality. 8
In order to comprehend Nāgārjuna’s understanding of meditative objects,9 it is 
helpful to understand the paradoxical factors contributing to Nāgārjuna’s 
understanding of śūnyatā, e.g. while something arises, nothing arises and while 
things arise due to conditions, no conditions exist.10 Nāgārjuna’s paradoxical 
conception of śūnyatā shares many of the tenets of the analogy of śūnyatā in PPM 
as ākāśa e.g. while the experience of ākāśa can be identified, nothing specific can 
be uttered about the experience.11
                                                
6 MK 15: 6, 24:1 and 25:2 4.
7 MK 1:1, 5:8, 18:9, 24: 8 and 25: 24.
8 Nāgārjuna’s understanding of reality will be explored in depth in chapters Four and Five. The 
argument in these chapters is that reality is all-inclusive, renouncing nothing of it perceiving it in the 
correct manner.  
9 “Meditative objects” refers to any sensory experience during meditation, including mental objects.  
The mind is the sixth sense in Indian thought and generates mental “objects” during contemplative 
states. See the Mahasatipatthana sutta, specifically the Eighth and Ninth Meditations on mindfulness 
of mind and phenomena. But for Nāgārjuna the meditative object is dependently originated and 
therefore cannot be seen in isolation from other phenomena.
10 MK 1.
11 The Dharma should be attained as nothing to settle in (anālaya) and nothing to grasp (anāgrahā) 
(Conze 1967: 37, Rgs xv, 8).
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The PPM is an amalgam of meditative experience, mythology and reflective Wisdom. 
Its ideas derive from non-Āryan culture but are not distinctively Buddhist from the 
point of view of early (agamic) Buddhism. McCagney follows Conze, in arguing that 
the roots of the PPM lie in Palaeolithic Mother Goddess worship that originated in 
Southern India.12 While this argument is, again, difficult to support due to lack of 
evidence, it does present a hypothetical solution to the PPM’s possible non-Buddhist 
influences which led to the idea of emptiness distinct from agamic Buddhism in that 
śūnyatā is evident in everything and not limited to the wisdom of the arhat.13
Similarly, Nāgārjuna’s understanding of meditational objects is characterised by 
fluidity, interdependence and equivalence between conditionalism and non-
conditionalism (saṃsāra and nirvāṇa) due to their co-origination.14 According to 
Nāgārjuna, any view that is held to be more correct than any other view is 
emblematic of erroneous thinking. Reality cannot be grasped by (or within) a thought 
system that discriminates and separates in this way. The experience of the śūnyatā
of meditational objects is inexpressible in reductionist terms. 15
In order to explore Nāgārjuna’s representation of meditative objects, I will   develop 
the argument advanced by Nancy McCagney, who highlights three concepts that 
                                                
12 Conze, 1967: 125
13 Harvey, 2005: 96.
14 It bears noting here that Conze makes a distinction between two emphases in Mahāyāna on the 
path to spiritual realisation between prajñā and dhyāna. He argues that Madyamaka emphasised 
prajñā and Yogācāra, dhyāna (1967: 144). While this distinction might be true, it would be incorrect to 
then assume that Madhyamikans did not integrate meditation into their spiritual practice as he 
confirms earlier in the same text on page 22.
15 MK 27 Newland and Tillemans (in Westerhoff et al 2011: 20) identify the development of
intentional objects in later Buddhist thought. Meditational objects are similar to intentional objects in 
that intentional objects can be used as objects of meditation to assist the subject to realise their 
emptiness.
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define the emergent sense of śūnyatā in the PPM.  These are: apratīhistita (not 
settling down), anālaya (nothing to settle in) and anāgrahā (nothing to grasp).16 In 
the early sections of the PPM śūnyatā as nothing to settle in (anālaya) and nothing to 
grasp (anāgrahā) is likened to akāśa, particularly in the Aṣṭasāhasrikā (Aṣṭa), 
Ratnakūta (Rt) and the Ratnagunasamcayagātha (Rgs) sutras.17 The meditative 
experience is likened to akāśa in these texts because of its sense of expansiveness, 
non-discriminateness and ineffableness.18 McCagney argues that Nāgārjuna’s 
understanding of śūnyatā shares these three attributes due to the fact that he 
identifies śūnyatā with pratītyasamutpāda, (the originless co-origination of all 
phenomena) which encapsulates the interdependent and fluid nature of all 
phenomena.19
McCagney translates śūnyatā as “openness” to capture the akasic qualities of the 
meditational experience of śūnyatā in the PPM. She then also translates śūnyatā in 
the MK also as openness to show that the translation in both cases works 
semantically.  Openness is a useful translation of śūnyatā because it expresses the 
cognitive and linguistic understanding of wisdom in the PPM, in which objects in the 
sensory world point to the experience of akasic śūnyatā when viewed meditatively, 
without the mind imposing any factors. The akasic experience of phenomena (in 
terms of the PPM) and the indiscernibility of phenomena (in terms of Nāgārjuna’s 
thought), which are conveyed by the experience of openness in meditation, prevent 
the experience of phenomena being confused with their perceived metaphysical 
                                                
16 McCagney (1997: 22).
17 McCagney (1997: 22).
18 McCagney (1997:22) and Conze (1990: 181).
19 McCagney (1997: 58).
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function.20 The result of this confusion leads to the world’s objects erroneously 
acquiring metaphysical properties.21 Instead, I will argue that, in Nāgārjuna’s thought, 
a sense of openness gives meaning to the phenomenal world.
In this chapter, therefore, I return to Conze’s discovery of similarity between the PPM 
and Nāgārjuna’s MK to show how ākāśa is used in the PPM to direct attention away 
from a limited and finite view of phenomena towards an infinite experience of ākāśa
and how a similar pattern exists in Nāgārjuna’s thought in the form of linking śūnyatā 
to pratītyasamutpāda.  In order to achieve this, I distinguish between meditative 
objects and reified objects.  Meditative objects are experienced within the inclusive 
scope of the complex and interconnected relations between phenomena, while 
reified objects result when one views phenomena based on distinctiveness and 
distinguishing characteristics, which develop into metaphysical attributes. This latter 
process “brings forth” a fictitious world based on ignorance, where sensory data are 
projected onto abstract categories and function as metaphors for abstract categories, 
leading to confusion between what a thing is and its perceived function. By contrast, 
as I argue in Chapter Four, meditative objects are metaphors for śūnyatā, and the 
world that is “brought forth” by these metaphors is fluid and empty of metaphysical 
                                                
20 Anderson argues that Kalupahana’s view of Nāgārjuna’s position regarding nirvāṇa’s identity with 
saṃsāra emphasises a positivistic interpretation of the Buddha’s teachings rather than an indication 
of  tension in Nāgārjuna’s interpretation of the Buddha’s teachings concerning the nature of the self 
(1990). He argues that the oceanic experience of Wisdom cannot be described, which inclines 
towards positivism. But Anderson argues that that does not mean that depth of understanding beyond 
empirical presentation does not exist (1990: 6). My argument is that the gap between enlightened 
knowledge and empirical knowledge is bridged by the use of metaphoric logic as evinced in the PPM.
21 My argument is that śūnyatā gives rise to specific and transient characteristics. This position 
stands in opposition to the view that the two truths formulation asserts two types of truth, conventional 
and absolute. In this interpretation conventional truth is viewed as merely established via mutual 
consent. My argument, based on Nāgārjuna’s statements in MK 24:14 and VV 70, is that saṃvṛti is 
perceived as expressing qualities precisely due to its fundamental śūnya status.
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qualities and fixed categories.22
In this chapter I will show how Nāgārjuna sets up the framework for identifying 
śūnyatā with pratītyasamutpāda as the central condition of all meaning.  This is 
achieved via statements that are meditationally inspired, rather than linguistically and 
logically developed. These meditational statements show strong resonance with 
references to akasic experiences in the PPM. They point to the experience of 
meditational objects as fluid and non-reductive, so that the experience is separate 
from the perceived functions of these objects. In this way the mind is able to 
experience the emptiness of objects. 
The chapter has four sections. First, I trace the textual roots of the non-Āryan yoga 
tradition in the PPM and Nāgārjuna’s thought. Second, I focus on the philosophical 
ideas of non-dualism and dualism, which emerged from textual expressions of yoga, 
and their impact on Nāgārjuna’s argument. Thirdly, I show how descriptive 
statements, derived from the meditative experience of ākāśa, about the nature of 
reality provide ground for Nāgārjuna’s philosophy of saṃsāra, its equivalence with 
nirvāṇa  and the identity of pratītyasamutpāda and śūnyatā. Finally I explore yoga in 
Nāgārjuna’s writings in relation to the akasic elements in the PPM in order to explore 
how he avoids the philosophical pitfalls associated with dualism and non-dualism. 
                                                
22 See Newland and Tillemans’s distinction between the translation of satya as truth when referring to 
an object and its semantic notion (in Westerhoff et al 2011: 4-50).
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2. The impact of the Indian tradition of Yoga on the PPM and on 
Nāgārjuna’s thought 
The origins of yoga are unclear. There is archaeological evidence in the form of 
carved statues, depicting figures in meditative position, found in the Indus valley 
dating back as far as 3000 BCE and perhaps further back in history.23 The early 
inhabitants of Mohenjo-daro and Harappa, as well as the surrounding network of 
cities, were neither Hindu nor Āryan.24 Little is known about their culture or what 
caused their demise, so very little can be deduced from the seated figures. Yet from 
their artefacts that remain we can observe evidence of meditative practice in the 
form a seated figure in yoga posture and an earth mother figure. Clearer evidence of 
yoga traditions is found in the Atharvaveda, Puranas and Tantras, which provide lists 
of mantras. These are bīja (seed) mantras that, when repeated, focus and still the 
mind so that the “practitioner appropriates its essence”.25 There is, therefore, 
evidence that yoga existed in Āryan traditions, either separately from non-Āryan
traditions or influenced by them. Evidence of yoga is also found in both early and 
later forms of Buddhism. The PPM is a Buddhist example of a bīja mantra, where the 
root, pram, contains the truth of the “eternal void”.26
Conze argues for a link between the PPM and earth mother worship by asserting 
                                                
23  This figure has been termed the “proto-Shiva” (Kulke and Rothermund 1986: 2). 
24  There is an argument which stems from Indian nationalist sources (Aurobindo (1992) and 
Dayananda) that posits an Indian origin for Indo-European culture, rather than the more accepted 
position of Aryan migration around 1500 BCE. A recent proponent of this hypothesis is Frawley 
(2010).
25 Eliade (1970: 215).
26Eliade (1970: 215) and Conze (1973: 10).
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that earth mother worship existed  in matriarchal Dravidian South Indian culture 
(such as in Savaism’s association with Śakti). Here a link with yoga through 
inwardness, intuition and contemplation is possible. As opposed to the male 
iconography connected to Northern Buddhism in the form of the male founder, the 
PPM contains female iconography and the celestial Boddhisattva Taras, born of the 
protector and all-compassionate Avalokitaśvara, who is usually depicted as bare 
from the waist and full-breasted.  In addition, the PPM is written in the feminine 
grammatical form.27 In contrast to the male sense of the Buddha as father-founder of 
the religion, the PPM is seen as a form of Wisdom that is approached intuitively. The 
logic used is contemplative rather than argumentative. Learning is achieved through 
identification with its message and by absorbing its knowledge.28
While it is very difficult to prove a link between early earth mother worship in South 
India and the PPM due to a lack of archaeological evidence, there is a “feminine” 
sense of śūnyatā articulated in the PPM as non-measurable, boundless, all-
encompassing and open. Ākāśā is used in the PPM to encapsulate śūnyatā in all 
these senses. The PPM’s interpretation of śūnyatā is significant because it is 
undoubtedly at variance with older forms of Buddhism in its feminine metaphoricity 
rather than the more masculine, agamic Buddhism. 
I argue that the common assumption concerning yoga, in both the Hindu and 
Buddhist traditions, is that the mind should be made tranquil for it to perceive Truth. 
The predominant example of this is found in the Yoga Sūtras (1.2). The Yoga Sūtras
                                                
27 Conze (1967:80 and 243).
28 Conze (1967: 80).
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were compiled by Patañjali between the fifth and the second centuries BCE.  The 
Śūtras train the mind to observe movements of thought and actions in the mind and 
then to correct these actions (Iyengar 1993: 2). In psychological terms, vṛttis (mental 
agitations) are observed and stilled. Bringing the mind to a state of stillness allows 
samāpatti to take place, which is coming face to face with the Self.  This sounds 
reminiscent of the process of rtavrdhah in Rg 1.2, which implies, according to 
Aurobindo, contact with the Truth or touching, leading to Truth-consciousness.29 In 
order to be able to observe the operations of the mind, the practitioner needs to be 
able to distinguish between gross and subtle mind.  Here a two-tiered approach is 
adopted, which prefigures the distinction made by Kapila (the founder of Sāṃkhya) 
between Puruṣa and Prakṛti.  It seems that a two-tiered formulation is important for 
Yogic practice because, for the mind to be tranquil, it must be able to rest in a state 
that does not cling. In this state, when agitated thoughts have ceased, the mind is 
able to observe sensory impressions without allowing them to affect its equanimity.  
In other words, i.e. Prakṛti must be observed from Puruṣa (Yoga Sūtra 1.3).   
Similarly, in Nāgārjuna’s MK, saṃvṛti must be seen in relation to paramārtha.30 In 
both philosophies, the two tiers of the mind function together and the practitioner is 
led ultimately to perceive the distinctiveness and the complementarity between them. 
Therefore the two tiers of mind are more accurately rendered as two truths, which 
the mind apprehends in Nāgārjuna’s thought. In the Yoga Sūtras atmā is the inward 
aspect of mind, which is identified with the soul and the seer, and citta is associated 
with the outward phase of the mind, namely the created or sensorily constructed 
                                                
29  Aurobindo (1992: 72).
30 MK 24: 6 & 7.
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consciousness.  Chapter 4 v 25 of the Yoga Sūtras reads:
For one who realises the distinction between citta and atmā, the sense 
of separation between the two disappears.31
This paradoxical statement implies that, when one perceives mental fluctuations as 
insubstantial in themselves, the distinction between them and their source 
disappears. In MK 18: 7 these two aspects of truth are rendered as follows: 
Unrisen and unceased, like nirvāṇa is the nature of things.32
The common thread that runs through the two quotations from the Yoga Sūtras and 
the MK is that spiritual realisation is seen as interdependently related to mental and 
worldly activity. This conceptual thread is also found in the PPM. A common motif in 
PPM sūtras is a focus on experienced reality as a way to attain Wisdom, founded on 
the experience of the akasic emptiness of objects. Verse 13 of the Vajraccedika 
Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra reads:
The Buddha asked, “What do you think, Subhuti? World honoured One, 
is there nothing about which the Tathāgata preaches?” 
Subhuti replied, “The Tathāgata has nothing to teach, World Honoured 
One.”
“What do you think, Subhuti? Are there many particles of dust in the 
3000 chiliocosms Universes)?”
“Very many, World-Honoured One.”
“Subhuti, the Tathāgata says that these particles of dust are not 
particles of dust that is why they are truly particles of dust. And what the 
Tathāgata calls chiliocosms are not in fact chiliocosms. That is why they 
are called chiliocosms.”33
                                                
31 In Iyengar (1993: 257).
32 MK18: 7 in McCagney (1997: 182).
33 Suzuki (1935: 27). It is interesting to note that some translations of this verse (specifically Conze
(1973) and Cleary (1991)) translate the verse along the lines “that the universe is not the universe, it 
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This verse points through paradox to the fact that a particle only really makes sense 
when the perceiver fully grasps the nature of the infinite that comprises it. The logic 
that underlies the Buddha’s questions to Subhuti is directing his thought to the 
awareness that objects’ distinctiveness is due, paradoxically, to their emptiness. 
Indiscernibility, oddly, brings about discernibility; and conversely, discernibility leads 
to an awareness of emptiness, rather than acting as a veil that hides the reality of 
emptiness. The implication of this logic is that by meditating on the interdependent 
and relational character of the phenomenal world, wisdom concerning the nature of 
reality will be attained.34 This logic is also utilised by Nāgārjuna in MK 24: 14, and 
needs careful scrutiny. Following the PPM, Nāgārjuna asserts that saṃvṛti can be 
utilised as a tool to experience and understand śūnyatā. Saṃvṛti is without purpose, 
meaning or value; but if it is approached from a standpoint of pratītyasamutpāda, 
objects are shown to be necessarily śūnya, resulting in the mind not having to 
become stressed or agitated by either negating the perception of the object or 
substantialising it. But if the mind approaches objects from the starting point of belief 
in fixed concepts and substantial bodies, this will reveal discordance and conflict in 
thought due to the contradictions that result from sustaining these positions.
It is now clear why Nāgārjuna is so often hailed as the founder of Mahāyāna. His 
assertion that a peaceful mind is dependent on ceasing to project concepts onto 
                                                                                                                                                       
is called the universe” (Cleary 1998: 112). This translation does contradict the fundamental 
Mādhyamāka position of identity between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. It slips into the Tibetan interpretation, 
followed by Candrakīrti, of upholding a distinction between the two truths. I will explore this issue in 
more detail in chapters 3 and 4.
34 This type of logic is recurrent in the Diamond Sutra.  See also Chapter 6 (of the Diamond Sutra), 
where Sabhuti argues that the Buddha taught no trends of thought, “[t]herefore they are called trends 
of thought” (Conze 1973: 134). This line of logic is maintained throughout the Diamond Sutra.
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phenomena is not world-denying: rather, it underscores the recognition of 
equivalence between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa since everything is empty of own-being 
and therefore worthy of functioning as an intentional meditational object.35 The flow 
of phenomena across the mind’s eye becomes, in later Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna, 
the bījas for developing higher states of awareness through examination of the 
inherent śūnyatā of phenomena and the relations between phenomena. Nāgārjuna’s 
identification of śūnyatā with pratītyasamutpāda means that the dependent 
origination of phenomena, together with sensory instruments of perception, is an 
integral part of tattva. The universal reach of dependent origination means that no 
particular view can do justice to its vast interrelatedness and the interdependency of 
sensory instruments and the objects of knowledge (prameya).36 This is why the MK 
avers – in chapters 24 and 27 respectively – that the Buddha did not teach anything 
and that there is no view. 
In both Patañjali’s yoga and the Buddha’s teaching, nirodha is central. Nirodha is 
used both by the Buddha in the third noble truth and Patañjali in the Yoga sūtras 1.2. 
But nirodha does not imply a rejection of world’s phenomena. Indeed, in later 
Buddhist philosophy, the awareness of tattva is enabled through the nirodha of 
experience and perception. David Brazier’s celebrated book, Zen Therapy (2001), 
argues that the term nirodha suggests protection or containment against agitation. 
He bases his argument on the dissection of the term into ”rodha” or “earth bank” and 
“‘ni” meaning “tie down”.37 The term suggests protection from the consequences of a 
                                                
35 MK (Dedication); MK 5: 18; MK 18: 9 and MK 25: 24.
36 Garfield, J.L., in Westerhoff et al (2011: 28).
37 Brazier (2001: 91).
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part of the mind that misinterprets the phenomena of the mind. In both the Buddha’s 
and Patañjali’s teaching, the result of nirodha suggests a withdrawal from sensory 
perception, but not necessarily a collapse of consciousness or  a cessation of the 
duality of subject and object that is constitutive of individual consciousness.38
Nāgārjuna’s use of nirodha in MK 26: 11 and12 follows the basic yogic idea that 
ignorance is the root of saṃsāra and that yogic bhāvanā should be based on true 
knowledge of phenomena.39 But the practice of meditation, for Nāgārjuna, develops 
the skill of perceiving the interdependence between phenomena or between what is 
perceived and the processes of perception. Bhāvanā is, for Nāgārjuna, continuous 
reflection and interaction with saṃvṛti without the idea of an underlying substantial 
soul, Self or a dualistic relationship between the self and the world.   His 
understanding of yoga, therefore, differs from the dualism of sāṃkhya/yoga and the 
Advaitā Vedānta of Śankara because, rather than rejecting or transcending the 
physical world, Nāgārjuna reinterprets saṃvṛti so that it is free of mental impositions. 
Garfield interprets MK 17: 15-17 to mean that, in order to abandon attachment to 
habitual mental impositions on phenomena, i.e. ‘confusing existence with inherent 
existence’, one needs to engage in “extensive meditation on the nature of 
phenomena and causal factors that bring about its emergence”.40 Here the emphasis 
is on the fact that all that exists in reality are emerging and ceasing phenomena 
                                                
38 Garfield argues that phenomena are conventionally true.  In his view, a mirage is not an illusion, it 
is an actual mirage. A mirage is only deceptive if it is mistaken for water (in Westerhoff et al, 2011: 
30).
39 McCagney (1997: 212).
40 Garfield (1995: 236-237).
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without essence.  In his 1995 text, The Fundamental Wisdom of the middle way: 
Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā Garfield argues for the identity of saṃvṛti and 
paramārtha based on the logic that saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are only concepts and 
neither actually exists.41 Here he is slipping into a non-dualistic model, which will 
eventually result in the denial of perceptual events. Recently, though, Garfield has 
altered his position, saying that, while a mirage is an illusion, it is an actual 
perceptual event. I understand this to mean that, on careful observation, it may be 
divested of imposed metaphysical attributes.42 This example uses perceptual illusion 
to demonstrate that saṃvṛti is never anything other than illusory in itself, but with 
meditation it is perceived in relation to paramārtha. 
Meditative objects are both limited and unlimited. For Nāgārjuna, the limited scope of 
saṃvṛti can be used by analytical thought and meditation to perceive and experience 
ultimate truth.43 In this way, saṃvṛti can be used as a means of communication to 
point to paramārtha. Śūnyatā can be experienced in saṃvṛti if limited views (i.e. 
saṃvṛti) are understood to point beyond themselves to dependent origination. Here 
Nāgārjuna echoes the logic of the PPM, where meditating on objects allows objects 
to refer beyond themselves, but in doing so their very existence is verified. 
Nāgārjuna shows in the MK that phenomena make sense as a result of the 
interrelation of perceiving functions.44 When phenomena are correctly understood to 
be dependently originated, they are seen to be without substance, indeterminate, 
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51
fluid, unlimited yet context- bound.45 In relation to this point, I am in accordance with 
McCagney’s position that saṃsāra and nirvāṇa must be seen in equivalent or 
relational terms, rather than as identical.46   I argue that there is an underlying logic 
that contradicts the identity between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. This logic is apparent in 
the Diamond Sutra verse 13. The notion of identity implies that a fixed unit is the 
same as another fixed unit. But saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are not fixed units. Their 
“nature” is unfixed and fluid, so the best description of their relationship is in terms of 
equivalence and not identity.  Despite the fact that the PPM translates as “knowledge 
that lies beyond’,47 it describes experience, rather than a transcendent realm, as the 
ultimate reality.48 For this reason I disagree with Conze’s description of PPM 
literature as world-denying. On the contrary the PPM’s use of ākāśa encompasses 
phenomenal and non-phenomenal experiences as opposed to the Āryan
speculations about the immortality of the soul in the Vedas and Upaniśads, such as 
the Katha Upaniśad: 6 and Rig Veda 10.14.2.
3. Nāgārjuna’s solution to the problem of dualism and non-dualism in 
Yoga
The problem that Yoga deals with is that the world appears stable, reliable and 
substantial and yet is the result of ignorance and the cause of suffering. Yoga’s roots 
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in non-Āryan thinking should give it a this-worldly, experience centred philosophy. 
Indeed, the PPM and Nāgārjuna’s writing seem to follow this trajectory of thought. 
Indeed there is convincing evidence that Yoga-Sāṃkhya philosophy also developed 
from non-Āryan roots.49 However, the central problem with Sāṃkhya-yogic
philosophy is its perceived need to situate itself in a particular metaphysical and 
abstract framework in order to explain the perceived world. There are two 
metaphysical explanations for investment in the perceived world in Indian Yoga, 
according to Feuerstein:  the first is non-dualism and the second is dualism.50   The 
yoga that culminates in Advaitā Vedānta follows the monistic trend and dualistic 
yoga culminates in Sāṃkhyadarśana and Yogadarśana where puruśa is separate 
from prakṛti (however it must be noted that in Sāṃkhya it is puruśa that is separate 
from matter, the other aspects of mind are part of prakṛti). The metaphysical 
frameworks of dualism and non-dualism emerge from opposing assumptions about 
the relationship between consciousness and objects. Dualism holds that thoughts 
are separate from objects in the world whereas non-dualism does not perceive a 
separation between the operations of thought and the physical world: ideas are 
either seen as physically produced or the world is an extension of the operations of 
the Mind. Therefore, in terms of Āryan thought, Yoga’s purpose of calming the mind 
needs to be understood within the assumptions of dualism and non-dualism; either 
thought is caused by the activity of consciousness or it is the result of sensory 
impingements from the physical world onto the mind. 
The ontological frameworks of dualism and non-dualism relate to the basic Indic idea 
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of the Mind’s inherent structure. It is crucial to understand the Indic view of Mind as a 
three-tiered hierarchy in order to understand Indic metaphysics.  Citta is the highest 
aspect of mind and recognises phenomena pre-linguistically. Citta enables one to 
see the essence of phenomena. It provides a mental map of our world and our 
passage through the world. Buddhi resides below citta and it enables the mind to 
reason and discriminate truth from falsity, but also enables creative engagement with 
the world. Manas is the discursive aspect of mind. Its major function is to control the 
senses and to express what buddhi feeds it. Manas also sorts and categorises 
information to feed to buddhi. It requires an intelligent operator because, in and for 
itself, it is unable to reason and discriminate or be creative.51
In Vedic philosophy as expressed in Yoga, Sāṃkhya and Vedānta, the mind must be 
transcended in meditation, prayer and karma so as to experience Absolute Self. 
Transcendence is seen to be enabled by the split in the Mind between gross and 
subtle elements (gross – manas, subtle – buddhi and citta) allowing the mind to
experience ever subtler aspects of Self until eventually the mind is transcended 
altogether. 
A logical problem arises when Āryan-influenced Yoga attempts to explain the 
experience of Absolute Self. The description of the experience of transcendence in 
Vedic texts, such as the Upaniśads52 and the Bhagavad-Gītā,53holds that knowledge 
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is an experience of total, substantial conscious Self (Ātman/Brahman). The subject
fixed-term referent, stable and completely knowable after the Mind attains liberation. 
Both non-dualism and dualism attempt to explain how Absolute Self is experienced. 
Brahman/Ātman is a fixed point of reference, which can be identified as “you-are-
that” (tat tvuam asi).  Advaitā Vedānta, as developed by Śankara, avers that the 
stable Self is all-pervasive. At the conventional level, ātman is known as saguṇa or 
divinity with qualities, and, at the transcendent level, the Divine is experienced 
without qualities or nirguṇa.54 In the Bhagavad-Gītā the Self is experienced in 
renouncing the material world.  Kapila’s Sāṃkhya philosophy has a clear influence 
on this aspect of the Bhagavad-Gītā.55 But neither Advaitā Vedānta or Yoga-
Sāṃkhya can explain how the mind experiences a transcendent Ultimate Reality if 
the Mind itself is transcended. In order to explain this apparent contradiction, I argue 
that Āryan forms of yoga have to invert the epistemological framework by confusing 
mental concepts with reality.
Vedic traditions such as Vedānta, Sāṃkhya and Yoga view mind as pre-existing and 
non-causal in origin and this includes the Mind’s structure.56 In the Vedic tradition the 
Mind is seen as an instrument to learn about the substantial conscious Self. The 
Mind learns about the Self through a dialectical alternation between pure experience 
of the Self in yoga, the material world and the revealed word. The Vedas and the 
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Upaniśads describe a direct experience of the absolute by the rishi and guru, but the 
study of these revelations must be seen in relation to personal meditative 
experience, due to the connection made in Indian darśana between truth and 
transcendental experience. 
The application of the general Indic view of the Mind in Vedānta, Sāṃkhya and Yoga
differs according to the number and definition of these categories of the mind’s 
capacities. In Vedānta the Mind acts as a conduit for sending external experiences to 
the Self via four categories of manas (feelings and sensations from the external 
world) and ahaṃkāra or ego, which is responsible for the individual’s sense of I-
ness, along with buddhi, the intellect and decision-making faculty, and citta (or 
memories that are recalled by the lower mind and the ego).  Vedic yoga explains the 
relationship between the sensory world and transcendent truth by dividing Mind into 
different levels and ascribing different functions to each level. This is particularly the 
case with Sāṃkhya and Vedānta, where mind is seen as a stable state with various 
levels with different functions. In contrast, Yoga ascribes all activities of Mind to citta: 
reacting to sensory impressions; collection and recall of memories; and subtle 
activities such as withdrawal from sense, inner focus, meditation and Samādhi.57
But it is the contention of this thesis that confusing reality for function leads to the 
error of giving metaphysical status to objects according to their function. In this 
instance, the functioning of the Mind to collate, categorise, conceptualise and recall 
sensory experiences, together with experiencing subtle aspects of inner attention, 
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erroneously establishes the essence of the Mind as a tool that learns the truth. The 
Mind in Nāgārjuna’s philosophy is seen as a metaphysical entity whose function is to
realise transcendental Truth. But any notion that perceives the Mind in this way, as 
an essential entity that has the ability to learn about transcendental truth, is illogical. 
Other than observing the functioning of the Mind, there are no grounds for ascribing 
substance to it. There are no logical grounds for arguing that the Mind can transcend 
itself, since, if we perceive phenomena as devoid of essence, there is nothing to 
transcend.  Second, if the Mind is to transcend itself, how can it learn about a Self 
that is totally other than itself? 
The non-dualism of Advaitā Vedānta attempts to overcome this problem by 
suggesting that the divine is all-pervasive and that Īśvara establishes maya as a 
learning tool to assist people in attaining true knowledge of Brahman by utilising the 
Mind’s faculties of manas, buddhi and citta and learning to transcend them. It is not 
logical to argue that perfect truth establishes illusion in a non-dualistic framework, 
because it would be contradictory to each nature (i.e. truth and illusion). 
Nevertheless, for the arch-non-dualist, Śankara, to argue that Brahman is all-
pervasive, he must entertain the contradiction of Truth spawning illusion. Even 
though he does not err, along with Plato, in establishing the existence of perfect 
Form by way of proof of imperfect form, he does allow mental concepts, such as soul 
and self, to become metaphysical properties for no other reason than that they are 
functions of higher mental categories (citta and buddhi). 58
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Equally, the dualist argument that spirit is trapped and beguiled by matter is illogical.  
This argument presupposes that the mind has forgotten its true nature in spirit
(prakṛti) and has identified itself with matter due to its agitated mental processes. It is 
possible that the mind attaches itself to its own mental forms and sensory 
impressions in a confused belief that they are real. But that does not necessarily 
imply that the mind is essentially composed of spirit. The mind may not be an entity 
or a substance and therefore would not be able to have its true identity in spirit. But, 
because the mind is able to function subtly by observing inner processes, its 
essence is assumed to be spirit.  In pursuing this error of thought, we see how a 
dualistic framework cannot be used to support a non-dualistic, non-material one.
Both dualism and non-dualism in Āryan yoga are framework inversions in that they 
erroneously justify perceiving concepts such as Mind, Self and Soul as abstract 
entities by confusing mental activities with essential properties. In fact, there are no 
logical grounds for aligning mental processes with absolute truth and, by so doing, 
inverting the epistemological framework.  
The Buddha also saw the problem inherent in a concept of mind/Mind (where mind is 
a non-transcendent entity and Mind is a transcendent entity) and tried to avoid the 
complexities associated with it.  This position is articulated in early Buddhism, which 
avoids a clear definition of Mind.  In addition, these texts do not reify the mind and do 
not put forward the idea that the Mind needs to be transcended in order for liberation 
to occur. In Theravada Buddhism, citta, vijñāna and manas are seen as synonyms 
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and all indicate consciousness.59 While the notion of Mind was firmly established in 
Indic epistemology, it developed slowly in Buddhism. The Buddha held, in general, 
that there is no fixed point of reference in either the perceiver or the object of 
perception. He termed his spiritual approach nāmarūpa, which indicates his 
understanding of the fluid and interdependent relationship between mental activity 
and the recognition of physical form. The Buddha emphasised the importance of 
developing an awareness of mindfulness of these karmic processes in the 
Satipattana sūtra. He emphasised the crucial role karma, and particularly, intentional 
karma plays in shaping the world as opposed to unintentional karma such as 
breathing or deficating. 
For this reason Nāgārjuna focuses on pratītyasamutpāda with reference to the 
Buddha’s focus on actions and the consequences of action. Nāgārjuna aims to show 
that nirvāṇa, saṃsāra and mental aspects arise interdependently. Nāgārjuna never 
used the term mind and only the later philosophical school of Yogācāra pulled the 
concept into its epistemological framework, arguing that, through the process of 
meditation, the mind experiences its own nature. The closest Nāgārjuna comes to 
discussing mind is in his use of the term cittagacore, which is the ‘range of thought’ 
presented to the mind. He does not entertain a notion of mind. Rather he is 
concerned to purify mental activity through meditation and reason to reveal that 
cittagacore is empty and fluid.60
Nāgārjuna avoids the problems inherent in Indian epistemology by not aligning 
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himself with either dualism or non-dualism. Nāgārjuna’s understanding of yoga, 
however, is conditioned, not merely by the PPM or by his response to the 
Abhidharmikas, but, to some degree, by the larger network of ideas in his cultural 
and philosophical milieu. If one considers yoga in Nāgārjuna’s writings from the 
wider Indian perspective, and not merely from the view of the PPM, the factors that 
influenced his thinking are revealed as more complex and nuanced than has been 
recognized by previous commentators. Although Nāgārjuna does not fall into any of 
the problems associated with non-dualist and dualist thought, his understanding of 
meditation or yoga must be considered within a framework of the wider Indian 
understanding, within yoga, of dualism and non-dualism. 
It is worth reiterating here that Nāgārjuna’s philosophy is neither dualistic nor non-
dualistic and he does not refer to mind in any of his writings. But his distinction 
between saṃvrtisatya and paramārthasatya shares similarities with several other 
concepts of a two-tiered reality.  This is found in the differentiation between purūśa
and prakrti in Sāṃkhyadarśana, Chapter Two of the Bhagavad-Gītā , Chapter One of 
the Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali and Śankara’s separation of Brahman into nirguṇa and 
saguṇa in that Nāgārjuna’s two-truths formulation and the dualistic philosophies of 
Sāṃkhya and Yoga depict two types of mental reality — subtle and gross or 
conditioned and unconditioned. These are distinct, but not exclusive:   a calm and 
subtle mind can comprehend Absolute Truth while participating in sensory existence.  
This raises the philosophical question of whether reality is dualistic or non-dualistic. 
In the Bhagavad-Gīta and Yoga Sūtras, the play of prakṛti at the gross level conceals 
the truth of puruśa at the subtle level, but both prakṛti and puruśa are substantially 
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real. In the non-dualism of Advaitā Vedānta, the play of Maya is illusory and 
Brahman/Atman is the only reality – but Brahman can be known either with qualities 
(saguṇa) or without qualities (nirguṇa). 
It is important to note that, for Nāgārjuna, reality is not non-dual, neither is it dual. It 
is not substantial, but, while it is empty of svabhāva, it is not absolutely insubstantial 
or nihilistic.61 The flow of pratītyasamutpāda is characterised by śūnyatā, but in terms 
of pratītyasamutpāda conditioning occurs.62 From the ultimate point of view, 
phenomena have no status other than their śūnya, which implies their contingency, 
impermanence, dependency and impermanence.63 In this way Nāgārjuna tries to 
overcome the pitfalls in both the dualistic and non-dualistic models of yoga. 
Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that Nāgārjuna’s two-truths formulation 
echoes the Indic epistemological and metaphysical structures that underpin its 
understanding of mind as divided between two types of experience — qualitative and 
non-qualitative. His epistemology does not involve the transcendence of a higher 
non-qualitative experience over a lower qualitative form of experience. Nāgārjuna 
attempts to overcome the problems inherent in dualism and non-dualism by arguing 
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63 Jones (2010) and Burton (1999) challenge Nāgārjuna’s logic pertaining to pratītyasamutpāda. 
Jones argues that, while the passion and the passionate person are interrelated and interdependent, 
the person existed prior to being passionate. Burton offers a more fundamental criticism of
Nāgārjuna’s logic when he argues that,
It is certainly true that a tree, for example, in order to be known is dependent on a 
knowledge episode. But from this it does not follow that the tree itself is dependent 
for its existence on the knowledge of it! (1999: 147)
However, I argue that both Jones and Burton are ascribing an unfounded apriori status to the 
subjects of their enquiry.  I maintain that it is impossible to make empirical claims of knowledge about 
objects apriori. To assert such a claim is to confuse belief for knowledge.
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that the two truths are neither one nor hierarchically distinctive. He argues, instead, 
that saṃvṛti and paramārtha are equivalent in every way, due to their shared śūnya, 
but distinctive according the way they are viewed in the same way that a panoramic 
landscape can be view from different perspectives. In this regard his two-truths 
framework contrasts with the Vedic idea that knowing involves knowledge of a stable 
absolute substance. Nāgārjuna’s approach to pratītyasamutpāda differs diametrically 
from the Vedic approach to truth. For Nāgārjuna, knowledge is process-orientated. 
Knowing happens as a consequence of a process that cannot be transcended. It is 
always indiscernible, fluid and open. But, by understanding that process, śūnyatā is 
realised.64 This allows for creative involvement with saṃvṛti. Saṃsāra and nirvāṇa
are only known here and now. The purpose of the MK is to teach that the created 
conceptual world is unbelievable. Any fixed idea, even absolute Brahman, is 
contradictory to dependent co-origination. Process does not allow for fixity of views, 
even of the most transcendent of concepts. Nāgārjuna’s argument against svabhāva
is that the idea of absolute identity is contradictory in the presence of change. 
Absolute identity is, like any concept, impossible to sustain within a framework of 
pratītyasamutpāda (even a notion of relative identity is contradictory within this 
framework).65 This line of reasoning leads me to conclude that, while Nāgārjuna was 
influenced by the broad Indic epistemological categories that surrounded his 
investigation, his “ontology” was unique in its interrogation of dualistic and non-
dualistic frameworks.
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Nāgārjuna questions whether substantiality (either in the form of dualism or non-
dualism) and indeterminacy can co-exist. In so doing he insightfully prefigures the 
direction Buddhist philosophy will take in the future in the form of vajrayāna and 
Tibetan Buddhism, and pre-emptively cautions against the errors of substantialising 
mind and consciousness.66 Nāgārjuna is careful not to present a model of thought 
that would suggest a form of consciousness, either as an entity in process, like a 
”stream of consciousness”, or a contained entity sub-divided into different categories, 
where some are more conscious than others.67 He presents knowledge as a 
consequence of mental activity, but it is not in consciousness or mind. In this way he 
does not fall into the trap of confusing function for essence. Mental activity is part of 
the larger, open process of dependent-origination, which is neither totally conditioned 
nor unconditioned. I believe that Nāgārjuna is able to avoid the error of confusing 
function for metaphysical entity (as I will demonstrate in the next section) precisely 
because he follows the same logic as the PPM. The next section will explore the 
grounds for my interpretation.
4. The roots of the meditative experience of  insubstantiality 
in Indian thought and its expression as ākāśa in the 
Prajñaparāmita Sūtras and in Nāgārjuna’s thought
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According to De Wijesekera,68 the Buddha was the first teacher in India to give a 
central place to insubstantiality in his thought system. De Wijesekera argues that the 
Buddha’s contribution to Indian philosophy was in the notion of cessation (nirodha), 
which he discovered in the eighth Jhānic state of meditation. The preceding seven 
jhānas were realizations already discovered by his previous Vedic teachers.69 De 
Wijesekera notes that the Buddha called himself Brahma Bhuta and that he was 
born into an atmosphere that was charged with the prevailing religious ideas of his 
day.70 Much of his teaching was a challenge to Vedic culture and philosophy.  For 
example, he replaced the substantialist thought, which was grounded in the Vedic 
thought of his day, with the insubstantialist notion of skandhas.71  It is unique to 
Buddhism, according to De Wijesekera, that the only skandha that survives death is 
consciousness — although even this is subject to impermanence.72  De Wijesekera’s 
claim is complex, however, because he notes that insubstantialistic thought can be 
found in the Bṛihadārayaka Upaniśad where the phrase “neti neti” is used.73 This 
implies that a notion of insubstantiality, which does not hold any concept as ultimate, 
precedes the Buddha’s teachings. 
The earliest expressions of meditational experience of insubstantiality can be found 
in the Vedas in the two gods Mitrâ-Varuna. For example, in the Mitrâ-Varuna 
sections of Rg 1.2 space is implied in words like brhut (v8) and urukshya (v9), which 
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are fundamental terms used to describe meditative clarity and tranquility. Viyogi
utilises this evidence when he argues that these two gods are hybrid non-Aryan 
gods.74 Mitrâ–Varuna describe an insubstantial experience of light as the truth. In the 
Vedas the paired gods Mitrâ-Varuna and Indra-Vayu set up the tiered psychological 
states of ultimate Truth and intellectual Truth.  Nāgārjuna follows the same structure 
of thought when he sets up the categories of ultimate Truth and conventional Truth. 
What is even more interesting is that both philosophies make the ultimate point that 
the two Truths are, if not identical, in close proximity to each other. In the hymns of 
the two paired gods Mitrâ-Varuna and Indra-Vāyu, the understanding is, that when 
thought occurs at the level of rtam, it becomes brilliantly clear and takes on the 
quality of Truth-Consciousness. Similarly, for Nāgārjuna, conventional Truth is not 
separate from Ultimate Truth. Śūnyatā allows the two conditions of knowledge to 
reside together without privileging either of them.75
In order to understand Nāgārjuna’s attempt to reconcile the experience of the world 
with the experience of nirvāṇa, I argue that we need to take cognisance of the larger 
Indic debates on yoga. It seems rather strange that very few Buddhologists 
recognize the importance of the fluidity of thought patterns between Buddhism, pre-
Āryan and Vedic traditions, with the notable exception of a few, such as De 
Wijesekera, who examined the Buddha’s realizations against the backdrop of the 
knowledge from which he emerged and which he would have been aware of.  As 
noted above, the Buddha established his distinctive teaching while remaining 
ensconced in a larger Indian thought framework, which included Āryan motifs.
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The Buddhist understanding of insubstantiality, however, became more sophisticated 
over time and was able to resolve the problems arising from the experience of 
insubstantiality and the world. Newland and Tillemans argue that Buddhist 
philosophy represented truth in two ways: as statements having truth-value and 
objects having truth-value, but it is probably more accurate to understand the term 
“object” as referring to an intentional object or object of consciousness.  In 
Mahāyāna there is perhaps a greater emphasis on the truth-value of intentional 
objects than statements because objects were understood to be, not merely a 
teaching tool for the Buddha’s dharma, but rather an integral part of tattva76 and the 
causal network of pratītyasamutpāda. In this regard intentional objects are either in 
accord with tattva or in discord with tattva. The truth of an object therefore lies in its 
being identified with śūnya rather than projecting fixed properties and concepts onto 
phenomena. Objects therefore become the intentional meditational objects on śūnya.  
Newland and Tillemans observe two conflicting notions of truth: truth statements and 
truth value in objects. While semantics and the accurate perception of objects might  
articulate different views of truth, it can still  be argued that the PPM sūtras provide a 
way for truth statements and truthful perception of objects to be linked, through the 
application of metaphoricity. The use of the term ākāśa in the PPM alludes to the 
emerging idea of objects as metaphors for śūnyatā. The literal meaning of an object 
is indiscernible in the sense that objects do not have a fixed meaning within even the 
largest framework, such as consciousness. Thus, for example, there may be an 
accurate answer to a question, but that answer is not independent of the particular 
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context of the enquiry that is dependently originated and, hence, empty. In the 
Abhidharma things are defined according to their function in a mental event. The 
defining quality of the 94 dharmas that were identified by the Ābhidharmikas was 
their activity,77 whereas in the PPM objects point beyond their particular activity and 
context towards śūnyatā. I argue that Nāgārjuna was attempting to critique the 
encroachment of essentialist thinking amongst the Ābhidharmikas with regard to their 
definition of dharmas by placing the experience of objects within a fixed experiential 
context. He wanted to expose the falsity of any thought that strove to essentialise the 
a thing according to its function and, correspondingly, he wanted to show the 
emptiness of things by unravelling both the nature of the object and the observer of 
the object. By doing so, he argues, he would return to the kernel of the Buddha’s 
teaching of overcoming the roots of dukkha, where objects are imbued with the 
magical power of providing happiness through their function of serving our needs. 
Thinking errors occur when one places objects within a fixed framework, such as the 
world or consciousness. When objects are set within a limited framework they cannot 
be understood as infinitely open. The result is that objects derive their ‘power’ from 
their perceived context, which leads to confusing function for essence. This is 
because their function is understood in terms of the limited scope of the perceived 
context. By contrast, the PPM places perceived objects in the context of ākāśa, 
which is to be read as a synonym for tattva, and “emptiness”.  
In Chapter 2 of Rgs, Wisdom is likened to ākāśa. The constituting aspects that 
determine the person and their perceptual knowledge are not to be identified with 
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Wisdom.
9. Form is not wisdom, and wisdom is not form,
Just as with feeling, perception, will and consciousness.
They are not wisdom and wisdom is not them.
Wisdom is like space, without a break or crack
10. The nature of supporting conditions is boundless,
As the nature of beings is boundless
As the nature of the space is boundless
Just so the wisdom of the world-knowers is boundless.78
In this scheme experience does not denote an actual referent, either conditioned or 
unconditioned.79 In addition, experience does not denote a contextualised subject:
The leader himself was not stationed in the realm which is free from 
conditions,
Nor in things which are under conditions, but freely he wandered 
without a home.80
But yet despite ākāśa being without context or supporting conditions, objects retain 
their identity and contextual support.  In this regard, Rgs 27: 8 reads:
A bird dwells in the sky (space), but does not fall down. A fish dwells 
amidst water, but does not die. Just so the bodhisattva who through the 
trances and powers has gone beyond,
Dwells in the empty (śūnya), but does not reach the blessed rest.81
                                                
78 In Conze (1990:14).
79 Rgs 27.8-9.60 (in McCagney 1997: 23).
80  Conze (1990: 13).
81 Conze (1990: 60). 
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The logic that is expressed in VV70, where specificity and characteristics are due 
solely to śūnyatā and not to essential characteristics, is already nascent in such 
statements in the PPM.82
Here we see the emergence of the idea, which underpins the Bodhisattva ideal, that 
the highest wisdom is śūnyatā and must be understood as pratītyasamutpāda, not 
cessation. The meditational experience of the śūnya of objects enables 
pratītyasamutpāda to be understood. Indeed in the Asta the identification of Wisdom,  
ākāśa and śūnyatā is becoming explicit.
Supported by space is air, and (by that) the mass of water;
By that again is supported this great earth and the living world.
If the foundation of the enjoyment of the deeds of beings 
Is thus established in space, how can one think of that object?
Just so the Bodhisattva, who is established in emptiness, 
Manifests manifold and various works to beings in the world,
And his vows and cognitions are a force which sustains beings.
But he does not experience the Blessed Rest; for śūnyatā is not a place 
to stand on.83
Similarly in the early section of The 8000 Lines, the Bodhisattva is 
not discriminating, comprehends all dharmas as empty, signless and 
unimpeded. Without any dualism he seeks in wisdom for enlightenment.  
                                                
82 See Garfield and Thakchöe in Westerhoff et al (2011: 73). They compare the arguments of
Tsongkhapa and Gorampa and find that Tsongkhapa’s position leads to the contradiction of holding a 
form of truth from the saṃvṛti view and Gorampa’s position holds that conventional truth is entirely 
false. The authors concur that both positions underline the ambivalent status of conventional truth in 
Indian Madhyamaka. My argument is that if Madhyamaka is a descendent of the PPM, then the 
indiscernibility of concepts and ideas does not point towards ambivalence.  Rather, indiscernibility has 
a more profound metaphoric function.
83 Rgs 20, 5 in Conze (1990: 45).
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Devoted to the foremost perfection of wisdom is that Yogi.
An unobstruction of the space-element by the firmament cannot be 
found any where by any one.  Just so the wise Bodhisattva, course in 
wisdom is just like open space and he courses calmly and quietly.84
Later in the same text the very ”Perfection of Wisdom” is equated with purity and 
space, which is attained by learning the “Perfection of Wisdom” and by practicing 
Yoga (1973: 158). Yogic meditation is described in the PPM either as a trance or 
contemplation. It is explained that the perfection of wisdom is attained by a series of 
thoughts “which are inclined towards all-knowledge,”85 which is the psychological 
state where the mind neither takes hold of anything nor settles down in anything.86
By implication and crucially, objects’ existences are not rejected in this state of mind. 
In this respect the dynamism of śūnyatā is expressed where space “is an existing 
nothing; it both exists and does not exist”,
And so the long-lived Subhuti said this to Bhagavan;
This is a perfection of what is not because of the existence of space.
This is a perfection equal to the unequalled because all events cannot 
be recognised. This is a perfection of clarity because śūnyatā is beyond 
limit.87
Nāgārjuna’s argument could be seen to have developed this line of thought into his 
assertion in VV70 that in order to understand existences of things one must 
understand śūnyatā. Aṣṭa 9: 205 reads:
Bhagavan: so many signs, so many attachments. What is the cause? 
From signs comes attachment ... The nature of events is not past, nor 
                                                
84 Conze (1973: 57).
85 Conze (1967: 191).
86 (1967:182).
87 Aṣṭa Ch 9 in McCagney (1997: 24).
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future, nor present, it lies outside the three periods of time and for that 
reason, it cannot possibly be converted, cannot be treated as a sign, or 
as an objective support, and it cannot be seen, nor heard, nor felt, nor 
known.
Subhuti: Deep is the nature of events.
Bhagavan: ... because of having clarity.
Subhuti: The nature of clarity is the perfection of wisdom. I pay homage, 
O Venerable one, the perfection of Wisdom.
Bhagavan: Also the nature of all events is clarity. And the nature of 
clarity is the perfection of Wisdom. What is the cause of this ...
Bhagavan: It is just because of their nature that events are not 
something. Their nature is no-nature and their no-nature is their nature 
because all events have not two marks but one mark only, no mark. So 
because of this, all events are not realized. … There are not two 
natures of events, just one is the nature of events. And the nature of 
events is no-nature and no-nature is the nature of events. It is thus that 
all the limits of attachment are gotten rid of.88
VV 70 and MK 24:14 also combine the ideas of the nature and no-nature of 
phenomena into one and the same instance. But Nāgārjuna takes the point further 
by arguing that phenomena become clear or make sense due to their emptiness.  
There is a suggestion of this argument in the following verse from the Laṅkavatāra 
Sūtra:
Here is no inherent nature in any being, consequently, here is no true 
verbal description.
Thus inexperienced fools separate the use of śūnyatā from śūnyatā.89
This implies that attachment occurs when the use of a thing is confused for its 
essence. Hence, without understanding the lack of inherent nature in phenomena, 
there is the potential of confusing function for the reality of phenomena. The result of 
this error of judgement is the construction of dispositions, as expressed in MK 26: 10 
and 11. But that is not to presume that what is being described is nihilism. It is, 
                                                
88 In McCagney (1997:30).
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rather, the case that nothing can accurately be named or defined, although it can be 
utilised by “skilful means”. Conze suggests that skilful means requires a 
reinterpretation of the illusory world. The most radical break from traditional Buddhist 
thought, which the PPM advances and Nāgārjuna echoes, is that nirvāṇa itself is 
illusory.90 This reinterpretation of traditional belief suggests that all concepts and 
intentional objects “exist” only as metaphors for reality. But as metaphors, used by 
skilful means, they cannot be held in nihilistic terms. Indeed, Nāgārjuna extends this 
argument in his identifying pratītyasamutpāda with śūnyatā in that the metaphor 
exists as śūnyatā. This strategy is not yet apparent in the Rgs, although a skilful use 
of metaphoricity is suggested in Rgs XX: 11-20, for example:
14
Just so the wise Bodhisattvas, having stood in compassion,
Having taken hold parachutes of skill in means and of wisdom,
Considers dharmas empty, signless and wishless,
Though he does not experience the Blessed Rest, he nevertheless 
sees the dharmas.91
It is my contention that Nāgārjuna follows the same idea of the centrality of 
metaphoricity in the PPM in his understanding of the world by showing that 
dependent origination is emptiness: in other words, the arising and ceasing of 
phenomena due to pratītyasamutpāda is a way for the mind metaphorically to grasp 
the inexpressible quality of śūnyatā. But he does not embrace the PPM’s 
understanding of the Bodhisattva, who offers a bridge to progress from illusion to 
nirvāṇa. 
                                                
90 Conze (1967:12) and Rgs II v.5 and 3 (in Conze 1990:13).
91 Conze (1990: 47).
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5. The meditative experience of ākāśa in Nāgārjuna’s 
writings
Nāgārjuna’s philosophical approach strongly resembles the method in the PPM of 
using the phenomenal world to shift focus from a limited view to unlimited or open 
experience. His rhetorical use of prasaṅga shows the absurdity of maintaining a view 
of phenomena as independent categories. He asserts that things make sense due to 
causal interrelatedness and inherent nothingness,92 although he does not prove his 
position, but merely makes a bald claim after deconstructing substantialism. This is 
perhaps due to the fact that he is influenced by the PPM sutras, which are founded 
in an akasic formless meditative experience and not rational thought.93 This position, 
however, establishes a contentious area in the PPM’s thought-system, which 
struggles to find an appropriate relationship between the world and the world beyond 
(or nirvāṇa) because the phenomenal world refers to the reality beyond, and then the 
philosophy tends to be world-denying.94 Nāgārjuna makes an important contribution 
to this thinking by shifting emphasis from the indiscernibility of phenomena to 
causality. While maintaining that saṃvṛti is mirage-like, he never questions the 
reality of causality and the impact causality has on saṃvṛti. Indeed causality is the 
‘essence’ of pratītyasamutpāda, which he equates with śūnyatā. By upholding the 
primacy of causality, Nāgārjuna shifts the emphasis from phenomena to relationality 
and dependency. Nāgārjuna wants to show that spiritual peace can be experienced 
                                                
92 VV 70.
93 Conze (1967: 128).
94 Conze (1967: 131).
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by contemplation and meditation on dependency of saṃvṛti and paramārtha. His 
point is that saṃsāra shows no distinction from nirvāṇa when both are correctly 
viewed from a position of interrelated dependency.
Nāgārjuna develops the PPM’s use of the phenomenal world to explain ultimate 
reality by using the common Indic differentiation of two truths (namely, conventional 
or conceptual truth and absolute or non-conceptual truth). Nāgārjuna adapts the two-
truths formulation to his own thought where tathatā is a result of the correct 
understanding of the interdependency between saṃvṛti, the conceptual view, and 
paramārtha, the non-conceptual view. Paramārtha refers to the highest view of 
interrelatedness, where things cease to be distinct and saṃvṛti refers to a confined 
view of reality, where phenomena are fleetingly apparent. His adaptation of the two-
truths formulation is neither dualistic nor non-dualistic, i.e. he neither renounces the 
phenomenal world nor accepts its existence.  In verse 7 of chapter 18 Nāgārjuna
argues that, when thought quietens, nothing can be independently identified because 
there is no stable foundation on which to establish meaning. Mind, senses and the 
objects of the senses are all and equally dependently originated. In this sense it is 
better to read the use of nivrtte in this verse as denoting senses and sense objects 
being quietened or retreated from, rather than renounced, as is the more common 
translation, because “renunciation” is suggestive of the view Nāgārjuna opposes.95  
Later in verse 9 this translation of nivrtte as “quieten” is reinforced by the use of the 
word sāntam (composed mind), which does not suggest renunciation, but, rather, a 
                                                
95 I find McCagney’s translation of nivrtte as “renounce” in MK 18:7 misleading because it does not 
make sense to renounce something like thoughts that has no real existence.  
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balanced perspective on the world. In verse 8 Nāgārjuna asserts that the Buddha’s 
teaching about reality should not be forced into conceptual constructs: 
Everything is factual, nonfactual, both factual and not nonfactual.96
Peace is therefore attained through non-projection onto phenomena and knowledge 
of the dependent origination of phenomena. The consequence of these spiritual 
practices is that cittagocare (the range of thought) has been quietened but not 
renounced.97
Nāgārjuna’s interpretation of the two-truths formulation relies so heavily on causality 
that his understanding of causality requires close scrutiny. In the Dedication to the 
MK Nāgārjuna writes:
I greet the best of teachers, that Awakened One,
Who taught liberation, the quieting of phenomena, interdependent 
origination.98
Clearly, for Nāgārjuna, the Buddha’s teaching is based on the relationship between 
liberation, the quieting of phenomena (not renunciation of phenomena) and 
interdependent origination. Causality is not linear for him.99 He is not concerned with 
errors that would arise from wrong assumptions about the beginnings and endings of 
                                                
96 MK 18:8 in McCagney (1997: 182).
97 See Dreyfus in Westerhoff et al (2011: 89). Dreyfus explores the consequences of a sceptical 
approach to Nāgārjuna’s knowledge claims. If one approaches Nāgārjuna’s claims about the two 
truths  from the basis of meditative practice, the consequence of adopting or not adopting a sceptical 
approach do not pertain because conventional mental impressions are not denied or accepted 
conventionally: their mental impact is merely quietened.  
98 In McCagney (1997: 137).
99 MK 20: 19.
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casual sequences; nor does he argue that correct action leads to release from the 
world. For him, pratītyasamutpāda is an interrelated network of relations. But that 
raises a pertinent question about the processes of causal consequences:  in other 
words, what is the role of karma? Nāgārjuna followed the Buddha in asserting that 
the fruits of karma are continuous: they are not dependent on the continuity of action 
in a certain direction, such as towards enlightenment.  Chapter 17 of the MK focuses 
specifically and pertinently on causality. In verse 6 Nāgārjuna maintains that karma 
goes on into perpetuity. In verses 14 and 15 Nāgārjuna makes claims that come 
closest to underlying substance than in any of his oeuvre. He states regarding 
karma:
14. What is imperishable is like a promissory note and an action like a 
debt. It has four kinds of elements and it is indeterminable in primordial 
substance.
15. The imperishable is not abandoned by the act of abandonment or by 
unabandoned meditation,
Therefore, by means of the imperishable, the fruit is born out of action.
These two verses, however, need to be read in the context of verse 10:
Since from thinking there is continuity and from continuity, origin of 
thought, thought is prior to thinking. Therefore, there is neither 
disruption nor permanence.
Chapter 17 is one the most intriguing chapters in the MK.  Nāgārjuna’s references to 
the imperishability of karma, the source of thought and primal substance seem to run 
directly contrary to his central philosophy of emptiness. In addition the logic 
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employed in the chapter suggests that mindfulness of what is present in the mind 
(thought) is prior to action or thinking. Mindfulness is awareness of causal 
relations.100 But mindfulness is not accomplished without engagement with karma. 
Mindfulness and karma are therefore interdependently related. The spiritual process 
being described here again echoes the logic expressed in the PPM, that is, the 
interrelated perspectives of engaging with limited and fixed phenomena and views 
but allowing the latter metaphorically to point to a limitless point of view via the 
infinite network of causal relations in pratītyasamutpāda. For Nāgārjuna the 
interrelation between karma and mindfulness suggests the interrelation between 
paramārtha and saṃvṛti in that karmic interaction is held together due to emptiness 
and the awareness of such emptiness.
Tibetan Buddhist scholars do not hold this view of an all-inclusive causality. Sonam 
Thakchöe, for example, draws a distinction between the knowledge attained in 
meditative equipoise “where rational insight is seen as playing a dominant role” and 
subsequent attainment.101 She follows Tsongkhapa’s Candrakīrti influence, which 
leads  phenomena to be perceived as having  two attributes, namely the ultimate and 
the conventional. I do not see any support for this view in Nāgārjuna’s MK. On the 
contrary Nāgārjuna establishes the equivalence between nirvāṇa and saṃsāra.102
Following Tsongkhapa, Thakchöe argues that only in the Buddha’s state of 
enlightenment is attainment experienced simultaneously with meditative 
                                                
100 MK 17: 6-10 in McCagney (1997:176-178).
101Westerhoff et al (2011 et al: 50).
102  MK 25: 19.
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equipoise.103 Again I do not see any justification for such linear logic. Rather it is 
more likely that Nāgārjuna intended to assert that practice (bhāvanā) entailed a 
necessary shared experience of paramārtha and saṃvṛti. I do not agree with 
Thakchöe’s view that, prior to enlightenment, saṃvṛti and paramārtha occupy an 
either-or relationship. In my view, their relationship is one of both-and. This approach 
allows saṃvṛti to be experienced, not as restricted to fixed views, but rather as 
dynamic and imbued with creative potential. 
Following MK 24: 14:
To whomsoever emptiness makes sense,
Everything makes sense.
To whomsoever emptiness makes no sense,
Nothing makes sense.104
Nāgārjuna establishes the equivalence between pratītyasamutpāda and śūnyatā on 
the basis of working with saṃvṛti and paramārtha together as a form of meditation, 
the identity between the two aspects are not meant as a result of practice but as a 
means.105 His two-truths formulation must not be understood as a way of separating 
views of reality. Rather it operates to show how the truth of śūnyatā is reflected in 
both the conceptual and the ultimate views of reality and how an accurate 
understanding of the function of emptiness in viewing concepts enables an 
understanding of emptiness from the ultimate view of reality. 
                                                
103 Thakchöe in Westerhoff et al (2011: 50).
104 McCagney (1997: 201).
105 Ibid.
78
Nāgārjuna sets up the MK as posing a new way of thinking of reality by not affirm 
any view of reality. Rather, the analytical and logical analyses of Nāgārjuna’s 
Madhyamakan thought could be understood against the backdrop of the deeper 
structural forms of his text, which convey aspects of non-Aryan Indian culture, 
particularly with regard to their open and inclusive cultural understanding of saṃgha
and the meditative experience of ākāśa if a link between yoga and Nāgārjuna can be 
shown.  Yoga developed from non-Aryan society and expressed the non-distinctive, 
all-inclusive experience of ākāśa. Together with being a diatribe against the 
Sarvāstivādins and the Sautāntrikas, the MK is structured in such a way that, as 
Stafford Betty106 argues, it goes beyond merely cognitive philosophy and becomes a 
mental preparation for meditation. Betty writes that the logic in the MK functions as 
an effective means of communicating a mystical vision of reality. Although I do not 
agree with Stafford Betty’s use of “mystical” in relation to Nāgārjuna’s philosophy, I 
appreciate the argument that Nāgārjuna’s logical analysis serves to enhance 
practical activity and akasic meditational experience of śūnya and therefore is not 
simply a polemic or only an analytical exercise. 
Nāgārjuna devotes most of his writing to using the prasaṅga method of 
argumentation in order to show the inconsistencies in holding to a notion of 
svabhāva in objects. He wants to prove that all phenomena are śūnya as a 
consequence of disproving svabhāva. But śūnyatā, by his own admission, is not a 
binary opposite of existence, that is, non-existence: correctly understood, it is neither 
                                                
106 (1984: 135).
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existence nor nonexistence.107  He ably shows, by using prasaṅga, that imposing 
svabhāva on objects is absurd. But he does not inquire into the absurdity of holding 
perceiving  objects as simultaneously existence and non-existence. This implies that 
the contradictory middle position between existence and non-existence is more a 
meditative experience of reality than a logically held position. 
The Buddha was reluctant to answer questions about the nature of reality. He 
responded to questions of this nature with silence.108 Nāgārjuna follows this strategy 
and thus operates strictly within a Buddhist mindset. For example, in the MK 
Nāgārjuna says that the Buddha’s dharma is expressing nothing that can be 
conceptualised.109 He does, however, state that saṃsāra is equivalent to nirvāṇa, 
therefore saṃvṛti has the capacity to describe reality or dharmatā. But he draws 
attention to the importance of the ability to understand reality through quietening the 
mind’s response to phenomena.110 It could be argued that this experience is the flow 
of cittagocore (the range of thought) without substance.111 This explains why the 
chapters in MK do not end at 25 with Nirvāṇa, but go on to prescribe the problem of 
views (dṛşţi), the nature of perception and its potential for bondage or liberation.  
Nāgārjuna’s conclusion focuses on meditation, which, I maintain, is significant.112 But 
what does Nāgārjuna understand by the experience of ultimate reality in a state of 
meditation? I argue that Nāgārjuna’s approach to śūnyatā is all-inclusive yet not non-
dualistic. Pratītyasamutpāda is an infinitely large network of interconnected causal 
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109 MK, 25:14.
110 MK Dedication.
111 MK, 18:7.
112MK 26: 11.  
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connections. Any limiting of this view results in a substantial view of causality, where 
a phenomenon is understood to cause something else to occur. In terms of 
meditation practice, though, Nāgārjuna is not merely suggesting that one should 
observe the flow of phenomena in the “range of thoughts” (cittagocore). This 
approach would be no different from early forms of Buddhist meditation. His 
approach is to be aware of the interconnectedness between phenomena, thereby 
bringing their emptiness to awareness, not only their arising and ceasing.  For 
Nāgārjuna, peace is a consequence of the recognition of pratītyasamutpāda.113 From 
the saṃvṛti point of view, choice determines condition. But Nāgārjuna argues for 
equivalence between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, and it follows that no choice of view is 
better or truer than any other. There is equality of choice from the point of view of 
paramārtha, based on the recognition that all views are śūnya.114 Nāgārjuna 
identifies śūnyatā with pratītyasamutpāda, which implies that all views and conditions 
are interdependent and the equality between these two key concepts results in 
freedom from views.115 When views become fixed into conceptual rigidity, they are 
assumed to exist substantially. Conceptualisation causes anything that is perceived 
to be imprisoned in false and rigid views. To avoid this, perception must be based on 
peace and openness (śūnyatā). In this way perception is identified with 
pratītyasamutpāda. This implies that sensory objects are “free of being projected 
upon by conceptual properties, free of thoughts that make distinctions without 
multiplicity”.116 The freedom that is invoked here implies freedom from sharp 
                                                
113 Jones argues that Nāgārjuna uses the catuṣko ṭ i to show that all possible claims to svabhāva
are eliminated. He bases his argument on Mk 25;16, Mk 27;18 and 27:28 (2010: Kindle ebook  
location 3087).
114 MK 24: 18.
115 MK 5: 6, 12: 5,25: 5,27:18 and 27: 28.
116 Jones 2010 (Kindle  ebook location 3399);  see also MK 18: 9-11.
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distinctions and, discrete parts. Freedom, in practice, is an antidote to   the 
experience of the world interpreted as conceptual categories.
Nāgārjuna’s understanding of śūnyatā does not offer a transcendental view of reality. 
On the contrary, it offers a feasible view of reality that does not contradict common 
sense.117 Nāgārjuna’s understanding of śūnyatā does not vary from the accepted 
Buddhist view of tattva or dharmatā.118 In this view no transcendental or 
metaphysical reality is propounded: the only reality is the phenomenal world as it is,  
without mental projection.
Yogic discipline allows for the experience of conventional reality, but grounds the 
understanding of that world in emptiness. In this sense Nāgārjuna insists that 
conventional truth is the only realm in which insight is gained. But meaning that 
comes to us via sensory and intellectual activity is unreliable. Reality is only reliable 
according to its own criteria, that is, from the point of view of emptiness. Therefore 
the truth of any phenomena only resides in its status as śūnya. Any other apparent 
quality should not be reified. Any verbal account of reality is bound to be false 
because it is based on terms derived from conventional concepts. Even the 
ontological concept of emptiness or śūnyatā cannot be applied. Nāgārjuna most 
often uses the term śūnya to apply to phenomena without evoking a metaphysical 
                                                
117 This argument contradicts the argument followed by Tibetan scholars, such as Rje Rimpoche, 
who follow Candrakīrti’s  argument that all views are untrue from a saṃvṛti
point of view and unreal from the ultimate point of view. This argument suggests a separation 
between paramārtha and saṃvṛti, which contradicts MK 24: 19. In MK 13: 17 Nāgārjuna asserts that 
there is nothing that is not empty and therefore nothing can contradict emptiness. This allows for 
reality to flow “precisely that way the phenomenal world work[s]” (Jones 2010: Kindle ebook location 
3158). 
118 MK 15: 6, 22: 8, 24: 9 and 18: 7.
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explanation.119 Yet, interestingly, while the experience of śūnya has the effect of 
calming verbal differentiation, it paradoxically also affirms the common-sense world 
or the world we know. While the early Buddhist teachings expressed the sense of 
anattā to communicate non-identity, the PPM texts contributed fullness to the 
concept of śūnya, through its association with ākāśa.
For Nāgāruna, however, nirvāṇa is equivalent to saṃsāra and saṃsāra is equivalent 
to nirvāṇa. This means that the very nature of saṃsāra is dependent on nirvāṇa and 
the very nature of nirvāṇa is dependent on saṃsāra. Nāgārjuna’s notion of 
pratītyasamutapāda takes the middle way between existence, non-existence, 
existence-and-non-existence and neither-existence-nor-non-existence. What this 
means is that nothing exists independently. Therefore any ontological position 
referring to the self or the world should be refrained from. Nāgārjuna opens the MK 
(1: 1) with the lines:
Never, nowhere do any beings occur arisen from themselves, from 
others, from both or from no cause.
He goes on to assert that there are only four conditions, cause, supporting condition, 
contiguous condition and dominant condition. Therefore he asserts that:
Indeed, no self nature of beings occurs in conditions of beings
Since self-nature is not present, other natures are also not present.
                                                
119 Jones (2010: Kindle ebook location 3391). Some scholars, such as Huntington (1994), use the 
phrase “the emptiness of emptiness” to de-ontologise the term “emptiness”. I personally find the 
phrase clumsy. In my view translating śūnya as openness captures the sense of the term without 
turning it into an abstract noun.  
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Simple causality cannot explain conditions either:
Causal efficacy is not associated with conditions, causal efficacy is not 
associated with non-conditions, conditions are not associated with 
causal efficacy or non causal efficacy.120
But if, nevertheless, conditions exist from the saṃvṛti view, what accounts for them? 
Nāgārjuna introduces this two-truths formula later in the MK to explain why 
conditions are observed from the conventional point of view. As I have argued 
throughout this chapter, Nāgārjuna’s philosophy is closely related to the PPM. The 
PPM reinterprets the world along the lines of perfect knowledge, in which the 
phenomena of the world point to an experience of freedom and openness rather than 
the world of conventional experience. Nāgārjuna’s use of the two-truths formulation 
shows that conventional truth points to ultimate truth in a metaphorical sense. But 
the metaphoricity implied in the relation of conventional truth to ultimate truth is made 
possible by Nāgārjuna’s assertion that śūnyatā is identical to pratītyasamutpāda. The 
processes of conditioning and causality are possible because of the inherent  
emptiness of objects, and, more importantly, the experience of emptiness (or akasic
openness) in terms of the fluid flow of sensory experience. Saṃsāra is therefore not 
renounced or discounted in Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka philosophy:  rather, it is 
contextualised within the broader philosophical field of prasaṅga, paramārtha and 
pratītyasamutpāda. 
The point I make in this chapter is that  Nāgārjuna wants not only to point out the 
failings in texts such as those of the Abhidharma, but to establish a ‘viewless’ (MK 
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27: 30) approach to understanding the nature of reality based on the meditational 
experience of ākāśa. Such an approach cannot only consider analytical approaches. 
It needs to incorporate meta-cognitive and meta-linguistic approaches as well. From 
the saṃvṛti point of view phenomena are mistaken for having real existence. But, 
upon rational examination, their emptiness and openness are laid bare. The 
paramārtha point of view is not conceptual and therefore is an unmediated 
experience, beyond language. Such an experience must to be based in meditation, 
because only through meditation can these concepts  be experienced. 
The two-truths formulation is used by Nāgārjuna to synthesise cognitive and meta-
cognitive approaches to understanding. The two-truths formulation has its roots in 
the broad Indian thought system: for example the motif can be found in the prakṛti-
Puruśa in Sāṃkhyashastra. The MK sets itself up as a text which does not offer a 
theory, but only deconstructs other prevailing philosophies; but it does, I maintain, 
operate within the larger Indian hermeneutic circle and contains  voices and traces 
from other Indian thought-systems from the non-Aryan tradition, primarily the PPM.  
But in asserting the equivalence between saṃvṛti and paramārtha Nāgārjuna does 
indeed offer a theoretical position, adding his own twist to the two-truths Indian 
formulation. 
Nāgārjuna remains unclear how saṃvṛti is to be understood on its own terms. In the 
last verse of Chapter 24 in the MK, on the one hand, he states that the Buddha’s 
teaching never amounted to anything substantial; but, on the other hand, he does 
not deny the Buddha existed. Later Madhyamakans, such as Candrakīrti, in an 
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attempt to improve clarification, maintained that objects have two aspects:  the 
conventional and the ultimate. While paramārtha provides a sense of openness, 
saṃvṛti provides a sense of confinement to fixed concepts and views. The sense of 
being confined, which is associated with saṃvṛti, is the basis for ignorance. 
Confinement results in seeing objects as real. Understanding in a state of ignorance 
is, therefore, focused on knowing the object in order to gain “worldly knowledge”. 
However, such conceptual knowledge is necessarily vague because concepts are 
applied to phenomena that are in a continuous state of transition. The sense of 
openness or śūnya is the diametrical opposite to ignorance, where understanding is 
based on viewing objects as empty of substance. But the question still remains: Can 
the Buddha’s worldly existence, or, for that matter, any existence be possible without 
imposing metaphysical conceptual frameworks? Chapters Three and Four will 
explore this question in detail.
Nāgārjuna argues in the MK that space and time are invented by vikalpa and 
prapañca.121   This process is often interpreted along the lines of MK 16:10,122 and 
occurs due to samāropa (superimposition) in the similar way that Advaitā Vedantins 
use adhyāsa.123 In Advaitā Vedānta the illusion of separation is superimposed on 
Brahman or non- dual substance. The concept of imposition in Nāgārjuna’s thought 
is misleading because it seems to imply levels of cognition. In Buddhism, though, 
                                                
121 MMK 26:10
122 Westerhoff (2009: 48).
123 It is interesting that in the Vijñānavāda school, as found in the Mahāyāna-sūtrālamkāra samāropa
is paired with apavāda as a dual category. In this context samāropa establishes substance as it does 
not exist and apavāda repudiates what does actually exist. In combination both realism and nihilism 
are illusory. The middle path between nihilism and realism is asserted in ‘presentation-only’ (vijñapti-
mātra). All things are presentations of consciousness (Nagao. and Silk, 2000: 347-353).
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there is nothing on which illusory states can be imposed. In this regard the two-truths 
formulation can be misleading in that the assumption is that saṃvṛti is imposed on 
paramārtha, but to believe this would be a mistaken retention from Vedic thought 
structures. In early Buddhist philosophy, which certainly influenced Nāgārjuna, citta
is synonymous with vijñāna (consciousness) and manas (intellect).124 The processes 
of the mind are not hierarchically structured, but, rather, horizontally understood. 
There is, therefore, no level of mind that needs to be overcome or transcended. 
Rather, the flow of pratītyasamutpāda can be viewed either from narrow limits, that 
is, from the perspective of saṃvṛti, or broadly, from the perspective of paramārtha. 
These two views are epistemologically and metaphysically indistinguishable from 
each other from the frame of emptiness.125 The akasic experience of apratīhistita and
anālaya informs both experiences. Nāgārjuna interprets the akasic experience 
described in the PPM as pratītyasamutpāda – an interconnected fluidity of motion 
that, depending on one’s purview, reveals  interconnected phenomena or, from the 
widest view, nothing at all. The narrow view of saṃvṛti  is occupied primarily with the 
arising and ceasing of phenomena. When citta is activated, due to ignorance of the 
processes of vikalpa and prapañca, the arising and ceasing of phenomena of 
pratītyasamutpāda appears as if one is a phenomenon in relation to other 
phenomena. However, Nāgārjuna posits that what arises and ceases is experienced 
as apratīhistita and anālaya when understood from the vantage point of 
pratītyasamutpāda. In fact, the flow of dependent relations between phenomena can 
only be understood from the view of saṃvṛti’s open and non-fixed nature, which is 
                                                
124 Keown (2004: 171).
125 Nāgārjuna’s use of the term cittagocare describes the “flow of phenomena across the realm of 
mind” (McCagney 1997: 42).
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equivalent to paramārtha. This view is most ably reflected in VV 70 and raises 
significant question marks about the authenticity of MK 26 (This point is clarified in 
Chapter Four). Nevertheless, the point remains that Nāgārjuna argues that all 
phenomena are empty in themselves.
The central issue in the next two chapters is that if phenomena are empty, fluid and 
indiscernible, Nāgārjuna needs to account for why they allow us to navigate the 
world via cognitively mapped patterns with such accuracy. A second question is why 
the imposition of concepts onto phenomena is so effective in producing a workable 
understanding of the world. 
Nāgārjuna’s central proposition is that saṃvṛti makes sense due to the experience of 
ākāśa, which he interprets as pratītyasamutpāda. As I have pointed out above, he 
offers no argument or rational substantiation for this claim. It seems, therefore, that 
we have to infer that his claim is experientially verified in meditation. In Chapters 
Three and Four I argue that although Nāgārjuna refers to meditation or bhāvanā as a 
necessary component of his prasaṅga method, reading and understanding 
Nāgārjuna requires a subtle inter-textual awareness. Chapter 3 explores how the 
experience of ākāśa affects the perception of phenomena, which accordingly 
become understood as indeterminate.  Nāgārjuna’s surprising and apparently 
contradictory claim is that things make sense (or derive meaning) due to their innate 
nature as śūnyatā, and are therefore not indeterminate at all.    The logic observed in 
the PPM of focusing on the phenomenal world to explain the experience of infinite 
emptiness is based on the literary function of metaphoricity, as I explore in Chapter 
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Four.  In this chapter I unpack Nāgārjuna’s debt to the PPM, with particular reference 
to Rgs 20: 11-20, and a special emphasis on verse 14:
Having taken hold of the two parachutes of skill in means and of 
wisdom,
Considers dharmas as empty, signless and wishless.126
                                                
126 Conze (1990: 47).
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Chapter Three
Implications of ākāśa in Nāgārjuna’s thought
1. Introduction
My central argument, in this thesis, is that we can better understand Nāgārjuna’s claim 
that saṃvṛti and paramārtha are equivalent, and therefore offer seamless meaning if 
properly understood, if we explore śūnyatā as ākāśa along the lines that McCagney 
suggests.1 My argument is that the openness that ākāśa in the form of “nothing to settle 
in” (anālayu) and ”nothing to grasp” (anāgrahā) 2 allows for  interpenetration and 
communicability between saṃvṛti and paramārtha, enables phenomena to be 
meaningfully understood in relation to their true “nature” as śūnyatā if seen within the 
light of the metaphoric logic utilised in the PPM. This chapter, however, focuses on the 
problem that if śūnyatā is interpreted as ākāśa, along the lines of nothing to settle in 
(anālayu) and nothing to grasp (anāgrahā),3 then the implication is that concepts are 
indeterminate and contextually variable. Concepts, objects and statements not only 
have a variety of meanings dependent on the causal networks that give rise to them, but 
the indeterminacy of their referential function enables concepts and statements to be 
applied in a variable manner.  The consequence of entertaining the indeterminacy of 
                                                  
1 McCagney (1997).
2 Conze 1990:37 (Rgs 15: 8) and Conze (1973: 38).
3 Conze 1990:37 (Rgs 15; 8) and Conze (1973: 38).
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phenomena based of the “sunyatic”/akasic view is that, while it is true that phenomena 
are indeterminate due to their basis in śūnyatā, they therefore must function to obscure 
meaning. Such a confusion between truth and meaning is not what Nāgārjuna is 
asserting in MK 24: 14 and VV 70. The solution to this problem will be explored in 
Chapter Four in terms of  metaphoric logic. 
The interpretation of śūnyatā as the experience of openness, which I am exploring in 
this chapter, derives from the (non-Āryan) perspective, as articulated in the PPM, where 
śūnyatā is associated with the notion of ākāśa (space), which has clear connotations of 
openness. In this sense, concepts, objects and statements always evade clear 
identification and fixed meaning and are therefore always openly interpreted and 
indeterminate, contained by a range of possible interpretation within the contingency of 
dependent origination.  Meaning is, therefore, a consequence of pratītyasamutpāda
(dependent origination). In other words, if meaning is contingent on openness, the 
verb/process element prevails over the nominative function of language.4
In my view, saṃvṛti (conceptual knowledge) is fundamentally based on indeterminacy, 
which informs saṃvṛti’s central processes — vikalpa (separation into concepts) and 
prapañca (the play of concepts). Indeterminacy is associated with notions that are 
related to ākāśa, such as apratīhistita (nothing to settle down), anālaya (nothing to settle 
in) and anāgrahā (nothing to grasp).5 Vikalpa and prapañca can also be mistakenly 
applied to saṃvṛti to reify objects in the attempt to project/inject/ascribe stability onto a 
                                                  
4 McCagney (1997: 19).
5 McCagney (1997: 22).
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necessarily indeterminate system.  But vikalpa and prapañca are not necessarily 
processes based on ignorance (as I will show in the course of Chapter Four).
In Chapter Two the logic of śūnyatā interpreted as openness was explored from an 
historical literary perspective from Conze’s6 and McCagney’s7 perspectives. Based on 
their argument I suggested that the logic in the PPM bear a striking resemblance to the 
logic used by Nāgārjuna in his writings, particularly with regard to use of the 
phenomenal to refer symbolically to emptiness when viewed from the perspective of 
meditative objectives. 
Specifically Chapter Two focused on the experience of śūnyatā as ākāśa in meditation 
as explored in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras (PPM). This understanding of śūnyatā in the 
PPM provides the basis for the equivalence of saṃvṛti and paramārtha in Nāgārjuna’s 
philosophy from the perspective of śūnyatā as experienced in meditation. It was argued 
that Nāgārjuna follows the same line of logic in the PPM of engaging with saṃvṛti in 
order to come to an understanding of the equivalence of saṃvṛti and paramārtha. 
In this chapter, I am interested in exploring the consequences of ceasing reification in 
pursuit of akasic indeterminacy. Nāgārjuna argues that the problem with saṃvṛti is the 
tendency to project own-being onto sensory data; but when reification does not take 
place, meaning is seen as contingent on dependent origination and therefore Nāgārjuna 
                                                  
6 Conze 1967.
7 McCagney 1997.
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implies that meaning is context-bound and fluid. But while it is true that dependent 
origination points to contextual meaning, the influence of ākāśa on perceiving 
phenomena is that they are indiscernible and not merely contextual. It therefore follows 
that if phenomena are indiscernible they are ultimately meaningless.8
The chapter is critical of current interpretations of Nāgārjuna ’s two-truths formulation, 
based on Candrakīrti and Tsong Khapa (e.g. Garfield in Westerhoff et al 2011), which 
part ways from the southern Indian understanding of śūnyatā in akasic terms and place 
too much emphasis on the nominative aspect of human existence. This chapter will 
examine the nature of space in order to show that the two-truths framework   makes 
better sense in terms of an akasic, process-orientated interpretation of śūnyatā as 
highlighted in  Conze’s writings and developed by McCagney.9 I will focus specifically 
on the idea of indeterminacy that the ākāśa influence connotes. I will argue that 
saṃvṛtisatya and paramārthasatya are equivalent in that both are experienced as 
indeterminate in different ways. But while Nagarjuna’s argument makes logical sense, I 
will suggest that his assertion in MK 24: 14 and VV 70 of phenomena making 
meaningful sense due to their śūnya does not hold.
The chapter is divided into five sections. The first section provides a philosophical 
background to Nāgārjuna’s understanding of śūnyatā. The second section examines the 
                                                  
8 Tillemans (in Westerhoff et al 2011: 153) makes an interesting point when he argues that relativism is 
the result of attributing equal truth-status to opposing statements. In this sense, then, non-realism will 
always result in relativism.
9 Conze 1967; McCagney 1997.
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problems of describing śūnyatā in either realist or non-realist terms. The third section 
looks at the centrality of causality in Nāgārjuna’s understanding of śūnyatā and his 
identification of śūnyatā with pratītyasamutpāda. The fourth section focuses on the 
crucial role of the akasic characteristic of indeterminacy in the identification of śūnyatā 
with pratītyasamutpāda, from both the relative and ultimate points of view.  Finally, the 
fifth section focuses on the impact of indeterminacy on the two-truths formula. But while 
the akasic influence allows Nāgārjuna to make his radical philosophical move of 
identifying śūnyatā with pratītyasamutpāda, his assertions in MK 24:14 and VV 70 
require further supporting argument, I believe. 
The focus on meditational experience that runs through Nāgārjuna’s writings introduced 
the topic of the present chapter.10  In the previous chapter I explored Conze’s and 
McCagney’s argument that Nāgārjuna’s philosophy draws from a non-Āryan Indian 
mindset, which also influenced certain aspects of Āryan culture, early Buddhism and the 
Prajñāpāramitā sūtras  (PPM) I suggested that  there is evidence that the same line of 
non-Aryan influence in Yoga darśana and Sāṃkhyadarśana. I argued that the same 
non-Aryan thought patterns, concerning attaining an experience of unboundedness, 
non-individuated and inclusive understanding of śūnyatā (openness) resulting in 
profound peace through yoga and meditational experience occur in Nāgārjuna’s thought 
śūnyatā. So where as in the previous chapter I explored the sub-problem of under what 
under what conditions does a clear understanding of śūnyatā emerge?  In this chapter I 
                                                  
10 McCagney (1997: 22). See also MK7: 16, 18:7-8 and 26:11.
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will explore the sub-problem that it is still unclear what śūnyatā as a meditational 
experience of openness, as expressed in the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras, means in 
Mādhyamāka philosophy.  Therefore this chapter will focus on the philosophical 
challenges in interpreting śūnyatā as ākāśa in Nāgārjuna’s writings,  in order to resolve 
the central problem of the thesis of how does understanding śūnyatā ensure that 
phenomena makes sense?
I argue, in this chapter, that Nāgārjuna’s approach to the relationship between 
paramārtha and saṃvṛti is non-specific and dependently related.  By ‘non-specific’ I 
mean that Nāgārjuna affirms different interpretations of the relationship between saṃvṛti 
and paramārtha, which are contradictory if not held from the view of śūnya. In this sense 
śūnyatā is open and indeterminate. 11 This makes a philosophical analysis of 
Nāgārjuna’s writings challenging because there is a logical inconsistency in his thinking 
if the terms of his argument are seen as fixed, reified categories. At different points in 
his texts Nāgārjuna affirms the following propositions:
 Acceptance of saṃvṛti as condition of ignorance12
38 – How could something that ceases when ignorance ceases not clearly 
be only a mental creation of that ignorance?
 Acceptance of saṃvṛti as being dependently originated13
1:12 – Moreover, if the effect, nonexistent in those conditions, set in motion 
from those conditions, why is it not set in motion from no conditions?
 Acceptance of the non-reality of saṃvṛti, therefore it need not be opposed 
or negated14
                                                  
11 Garfield argues that meaning depends on conventions that are dependently derived, not due to causal 
efficacy but rather due to the ‘explanatorily useful regularities’ of conventions (1994: 2-4). Such an 
argument falls short of explaining the strong claims to meaning made by Nāgārjuna.
12 Yukti-shāshtikas 37 and 38 (in Jones 2010: Kindle  ebook location 1541).
13 MK 1: 12 (in Jones 2010: Kindle ebook location 126).
14 Yukti-shāshtika 3 (in Jones 2010: Kindle ebook location 1490).
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3 – If entities were in fact real, then why isn’t their absence accepted to be 
liberation from the cycle of rebirths?
 saṃvṛti needs to be renounced15
Thus from the cessation of errors, ignorance is stopped. Where ignorance 
has ceased, disposition, etc, is stopped
 saṃvṛti needs to be quietened but accepted as a conditioned phenomenon 
16
 18:9 – Unconditioned by another, peaceful, not constructed by means of 
false imaginings, free from false discrimination and without purpose, this is 
the mark of reality.17
There is a central contradiction in Nāgārjuna’s thinking that at once seeks to oppose 
saṃvṛti as reification or samāropa, while also accepting that saṃvṛti occurs due to 
dependent origination and this contradiction can only be understood within a rubric that 
interprets śūnyatā as openness. 
I argue that, while Nāgārjuna’s central method is reductio ad absurdum (prasaṅga), his 
identification of pratītyasamutpāda with śūnyatā means that he embraces non-
coherence in his thinking (non-coherence means that that there is not a necessary 
relationship between word of thing. Non-coherence does not imply incoherence from 
Nāgārjuna’s perspective). Paradoxically, he shows that this approach enables us to 
make sense of events and relationships between events due to the association between 
śūnyatā and the sense of openness (ākāśa). Such an association means that truth is an 
experiential value rather than a referential value between subject and object. 
Nāgārjuna’s conflicting and contrasting views of saṃvṛti imply that he does not value 
                                                  
15 MK 23: 23 (in Jones 2010: Kindle ebook location 558).
16 MK 18: 9 (in Jones 2010: Kindle ebook location 442).
17 MK 18: 9  (in McCagney 1997: 182).
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meaning as an iterable or repeatable notion. In fact he means exactly the opposite. If 
meaning were made of repeatable values, then it would imply that substantial entities 
were involved. Rather, because meaning is due to dependent origination, it implies that 
meaning is fluid and dependent on context. This unorthodox approach raises the 
question of whether it is adequate.
By viewing śūnyatā in relation to openness, I part ways with Madhyamikan scholars, 
who follow Candrakīrti and Tsong Khapa in arguing that objects have dual values of 
saṃvṛti and paramārtha, such as Garfield 18 and Thakchoë (2011). 19   Garfield, for 
example, argues that the illusion of water in a mirage is true in relation to the conditions 
that give rise to it, i.e. the illusory water is not not a mirage. His argument suggests that 
the mirage is “real” for the perceiver, while it is also real in its illusory status. By 
contrast, if śūnyatā is understood as openness and paramārtha is equivalent to saṃvṛti, 
then it is plausible to argue that saṃvṛti manifests different aspects of openness 
dependent on the context.
This is a vastly different approach from Vedic philosophy. In the Vedic tradition the 
experience of a stable, unmediated, non-individuated experience of Being evolved into 
the Upaniśadic philosophy of brahman–ātman in the Upaniśads and, in Śankara’s 
philosophy of Advaitā Vedānta , this experience gave rise to the notion of absolute, 
                                                  
18 Westerhoff et al 2011.
19 Westerhoff et al 2011.
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transcendent, all-pervasive Spirit without qualities, called nirguṇa.20 By contrast, in the 
non-Vedic tradition the experience of spirituality is associated, according to Conze,21
with the matriarchal Mother Goddess, which was experienced in the changing of the 
seasons and the fluidity of all movement. These this-worldly influences are apparent in 
the early Buddhist idea of saṃgha, anicca and anattā (by this I mean the latter Buddhist 
central tenets carried no metaphysical import). Nāgārjuna’s writings gave a firm 
foundation to these ideas by emphasising causality, the emptiness of all phenomena 
and process as the basis for meaning.  
2. Early Buddhist philosophy
In order to investigate the claims to meaning in Nāgārjuna’s  philosophy it is necessary 
to examine the roots of Buddhist philosophy, because these early philosophical notions 
were focused on establishing certainty, clarity and definition within different types of 
human experience. The Buddha never presented his Dharma philosophically. Instead, 
his Dharma had a healing and soteriological focus with the aim of diagnosing the 
causes of and release from suffering.22 Nāgārjuna’s writings participated in the later 
Buddhist philosophical tradition, which began with the Abhidhamma. It is accepted by 
                                                  
20 Raju (1985: 408).
21 Conze (1967: 125).
22 Garfield, however, argues that Nāgārjuna is largely soteriological in his approach in that his aim is to 
overcome grasping and craving (1995: 314). In this regard, A.C. Grayling makes an interesting 
observation about philosophy:  “Philosophy is far more accurately conceived of as a form of prophylaxis, 
part of the anticipation of living, involving thought in advance about how one would try to brace oneself in 
grief, or how one would try to cling to ideals and principles, beliefs and hopes, even when one is 
profoundly depressed, or faced with failure” (2006: 4).  This contrasts with the Buddha’s soteriological 
approach.
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Buddhist scholars that Nāgārjuna, in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, addresses his 
argument against the Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika philosophical movements (although 
Sauntrāntika was not an ordained lineage. In the sense that we have no evidence that it 
had a monastic code of its own and may just have been a Sarvāstivādin subsect and 
does not invalidate it as a philosophical movement). His aim was to establish a firm 
foundation for the Dharma without getting lost in debates about the properties of 
phenomena. It has been argued that he wanted to re-emphasise the Buddha’s teaching 
of anattā apart from the malaise that existed in the debates about the nature of mental 
phenomena between the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas within the Sthaviravāda
sect. 23 For Nāgārjuna, śūnyatā is Buddhism’s central philosophy. But Nāgārjuna 
believed that Buddhism had lost its way in its thinking about this central concept. The 
roots of the confusion can be traced back to early Buddhist philosophy in the 
Abhidharma, the aim of which was to enumerate all possible human experiences. 
Eighty-two experiences were identified and defined: eighty-one were classified as 
conditioned dhamma (Pali, Sanskrit dharma or elements of existence) and one 
experience, nibbāna, was marked out as being unconditioned.24 This enquiry seems to 
have been premised on granting the experience of mental phenomena a unique status. 
The question that arose amongst monks was: “what is the nature of such unique mental 
                                                  
23 Krüger (2007: 58).
24 The distinction between subjective and objective is often blurred in Buddhist philosophy. Terms such as 
existence and experience seem to overlap, although it would be rash to venture a mystical understanding. 
For example, at times Nāgārjuna seems to be referring to objects of experience as experiences of 
consciousness and, at other times, consciousness seems to be responding to raw data. Indeed, it seems 
to me that pratītyasamutpāda is a middle ground between what is disclosed and what remains 
undisclosed about existence, although my leaning is towards a phenomenological rather than a dualist 
approach because Nāgārjuna’s understanding of saṃvṛti is more constructionist than not.
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objects?” 25 The Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntrikas parted ways on this question. The 
Sarvastivadins argued that mental objects were inherently unconditioned, despite the 
fact that they all were subject to arising and cessation. Accordingly, mental objects 
always possess independent own-existence, or svabhāva. The unique, unconditioned 
status of mental objects allows them to be known as dhammas or “as they really are”. 
The roots of this thinking lie in the Abhidamma, where all experiences were recognised 
to have unique characteristics. The Sarvāstivādins separated dhammas into two 
groups: primary existents or dravyasat, which are sensory data; and secondary 
existents, constructed out of primary existents, concepts and conceptual existents 
(prajñāptisat ).26
The issue for the Sarvāstivādins was the impermanence of all dhammas, in particular 
those that existed in the past and those that will exist in the future. The challenge was to 
work out the nature of their unique existence and how they related to each other. The 
Sarvāstivādins explained dhammas as existing both a-temporally and temporally. A 
dhamma’s a-temporal nature gives it its own existence and allows  it to be known in 
                                                  
25 In Indian metaphysics the mind is seen as one of the senses. Ideas are considered as sense-objects 
and are therefore placed in the same category as material objects (Jones 2010: Kindle ebook location 
1869).
26 Williams (2000: 93). Burton argues that when Nāgārjuna refers to entities that are empty of svabhāva
he means prajñāptisat. This vitiates Nāgārjuna’s argument against the Abhidharmikas because, 
according to Burton, the Abhidharmikas always kept the concept of dependently originated entities 
separate from the concept of dependently designated entities (prajñāptisat). Lack of svabhāva could only 
be proved in that system if the dharma can be shown to have parts, and to call the causes and conditions 
“parts”, as  Nāgārjuna does, is to do violence to the  very notion of parts. Walser counters this argument 
by referring to the Sumyutta Nikāya 1:552, which the Sarvāstivādins would have accepted.  All Nāgārjuna 
has to do then to convince the Sarvāstivādins is to show that there are no existents, therefore all is empty 
of own being (Walser 2010: 242 & 243).
100
abstract terms. This was particularly useful in recognising the dharma of past and future 
objects and concepts. However, all dhammas become active in the present when the 
right conditions arise and they bring about an experiential effect.27 Their essence is 
derived from the actions in the world. Whether primary or secondary existents exist in 
the past, present or the future, they were argued to exert an effect on each other 
because they have own-being even after cessation. The only way this can make sense 
is if there exists an a-temporal substratum of dharmas. They therefore operate as 
”ontological glue” on each other and for each other. 
The Sautrāntikas were monks who held that the Buddha’s sutras were the only valid 
authority. They rejected the existence of dharmas in three time periods and held that the 
only reality was the present dharma, since dharmas can only exert activity in the 
present.  Each dharma has an indivisible momentary existence in time (that is, it does 
not have an a-temporal existence), but, similar to the Sarvāstivādin view, it has its 
dharma through its characteristic activity and influence in the world.28 Cessation arises 
almost simultaneously with existence. So closely are existence and non-existence 
associated that their intertwining goes beyond linguistic explanation. The closest 
                                                  
27 There seems to be a contradiction in the logic here. Either dharma derives its svabhāva from its a-
temporal quality, or its svabhāva is linked intrinsically to its characteristic activity. It is difficult to 
understand how svabhāva can be associated primarily with both a mental object’s temporal and a-
temporal qualities.
28 Williams (2000: 118) points out that a dialogical relationship existed between the Sarvāstivādins and 
the Sautrāntikas. In many monasteries both groups coexisted and engaged in hermeneutical discussion. 
This is an important point to bear in mind. A similar dynamic occurred in monasteries later on when 
Theravada and Mahayana monks also lived in the same monasteries. Scholars such as Harrison and 
Schopen maintain that it is inaccurate to view Theravāda and Mahāyāna as being discrete schools within 
Buddhism based on inscriptional evidence found in monasteries (in Williams 2000:104). I find this an 
important piece of   research because it implies that meaning is arrived at dialogically and is not a result 
of pure reasoning detached from historical context.
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language can come to approaching a description of this dynamic is a continuous 
process devoid of substance or being.29
According to the Sautrāntikas, perception is a construction (savikalpa) from the 
unconstructed thing seen (nirvikalpa). Savikalpas plant seeds of erroneous perceptions 
in the mental continuum, which give rise to a “constructed mental reality’” For this 
argument to make sense, as it did for the Sarvāstivādins, a continuum of subtle mental 
consciousness that connects momentary experiences is posited. 30 The notion of a 
substratum of consciousness is not clarified by either the Sarvāstivādins or 
Sautrāntikas. 31 It seems to be an “adhesive” that binds reality in both of their 
frameworks; but neither group explores it fully.32
In early Buddhist philosophy the need to reify experience led to a struggle to integrate 
concepts with sensory data, giving rise to a struggle to integrate impermanence with 
identifiable experiences of objects. This is an on-going debate in Buddhist philosophy 
and many of  Nāgārjuna’s commentators have participated in it. Certain early Buddhist 
philosophers, such as the Abhidharmists, maintain that it is simply not sensible to argue 
that experiences cannot be categorised in a normative sense. But the earliest accounts 
                                                  
29 Nāgārjuna also addresses the doctrine of momentariness in the Ratnāvali, where he argues that it can 
neither be affirmed or denied (Rt 1: 66-77). But his position is that momentariness is valid only if “those 
moments are empty” (Walser 2010: 263).
30 Williams (2000: 121).
31 The notions of a-temporal dhammas and subtle consciousness were developed later by the Yogācarins 
into a very sophisticated form of psycho-philosophy, but is difficult to ascertain how far particularly the 
Sautrāntikas developed an idea of subtle consciousness by themselves.
32 Williams( 2000: 111-122).
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of the Buddha’s teachings represent objects as purely obscurational and therefore 
arbitrary in terms of the principles of anicca and anattā. The notion dharmas as 
identified in Abhidharma seems to an imposition on the Buddha’s teachings Later 
Madhyamikan philosophers, such as Candrakīrti, attempt to integrate relative with 
ultimate values by maintaining that objects have both aspects. In contrast to these 
scholars, my argument in this chapter is that Nāgārjuna does enough to overcome the 
issue of phenomenal experience if śūnyatā is interpreted along the lines of ākāśa as set 
up in the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras by identifying pratītyasamutpāda with śūnyatā and 
thereby showing that conventional knowledge exists as a result of  mutual 
dependence. 33 The question of how mutual dependence leads to meaningful 
understanding between phenomena requires deeper reflection, which will be 
undertaken in Chapter Four.
2.1 The emergence of Nāgārjuna’s understanding of emptiness
The importance of the two absolutely authentic texts by Nāgārjuna, the 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MK) and the Vigrahavyāvartanī (VV), in Mahāyāna Buddhist 
philosophy can be likened to the effect of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason on Western 
thought if one considers the impact Nāgārjuna’s thought on śūnyatā had on later 
Buddhist thought. Nāgārjuna’s explanation of śūnyatā had profound implications for 
meaning, not only in Buddhism but in the Indian philosophical tradition, in that his 
                                                  
33 Newland and Tillemans in Westerhoff et al (2011: 14).
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arguments show the erroneous logic34 in substantialist thought. He developed his two-
truths framework from the earlier Buddhist two-truths framework that distinguished 
conventional knowledge from ultimate knowledge. 35 This framework influenced the 
division between nirguṇa and Saguṇa in Advaitā Vedānta and shaped later Mahāyāna
philosophy in vijñāvāda, vajrayāna and Zen schools of Buddhism. But the key issue in  
Nāgārjuna’s understanding of śūnyatā is his identification of  it with pratītyasamutpāda. 
In this regard śūnyatā is better translated as openness, I maintain, following the 
influence of ākāśa in the prajñāpāramitāsūtras.  Nāgārjuna’s highlighting of 
pratītyasamutpāda has several very important implications. First, saṃsāra is equivalent 
to nirvāṇa , therefore the two truths, saṃvṛti satya and paramārthasatya, are equivalent 
forms of knowledge in that they are both infinitely open.36  Second, following logically 
from the latter, the two-truths notion is a flat framework rather than hierarchical; 
therefore reality is shared, open and hence radically non-dualistic. It is only in the state 
of ignorance (avidyā) that grasping (tṛṣņā) occurs and the inequality of value places 
conflicting meaning onto representations.37 I argue that the two-truths framework and 
Nāgārjuna’s proposition that all phenomena are empty of own-being have profound 
metaphysical implications for meaning and purpose. Later Buddhist traditions struggled 
with his argument and in varying ways rejected it as nihilistic and therefore 
                                                  
34 It is argued by various scholars, such as Kalupahana, that Nāgārjuna’s thought represents pragmatic 
philosophy rather than theoretical philosophy. This chapter, in part, argues that pragmatism is an 
unfortunate term to describe Nāgārjuna’s work because it implies an over-emphasis on saṃvṛti. Such an 
argument places too much reliance on sensory data and therefore cannot attain the inclusive sense of 
knowledge that Nāgārjuna proposes (1986: 88-90).
35 McCagney (1997: 84).
36 MK 25: 19 (in McCagney 1997: 209).
37 McCagney (1997: 104).
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unsustainable.38 By contrast, I argue that Nāgārjuna was not nihilistic and that it is the 
criticism of his philosophy that leads to nihilism, as it is founded on an illogical 
attachment to the perceived world, its acquired meaning and “concreteness”.
Importantly, the third implication of his two-truths formulation is that knowledge is non-
fixed, insubstantial, non-referential and mysterious. This means that renouncing 
reification is crucial. This third implication raises certain problems, which I will explore in  
this chapter and the next. But making sense in saṃvṛti is possible because the world is 
presented as navigable. This implies that the two epistemological processes that are 
associated with saṃvṛti (vikalpa and prapañca) are reliable. But it also presents a world 
that logically should not exist.  If the conceptual world is empty, then why should it 
exist?  Nāgārjuna does not explain why knowledge splits between paramārtha and 
saṃvṛti, nor does he explain why knowledge is a reliable source of information beyond 
his broad term explanation of dependent-origination. He does highlight the prevalence 
of reification in saṃvṛti, but he is not clear that saṃvṛti will cease when imposition and 
projection are ceased.  This means that the imaginings of vikalpa are not fixed, but open 
to be seen contextually and are interdependently related to other concepts and objects. 
Nonetheless, I aver that mutual dependency is not an adequate framework for 
establishing coherent meaning due to its inherent relativity.39
                                                  
38 Williams argues that Mahāyāna Buddhism, which preceded Nagarjuna, struggled to find a place for his 
philosophy, arguing that Nāgārjuna’s philosophy amounted to nihilism, despite Candrakīrti and 
Bhavaviveka’s attempts to interpret Nāgārjuna’s work in a more mainstream Mahāyāna context (2000: 
149).
39 Garfield (in Westerhoff et al 2011: 28-35). Garfield argues that the two truths, paramārthsatya and 
saṃvṛtisatya, are reliable sources of of knowledge in terms of the cognitive instruments which produce 
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In this thesis I argue that Nāgārjuna’s reading of śūnyatā as pratītyasamutpāda resolves 
the philosophical problem of semantic inconsistency within a philosophical system 
based on non-realist principles. Samsaric and nirvanic equivalence shifts knowledge to 
process from a normative orientation based on the indeterminacy of phenomena in that 
causality is indentified with Wisdom or truth. This chapter questions whether knowing in 
terms of process orientation as a consequence of recognising the flow of 
pratītyasamutpāda and the interdependence between representations provides an 
adequate condition for meaning. In order to answer this question, I will examine 
Nāgārjuna’s logic in terms of his defence of the indeterminacy of phenomena. My 
argument includes a defence of McCagney,40 who holds that contradiction must be 
accepted as a fundamental facet of  Nāgārjuna’s thought due to the unfixed referent, 
given that words do not have a fixed denotative meaning. I maintain that Nāgārjuna is 
able to present a coherent argument in favour of dependently originated phenomena 
due to his understanding of reality and philosophy as infinitely open systems. As a result 
he identifies the difficulty of confusing activity for essence as found in earlier forms of 
Buddhism, such as the Abhidharma, which attempts to integrate impermanence with 
identifiable experiences of objects, as shown in both Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika. But 
while Nāgārjuna’s logic, based on pratītyasamutpāda and derived from akasic 
                                                                                                                                                                   
them. He follows the argument by Candrakīrti that views objects belonging to two epistemological 
cateogries – paramārtha and saṃvṛt. These two instruments are a consequence of dependent-
origination. While dependent-origination provides a logical consequence for a view of knowledge that is 
non-fixed, insubstantial and non-referential, it does not explain how meaning occurs. Chapter Four argues 
that the use of metaphoricity as derived from the PPM offers a viable explanation for how meaning occurs 
within Nāgārjuna’s dependent-orgination framework. Tillemans (in Westerhoff et al 2011: 163), however, 
follows the route of upāya where the two truths are not seen as identical or equivalent but rather that the 
two truths are seen as rungs on a ladder to truth i.e. they function as learning devices .
40 McCagney (1997: 112).
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indeterminacy, is coherent, his argument does not clearly explain how meaning arises in 
the experience of an identifiable yet empty object.
3. Realism and non-realism
In order to clarify the ideas of subtle and a-temporal consciousness that post-
Abhidharma Sarvāstivādin and Sautrāntika monks were wrestling with, I will turn to 
similar debates in Western philosophy between realism and anti-realism.  Realism, 
particularly with regard to universals, holds that the properties of things exist without any 
causal factors bringing them into existence; that is, they exist abstractly. For the anti-
realist, however, a square, for example, could only exist if it existed in the world. Both 
realism and anti-realism face logical problems. Plato, the arch-realist, had difficulty in 
explaining how a particular property related to its abstract counterpart. His idea of 
Forms held that perfect abstract forms had their imperfect copies in the world. But he 
could not establish a clear demarcation between abstract and concrete categories.41 For 
example, the property of “greyness” in the imperfect copy, for example in my wife's 
Mitsubishi, becomes an abstract form of ”greyness” at some undetermined point. It is, 
however, impossible to identify when this occurs. The danger is that the image of 
greyness slips into infinite regress of imperfect copies because ”greyness” always 
seems to have a spatio-temporal existence: even when I am driving my red Fiat from 
Johannesburg to Pretoria and thinking of “greyness”, the image has spatio-temporal co-
                                                  
41  Cratylus 439-440 in Jowett (2011:  55).
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ordinates. Plato also tried to argue that concrete objects participate or share in universal 
qualities, but the vagueness of his description undermines it. Plato does not make 
explicit how such sharing occurs in abstraction.  For instance, is it an infinite quantity, or 
does sharing with concrete objects diminish the abstract quality in some way, perhaps? 
Idealism in India does not interrogate the relation between concrete objects and 
abstract universals to the degree that Plato attempted. In Indian philosophy, which is 
permeated by idealism but is not entirely grounded in the latter, each person observes 
the world from their own standpoint, caught in the reciprocal relation between prameya
and pramāna. A person, then, is encased in their own subjective experience.42  
The Sarvāstivādins’ and Sautrāntikas’ could be positing of a substratum of 
consciousness suggesting an exploration into realist-type thought where dharmas are 
seen to have inherent properties. The monks would then encounter similar difficulties in 
confirming these posited inherent properties.
Anti-realists, by contrast, argue that phenomena can be explained by any of three 
methods:  conceptually, nominally, or by tropes.
                                                  
42 This trend of thinking is discussed in Sarma’s Reign of realism in Indian Philosophy  (1937). 
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The Buddha’s teachings articulate views that are  close to an anti-realist position; and, 
indeed, so do Nāgārjuna’s texts.43 However, anti-realism also faces challenges, which a 
non-essentialist, such as Nāgārjuna, would have to answer. If properties are held to be 
conceptual, then reality falters at being totally dependent on mind. This is absurd, as is 
obvious when we suggest that Pluto did not come into existence when it was discovered 
in 1930, despite the fact that it is not empirically verifiable. Common-sense tells us so. 
Nāgārjuna is not campaigning for a Berkeleyan world view; but we (and he) still need to 
clarify what it means for an object to be a conceptual construct. If nominalism 
determines the properties of phenomena, then we are still working with abstracts 
because a class must be, in some way, an abstract entity. Finally, the idea of tropes 
implies that objects have particular qualities. But if particulars have specific tropes, how 
do tropes relate to the context of experience? For example, if I look at the cream phone 
on my desk, I would like to know how the trope of individual creaminess of the phone on 
the desk is shared with other cream objects.44 In terms of these challenges, Nāgārjuna’s 
argument that phenomena are dependently arisen and that śūnyatā is the basis of all 
existence45 needs to be closely interrogated. 
Nāgārjuna appears to be challenging an encroachment of ”Realism” into Sthaviravāda. 
The a-temporal property of dharma, which both Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika (despite 
their emphasis on momentariness) fall back on, suggests that dhammas have an 
abstract existence independent of temporality. This is not to advocate that Nāgārjuna 
                                                  
43 See Siderits (2003: 150)
44 Swartz, N., 1991: 263-267.
45 Inada (1993: 147).
109
would be in agreement with the anti-realist position. He would also question the anti-
realist view of sensory phenomena as having specific existent properties, as he 
maintains that things are fundamentally empty.46
Nāgārjuna finds a distinguishing line of argument, not just against the Abhidharma line 
of thought, but also theoretically against realism and anti-realism. He criticises his 
opponent’s obsession with defining the properties of sensory phenomena by arguing 
that there cannot be inherent sensory phenomena because there is no perceiver to 
perceive them. In his view, identity, sensory instruments and sensory phenomena have 
an interdependent relation with each other.47 Chapter 9: 6-8 of the MK reads:
6 Nothing exists prior to
All such things as seeing.
Another one of such things as seeing
                                                  
46 Siderits (2003: 150-157) argues that anti-realism offers a view of knowledge that occupies the middle 
ground between “deflationism about truth and epistemologized truth”.  By this he means that anti-realism 
does not imply that, because knowledge is contextual, we should therefore deny the possibilities of 
knowing anything. Knowing can rely on certain testable assumptions. This argument  unfortunately 
presents a very simplified view of anti-realism. Siderits does not explain what he means by anti-realism in 
terms of the different types of anti-realism discussed above. However, his point is well made and  forms 
the basis of my argument later in this chapter. Contextual knowledge is not invalidated by its relativity. A 
context, though propositionally grounded, can and often does offer a large enough epistemological 
”space” with enough stability to make predictable statements. Certain statements, such as those 
specifying the distance between Cape Town and Johannesburg, are set within very stable propositions 
and conditions. Some thinkers, such as Priest, Siderits and Tillemans (in Westerhoff et al 2011), explore 
the limits of deflationary truth to the point of questioning the value of absolute truth. This position seems 
to be approaching the Prāsangika School of Madhaymaka who refrained from notions of absolute truth as 
opposed to the Svāntantrika-Mādhyamika  ascribed to Bhavaviveka who did assert an absolute truth. In 
their attempt to explain conventional truth in terms of Aristotelian logic of the excluded middle, they do not 
take into account Nāgārjuna’s understanding of pratītyasamupāda in relation to understanding
phenomenal objects.
47 See, for example, Dreyfus and Garfield  (in Westerhoff et al 2011: 118).They argue that Patsab 
Nyimadrak, the translator and commentator of Candrakirti’s works, reading of Nāgārjuna avoids the realist 
problem because, for him, Madhyamikan arguments do not  set out to prove truth or falsity, but  “rather 
debunk our naïve assumptions that things exist the way they appear to us.” This argument would have to 
account for what Nāgārjuna means in VV 70 for example. Surely his position, in this verse, is not merely 
one of debunking naïve epistemology. 
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Discloses another at another time
7 If it does not exits
Prior to all of such things as seeing,
How could it exist
Prior to each of such things as seeing?
8 If the seer itself is the hearer itself,
And the feeler, then
For it to exist prior to each of these
Would make no sense.48
While this quotation makes logical sense in dispelling the myth of prior existences as 
absurd, it does not explain  how phenomena are meaningfully encountered in the light 
of pratītyasamutpāda and how they have their basis in śūnyatā. To expand on the 
absurd idea that Pluto only came into existence on its discovery in 1930, Nāgārjuna 
indeed seems to be making  a similar claim. But in VV 70 and MK 24: 14 he does not 
suggest such an absurd reality. By contrast, he asserts that phenomena and concepts 
make sense if we see them in the light of śūnyatā. In the next section I will explore how 
Nāgārjuna attempts to establish the conditions of meaning within a framework of
śūnyatā.
4. The importance of indeterminacy in Nāgārjuna’s identification of 
śūnyatā with pratītyasamutpāda
Instead of dwelling on the issues of dhamma or dharmas that concerned the
Abhidharmists, Sarvāstivādins (who were a form of Abhidarma) and Sautrāntikas, 
Nāgārjuna returned to the Buddha’s original focus of causality, which provided the 
                                                  
48 McCagney:  (1997: 159)
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foundation of his understanding of anattā and anicca.49  Causality, according to the 
Buddha, was not self-caused (as in monism), nor externally caused (as in dualism). It 
was not subject to any of the flaws inherent in either eternalism or annihilationism, 
determinism (although this is debatable according to Charles Goodman) 50 or 
accidentalism. The Buddha understood cause as a dynamic and complex set of 
interdependent and contextual factors. But it was also universal in its reach across an 
infinite number of worlds, time and space. The two early Buddhist concepts of 
Idappaccayatā (idampratyayatā in Sanskrit) or conditionality and paticcasamuppāda
(pratītyasamutpāda in Sanskrit) or dependent origination, were the root ideas of his 
understanding of causality. It is a complex set of interdependent influences that causes 
each context or condition to be constantly evolving or devolving.51
Nāgārjuna directly refers to śūnyatā neither being eternalism or annihilationism when 
referring to Samyaktāgama 301 (Samyutta Nikāya (SN) 12:15) or the Buddha’s 
discourse to Kātyāyana (Kaccāyanagotta Sutta) in MK 15: 7. The sutta reads:
Everything exists: That is one extreme
Everything does not exist: That is the second extreme
Avoiding these two extremes the Tathāgata teaches the dhamma via the 
middle way52
                                                  
49 Kalapuhana, (1986: 31).
50 Goodman (2009: 151)
51 Krüger, (1995: 102).
52 Kalupahana (1975: 79).
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Kalupahana argues that the entire MK should be read as a commentary on the 
Buddha’s Discourse to Kātyāyana. 53 There is merit in this assertion because 
Nāgārjuna’s understanding of śūnyatā is inclusive in nature: it should not be identified 
exclusively with saṃvṛti or paramārtha, neither should it identified with nihilism or 
substantialism. Indeed, attaching śūnyatā to any concept creates a misunderstanding of 
its meaning. But it seems reductionistic of Kalupahana to suggest that Nāgārjuna is only 
commenting on Sutta 12: 15 in the SN. Surely Nāgārjuna would have read more suttas 
that preceded and followed it in the SN, which may have informed his thinking. For 
example, SN12:61 (Assutavā Sutta) concerns the way causality impacts on the fluidity 
between non-existence and existence. It reads:
When this is, that comes to be;
With arising of this, that arises.
When this is not, that does not come to be;
With the cessation of this, that ceases.54
The Buddha describes causality in this sūtta as sets of conditions that mutually 
interconnect through complex causal strands. When one thing is grasped it transforms 
the understanding simultaneously not only of what is being grasped, but also the actor 
who is doing the grasping, namely mind, consciousness, body or another actor in terms 
of the Buddha’s 12 nidāna development of ignorance due to pratītyasamutpāda . 
Nāgārjuna describes this process in MK 26 in his explanation of pratītyasamutpāda. It is 
clear that if you refer to SN 12: 15 you are in effect referring to the entire sutta 12 on 
pratītyasamutpāda. I believe, though, that Nāgārjuna is not reiterating the 12 niddāna
                                                  
53 Kalupahana (1986: 5).
54 Tipitaka:  The Pali texts.  Archived online at:  
http//www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn12/sn12.061.than.html, firstaccessed 2 August 2012.
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understanding of pratītyasamutpāda, but rather redefining pratītyasamutpāda in terms of 
its identity with śūnyatā, thereby inverting the use of pratītyasamutpāda as a means to 
understand emptiness rather than to understand the processes of ignorance. In this 
regard Chapter 26 of the MK does not fit logically into Nāgārjuna’s revised interpretation 
of pratītyasamutpāda in terms of its identity with śūnyatā. For this reason I concur with 
Jones’s suggestion that Chapter 26 may not be authentic, when compared with  the rest 
of the text’s authorship.55
Based on  SN chapter 12, we can infer that the Buddha’s understanding of causality 
was framed by the logic of the interlinked casual chain of the twelve Niddānas explained 
in various sections of the Suttapitaka. In these sections the Buddha explains how 
conditioning occurs through repeated contact with sensory objects. 
Nāgārjuna’s approach to causality is concerned with deconstructing sensory constructs 
and concepts in order to lay bare the inherent emptiness or śūnyatā of all primary and 
complex sense objects by applying the logic of pratītyasamutpāda in which he includes 
the notion of idampratyayatā. He identifies causality with emptiness.56 He understands 
emptiness as the middle ground between eternalism and annihilationism when he 
argues that existents are only conceptual constructs. 57 . He wanted to rescue the 
                                                  
55 Jones (2010: Kindle ebook location 2321-3522).
56 Williams (2000: 145).
57 Nāgārjuna refers specifically to the Discourse to Kātyāyana 11: 17, where the Buddha rejects the view 
that all exists and all does not exist. The middle way is presented as a middle way between the two 
views. Nāgārjuna in MK 15: 10-11 interprets this to mean the rejection of views that everything is eternal 
and that everything is annihilated. It is interesting to note that Joseph Walser (2005: 170-171) argues that 
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Buddha’s Dharma from contemplations on ideas of own-being, but also wanted to 
prevent the notion of insubstantiality in the Dharma from slipping into annihilationism.58
Thus, as Williams avers, emptiness became synonymous with dependent-origination: all 
things are subject to causes and conditions. This includes the origination of dharmas
that are empty of primary, substantial existence.  This implies that all things are sensory 
or conceptual constructs, according to Nāgārjuna.59
But does this mean that Nāgārjuna  wanted to make the same absurd claims as the 
conceptualist anti-realists, namely that things exist only as mental constructs? (The 
example relating to Pluto, which I cited earlier, demonstrates the internal contradictions 
of these claims.)60  Williams argues that the Madhyamaka position of empty primary 
existences is untenable due to its ultimate nihilism.61 Rather than ascribing a divine 
creative power to perception, Nāgārjuna challenges the existence of inherent nature by 
appealing to the logic of transformation. He therefore refutes the claim that perception 
proves existence. On reflection, he argues, all objects are in a state of transformation 
and this only makes sense if described in terms of causality. In addition, an inherent 
quality could not transform into another quality. Transformation, according to Nāgārjuna, 
implies two assumptions: first, that things have no inherent nature and, second, that all 
                                                                                                                                                                   
such views may have been very contentious at the time amongst non-Mahāyāna Buddhists (in Jones 
2010: Kindle ebook location 2083). 
58 Williams makes a similar point when he argues that the signature of a Madhyamika is the 
”universalization of the idea of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) …. Thus it should come as no 
surprise to find in Madhyamaka sources emptiness equated with dependent origination (MK 24: 18)” 
(2000: 140).
59 Williams (2000: 150).
60 In Lockean terms, such conceptualist thinking argues that things have secondary existence without any 
primary existence.
61 Williams (2000: 149).
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transformation is a consequence of pratītyasamutpāda. Nāgārjuna argues in Chapter 
Thirteen that a quality cannot prevail against transformation:
4 -   If there were nature
How could there be transformation?
If there were inherent existence then  
5 - A thing itself is without transformation
Nor is transformation in something else,
Because a young man does not age,
And because an aged man does not age either. (add a reference here)
But this logic does not make Nāgārjuna necessarily a non-realist. The thrust of his 
argument is that it is ludicrous to ascribe a nature to sensory constructs because they 
are always in a state of transformation. Anti-realist62 logic asserts that if perception 
holds a singularity of reference, then surely three axioms apply:
1. It is qualitatively identical to itself.
2. It is numerically identical to itself
3. Whatever is numerically identical is qualitatively identical.63
Nāgārjuna challenges the anti-realist logic that a thing’s qualities are identical to 
themselves because perception is unreliable and tends to impose values on sensory 
data that are non-existent. Even at a microscopic level there is continual flux and a 
                                                  
62 The terms anti-realism and non realism are used interchangeably by philosophers. See for example that Swartz 
uses the term non-realist (1991: 263) and Siderits uses the term anti realist (2003;91).
63 Swartz (1991: 230).
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mental construct is merely a consequence of pratītyasamutpāda. 64 It is, therefore, 
erroneous to identify a thing as an independent, separate entity. Here I find Nāgārjuna’s 
argument wanting because causality is also subject to the vagaries of perception. 
Perception can err in determining the sequence or complex of events that give rise to an 
event.65
Nāgārjuna maintains that meaning is established without conceding either to “realism” 
(substantialism) or ”anti-realism” (constructivism) by emphasising causality. He does 
this by identifying pratītyasamutpāda with śūnyatā in chapter 24 of the MK.66 He bases 
this identification on understanding causality as interrelatedness and interdependence. 
Therefore śūnyatā cannot be defined as either having a quality of emptiness or a having 
a complete lack of qualities. Śūnyatā is the process of pratītyasamutpāda and hence 
cannot, as Williams avers, be nihilistic because there is never a final state of 
nothingness. 
                                                  
64 In MK 14: 5-6 Nāgārjuna argues that we cannot talk about a thing being identical to itself because that 
presumes it possess own-being. A perceived thing is a relational product of three contributing causal
facets: the act of seeing, the one who sees and the object. A thing therefore cannot be compared to itself 
without considering its contributing relational properties.
65 The realist retort to this position is that not all concepts are subject to inaccuracies of perception that 
mistakenly ascribe individual nature.  Numbers, for example, are exempt from these flaws:  one plus one 
will always equal two, no matter what conditions are present. With this retort we are heading back to a 
Platonic framework of ideals, but we have already discussed the problem Plato had in establishing his 
realist structure. Swartz avers: “Two thousand years of mathematics has proceeded apace with no viable 
explication of number at all” (1991: 245). But the intuitive sense of the concept of number has not been 
further explained. Despite the difficulties with Plato’s Forms, it is hard not to be a reluctant realist for the 
sake of establishing consistency in meaning in the face of an intuitive sense of things containing primary 
qualities and mathematical and empirical testability.
66 MK 24: 18 (in McCagney 1997: 202).
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Nāgārjuna explains how knowledge of the constantly transforming process of 
pratītyasamutpāda can be attained. His notion of causality is not linear. 
Pratītyasamutpāda is universal, lying beyond time and space (but not in an abstract 
metaphysical sense). Perhaps this is the best way to interpret his confusing reference to 
primordial substance in Chapter 17: 14 of the MK. Though the senses may construe 
causal relations, they do not represent the actual imperceptible causal network of 
relations. Verses 14 and 15 in Chapter 17 lay down his understanding of 
pratītyasamutpāda/śūnyatā. It is indeterminable, imperishable and primordial. Saṃvṛti is 
born from it and therefore shares its “nature”.
14.  What is imperishable is like a promissary note and an action like a 
debt. It has four kinds of elements and it is indeterminable in primordial 
substance.
15. The imperishable is not abandoned by the act of abandonment or by 
unabandoned meditation, therefore, by means of the imperishable, the fruit 
is born out of action.  
Verse 10 issues a corrective warning. Though saṃvṛti shares its “nature” with its origin, 
that origin is neither substantial nor discrete. 
Since from thinking there is continuity and from continuity, origin of thought, 
thought is prior to thinking. Therefore, there is neither disruption nor 
permanence.67
                                                  
67 Chapter 17 in the MK is intriguing. Scholars such as Kalupahana, Inada, Garfield and McCagney 
interpret verses 10, 14 and 15 in different ways. The difficulty that these verses present is that they allude 
to ideas such as substance (prakṛti in verse 14) that clearly have no place in the common lexicon of 
Buddhist thought. Although it is clear that Nāgārjuna is not positing a notion of eternal substance, he is 
pointing to the role of thought, the origin of thought and mindfulness in recognizing the state of 
phenomena as neither permanent nor non-permanent. Garfield (1995) is reluctant give expression to 
substance, but in doing so he loses the importance of the role of mindfulness being articulated in the 
chapter. He translates prakṛti as ”nature is neutral”, which does not lend itself to the sense of mutual 
dependence being expressed. Kalupahana (1986) and McCagney (1997: 177) hold to the accurate 
translation of prakṛti   as ”primal substance but highlight the indeterminacy related to the term. Inada 
(1993), perhaps the finest translator of Nāgārjuna, offers the most accurate translation by including both 
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While the mind engages in saṃvṛti it is also always situated in the insubstantial, non-
conceptual origin of thought as well. 68 Newland makes use of the phrase that 
phenomena make sense by “being posited through the force of awareness.”69 Due to 
his reliance on Tsong Khapa he errs in suggesting that the “force of awareness is purely 
reducible to conventional consciousness”.70  But surely Nāgārjuna is arguing in verse 15 
that cognitive action and awareness of emptiness are dependently related.
In this thesis I explore the way the mind is understood by Nāgārjuna, not as an entity, 
but in relational terms.  Equally, I examine how  mindfulness is not accomplished 
without engagement with karma. The spiritual process described here echoes the logic 
expressed in the PPM, that is, by engaging with limited and fixed phenomena and views 
but viewing them from a limitless/akasic point of view, which is derived from the use of 
ākāśa in the PPM to explain the “nature” of śūnyatā (as explored in Chapter Two). For 
                                                                                                                                                                   
mutually dependent aspects of the realm of action and the indeterminate standpoint of prakṛti, which in 
this sense refers to the deepest awareness or śūnyatā.
68 In MK 17: 4 mindfulness is identified as the means by which false ideas are overcome. Again 
mindfulness suggests the mutual dependency of words, deeds and śūnyatā. Newland in Westerhoff 
(2010: 57) follows Tsong Khapa’s and Candrakīrti’s position regarding the two truths, namely that there 
are two cognitive objects related to the two types of truth. His reasoning runs into contradictions and is 
unable argue that Nāgārjuna’s two-truths doctrine only makes sense in terms of the interdependence of 
saṃvrti and paramārtha. Newland argues that saṃvrti  is distinctly identifiable. This forces him to argue 
that saṃvrti is a lower level of truth than paramārtha. These two assumptions lead him to the 
contradictory assertion that “these worlds are external to – but never independent of – our minds”. He, 
therefore, chooses to remain on the fence regarding the existence of an omniscient mind. Nāgārjuna is 
proposing that the two-truths formulation makes sense in terms of pratītyasamutpāda. Therefore it does 
not make sense to separate saṃvrti and paramārtha.
69Newland in Westerhoff et al (2011: 63).
70 This argue is supported by Berger (2010: 14), when he argues that Western translations of MK 24: 18 
have been influenced by Candrakīrti’s analysis of language being purely conventional. Berger argues that 
such an idea is illogical when applied to this verse because, if the identity of pratītyasamutpāda and  
śūnyatā is only meaningful at a conventional level, then  Nāgārjuna’s point does not make sense because 
it does not refer to anything true or real.
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this reason I cannot agree with Garfield 71 when he argues, along with Candrakīrti, for 
two distinct objects, according to either saṃvṛti or paramārtha views, that conventional 
truth is its own kind of truth and is appropriate to conventional epistemological 
instruments.  Nāgārjuna’s understanding of causality runs contrary to this view. By 
contrast,  pratītyasamupāda is all-encompassing and therefore the view of distinct view 
of conventional phenomena can only be entertained from a position that incorporates 
paramārtha.
4.1 Conze, McCagney and the PPM hypothesis
Edward Conze argues that Nāgārjuna’s thought, particularly in the MK, is a 
philosophical expression of the PPM.72 The act of viewing what is limited, i.e. objects, 
from a limitless point of view, which is so prevalent in the PPM, is captured in 
Nāgārjuna’s identification of śūnyatā with pratītyasamutpāda. What Nāgārjuna means 
by śūnyatā in its identity with pratītyasamutpāda is unique and challenging, and 
McCagney offers a most fruitful explication of his ideas.73 Her translation of śūnyatā as 
openness rather than emptiness or voidness adds a very useful element of space to 
śūnyatā that emptiness or related terms do not capture.74 But, even so, she maintains 
                                                  
71 Garfield in Westerhoff et al (2011  36-37).
72 Conze (1967:144) and McCagney (1997: 22).
73 McCagney 1997.
74 I do not mean to suggest that McCagney is the sole Buddhist scholar who interprets śūnyatā as 
openness. Indeed, Masao Abe uses the term ”boundless openness” regularly in Zen and Western 
Thought (1989: 21). What is germane to this thesis is that McCagney makes the connection between 
openness and the use of ākāśa in the PPM because of the use of metaphoric logic in the PPM that is 
similar to Nāgārjuna’s logic in the MK. I will explore this similarity in Chapter Four. 
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that the akasic sense of śūnyatā derives from the oldest PPM sutras such as the Aṣṭa.75
The problem with terms like emptiness in describing śūnyatā is that they tend to be 
object-related – e.g, all phenomena are empty of own-being. Her connotational move of 
including the spatiality of openness has the effect of encompassing the experiential 
element of the emergent interdependence of phenomena.  The translation of śūnyatā as 
openness suggests that śūnyatā is not a noun but a dynamic verb that captures the 
experience of inclusive wideness and indiscernibleness.76
The association of ākāśa with śūnyatā and wisdom in certain PPM sutras notably the 
Aṣṭa therefore can be read into Nāgārjuna’s use of śūnyatā. This implies, according to 
McCagney that śūnyatā connotes descriptive terms such as, alakṣaņa (signlessness), 
apraīhistita (not settling down), anālaya (nothing to settle in) and anāgrahā (nothing to 
grasp).77 Śūnyatā therefore, is more accurately understood as denoting an experience 
of akasic openness rather than the inherent quality of an object.78
                                                  
75 McCagney (1997: 22).
76 It would be technically correct to translate the verb form of śūnyatā as opening. Openness is classified 
grammatically as an abstract noun, although opening can still be used as a noun, for example: “The 
opening of an art exhibition.” I will continue to use openness, as McCagney does, due the problem of 
clarity that arises in articulations around verb-dominated sentences, for example, “It is raining.”    
77 McCagney (1997: 20 and 22).
78 Thakchoë (in Westerhoff et al, 2011: 41) argues that pratītyasamutpāda implies that epistemological 
instruments (pranāma) have relevance in terms of “their principle epistemological objects (prameya). This 
argument resembles Garfield’s argument that conventional knowledge must be taken seriously at the 
conventional level, despite its falsity from the paramārtha level. While it is true that Nāgārjuna does argue 
that senses and sense objects are mutually related, he also argues in MK 24: 14 and VV 70 that saṃvrti  
satya and paramārthasatya are mutually related and that the two types of truth are possible due to their 
interrelatedness. That suggests that prameya and pranāma are not only related to either saṃvrti or 
paramārtha, but also that they are epistemologically possible due to their basis in śūnyata. This idea is 
further developed in Chapter Four,  where it is argued that the only way prameya can be viewed as 
śūnyatā is metaphorically.
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Likewise, wisdom is likened to space as well. Wisdom cannot be reduced to noun form 
produced by the processes of cognition or the identifying of pramana (the tools of 
knowing) with prameya (the object of knowledge). Wisdom, like space, is dependently 
originated from boundless supporting conditions. 79 Candrakīrti interprets Nāgārjuna 
differently. He maintains in the Madhyamakāvatara, which Tsong Khapa follows in 
“Ocean of Reasoning”,80 that objects makes sense because they are empty, but he also 
holds that the premeya are dependently arisen and distinct from paramārthasatya. 
There is a contradiction in his thought that holds to a qualified distinctive dependent-
origination of saṃvṛti in that there are two kinds of knowledge instrument, according to 
him. In the light of Nāgārjuna’s argument in MK 24: 14 and VV 70, such a qualified 
separation between the types of knowledge of saṃvṛti  and paramārtha does not make 
sense. 81 Candrakīrti’s interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s two-truths formulation, therefore, 
does not clarify Nāgārjuna‘s argument in MK24: 14 and VV 70. Candrakīrti echoes 
Nāgārjuna’s assertion that emptiness of intrinsic nature makes sense because 
emptiness is dependent arising.82 My central argument in this thesis, therefore holds for 
Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti:  while the identity of śūnyatā and pratītyasamutpāda is 
logical, it does not necessarily follow that phenomena make sense due to their 
emptiness. On the contrary, according to the PPM, the perfection of wisdom is 
synonymous with śūnyatā.  It is a path, not an end. It is immeasurable, boundless and 
free. It is, however, difficult to put a name to śūnyatā: even the notion of voidness gives 
                                                  
79 1997: 22. 
80 Tsong Khapa 2006.
81 According to Candrakīrti, “All things bear two natures (rūpa) found (labdha) by correct and false views. 
The object of those who see correctly is said to be “reality” (tattva) and the object of those who see falsely 
is said to be “conventional existence” (saṃvrtisatya)” Madhyamakāvatara VI.23 (Westerhoff et al 2011: 
58).
82 Madhymakāvatarā in Westerhoff  (2010: 52).
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it shape and definition. Following the Aṣṭa, Nāgārjuna argues that space neither exists 
nor does it not exist.83 Indeed, wisdom and śūnyatā are like space in that they cannot be 
grasped, nor do they provide support or any type of framework if translated as 
emptiness or nothingness.
According to McCagney, Nāgārjuna is influenced by the PPM in his understanding of 
śūnyatā by ascribing to it the sense of ākāśa or space.84  Conze argues that this sense 
of ākāśa was likened to the experience of ultimate reality in the PPM.85 But such a view 
of space is not specific to the PPM. Space is inherently open and empty in general Indic 
metaphysics: “space and nirvāṇa are considered ‘unconditioned.’ Space in Indic 
cosmology is basically the absence of anything and so it is unconditioned”. 86   In 
identifying śūnyatā with pratītyasamutpāda Nāgārjuna shows how the space–like 
experience of śūnyatā applies both to infinite wideness in the form of ultimate Truth or 
paramārtha and to causal interconnectedness of sensory data in the form of relative 
truth or saṃvṛti. 87 It is important to remember that,  for Nāgārjuna. śūnyatā is 
pratītyasamutpāda and therefore is always in the process of change and conditioning.88
So, while Nāgārjuna applies the basic Indic understanding of space to his 
understanding of śūnyatā, this applies equally to saṃvṛti and paramārtha. His specific 
                                                  
831997: 25.
84 1997: 22.
85  Conze (1967:125).
86 Jones (2011: Kindle ebook location 1924).
87 MK 25: 19 and 20.
88 MK  18; 20.
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understanding of śūnyatā emerges from the akasic-orientated sense of śūnyatā in the 
PPM in that its indiscernibility and focus on process are seminal. 
4.2 Is śūnyatā as openness contradictory to the two-truths 
formulation?
If śūnyatā is understood as emptiness, it becomes trapped by its status as 
nomenclature and therefore cannot avoid being a concept with a name. 89 The 
translation of śūnyatā as openness finds accord with my argument that, for śūnyatā to 
be meaningful, it must be process-orientated and not refer to a particular concept or 
form (prameya), including the concept of emptiness. But, if śūnyatā is translated as 
openness, how does Nāgārjuna negotiate between the implications of ultimate 
(paramārtha) and relative (saṃvṛti) truth? Śūnyatā needs to provide universal equality of 
meaning and not relative meaning for it to produce harmony, peace and an escape from 
duhkha. 
Chapter 25: 19 in the MK encapsulates one of Nāgārjuna’s central ideas;  and yet he is 
frustratingly vague about what he means by equating saṃsāra with nirvāṇa . It is 
possible that Nāgārjuna implies an identity between samsāra and nirvāṇa, but unlikely, 
because that would imply a substantialist view in his thinking;  it would entail that 
                                                  
89 In this vein, Jones argues that Nāgārjuna would best be classified as a radical nominalist in Western 
philosophical terms (2010: Kindle ebook location 2659). 
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identity implies an exact nature.90 McCagney maintains that, for Nāgārjuna,  the two 
truths are distinct, based on the distinction made in the Buddha’s teaching between 
conventional truth and higher truth.91 But she also argues that the two truths have a 
relation of equivalence. Regrettably, she does not explore the logic of her argument 
sufficiently. McCagney maintains that it is important to hold the distinction between the 
two truths for the purposes of ensuring that pratītyasamutpāda does not dissolve into 
non-duality.92 She argues that “saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are equivalent because they are 
both śūnya.”93 All the same,  śūnyatā cannot be likened to a unifying substance. From 
the view of saṃvṛti, śūnyatā is a term that has no referent and only points to the 
absurdity of holding fixed views. It is interdependence that defines pratītyasamutpāda
and not identity. To put it another way, it is not the noun but the verb that is important. It 
is important that dependency and process are foregrounded, not  naming of  identity or 
qualities of the object. 
Process and dependency in saṃvṛti give rise to different arising and ceasing 
phenomena. While ignorance imposes svabhāva on what arises, conditioning does set 
phenomena in relation to each other. Therefore it is fair to say that akāśa, from the view 
of saṃvṛti, is relatively experienced due to the processes of emergence and ceasing. 
This view of akāśa gives a fuller sense to VV 70. The chimera of saṃvṛti makes sense 
because of the openness established between phenomena.  But from the view of 
                                                  
90 Garfield (in Westerhoff et al 2011: 37) argues that saṃvṛti and paramārtha are identical due to their 
common basis in śūnyatā. 
91 McCagney (1997: 74).
92 McCagney (1997: 95).
93 McCagney (1997: 96).
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paramārtha there is no arising or ceasing and this aspect of Truth is not adequately 
incorporated into such an understanding of pratītyasamutpāda.
The problem with viewing equivalence between samsāra and nirvana is that, while they 
are equal in terms of śūnya, they are not equal in scope. Saṃvṛti’s scope is limited, 
while paramārtha’s scope is infinite.94 Paramārtha does not denote a higher level but a 
broader range.95  If the two truths are not seen as occupying different levels of truth, but 
rather the same level, with saṃvṛti denoting a narrow view and paramārtha denoting a 
wide view,  this has implications that McCagney does not acknowledge. While 
equivalence is determined by dependence on pratītyasamutpāda, the narrow view of 
saṃvṛti must set objects in different relations with each other and establish different 
spatial relations. But the wide view of paramārtha overrides those relations in that 
arising and ceasing are seen not to occur.96
McCagney explains the difference between saṃvṛti and paramārtha by arguing that, for 
Nāgārjuna, “the arising and passing of worldly events or phenomena (due to 
pratītyasamutpāda) is not ultimately reality but neither is there any reality beyond that” 
(drawing from MK 24: 18 and MK: 22).97 This is significant because there is a rejection 
of an absolute unconditioned state of perfect peace that needs to be attained. But 
Nāgārjuna’s acknowledgement of  the existence of two truths  implies a distinction 
                                                  
94 McCagney (1997: 87).
95 McCagney (1997: 87).
96 MK 18 and 22 (in McCagney 1997: 181 & 192.)
97 1997:21.
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between the two truths, but he also states that the two truths are perfectly equivalent 
(which would then lend support to Garfield’s contention that saṃvṛti and paramārtha are 
identical). Surely there is a glaring contradiction in this statement because, as I argued 
earlier, something that is identical with itself must be itself? Nāgārjuna does not attempt 
to deal with this contradiction, but rather maintains that Reality is indiscernible to the 
extent that it is akasically open. In chapter 7: 30 Nāgārjuna maintains that “In identity, 
neither a being nor a non-being happen.”98 The agnosticism prevalent in his thinking 
leads him to approach reality as an open process rather than as conditional i.e. reality is 
fluid rather than identifiable of cognitively fixed. 
4.3 The role of imagination in pratītyasamutpāda
Nāgārjuna derives his understanding of relative truth from Indic philosophy, where 
conceptual discrimination causes reality to be divided and separated into discrete parts. 
In Nāgārjuna’s thought this results in his two-truths philosophy, in which he divides truth 
into saṃvṛti and paramārtha. For him saṃvṛti is due to vikalpa (conceptual 
discrimination, or what is imagined) and prapañca (conceptual play).99 What is imagined 
is indiscernible and therefore results in fictional conceptual play between related 
concepts. Concepts, for Nāgārjuna, are neither true nor false: they are merely functions 
of saṃvṛti.100 This leads to the question, how does vikalpa arise in saṃvṛti? If reality is 
                                                  
98 In McCagney (1997: 172).
99 McCagney (1997: 106).
100  MK 18: 8 & 9 (in McCagney, 1997).
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inherently open (or śūnya ) then why do we experience saṃvṛti at all? Saṃvṛti is not a 
consequence of avidyā, as it is in Āryan philosophy. Rather, it is a misinterpretation of 
saṃvṛti to believe that it is based on avidyā. The imposition of own-being onto concepts 
due to ignorance causes a dissonance to occur between tathatā and the constructed 
world or saṃvṛti.101
Nāgārjuna describes saṃvṛti as a flow of interrelated conditioned states102 (dharmatā). 
These are a result of vikalpa and prapañca (conceptual play and the discrimination of 
multiple entities).103 Yet what is constructed in saṃvṛti is inherently indiscernible.104
Nāgārjuna argues that these entities are real, are not real and are neither real nor not 
real. 105 Saṃvṛti is therefore inherently contradictory and concepts and objects are 
indiscernible. The only way that concepts can describe dharmatā is via conceptual 
contradiction, for example, “not one, not diverse, not annihilated, not eternal”.106
According to Nāgārjuna’s two-truths formulation, however, tathatā is a result of the 
correct understanding of the causal interdependency between saṃvṛti – conceptual 
reality and paramārtha – ultimate reality, which is a clear view of reality as it is. 
Paramārtha is the highest view of interrelatedness, where things cease to be distinct. In 
                                                  
101 This issue will be dealt with in Section 5.
102 Mk 18: 10.
103 MK18: 5 (in McCagney 1997: 181).
104 Based on this assertion by Nāgārjuna I find Garfield’s argument that mirages have identifiable certainty 
implausible. The very fact that he accepts the non-foundationalism of knowledge surely must imply that 
knowledge of mirages is contextual, unstable and equivocal.
105 MK 18: 8 (in McCagney 1997: 182).
106 MK 18: 9 (in McCagney 1997: 182).
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verse 7 of chapter 18 Nāgārjuna says that, when thought is quietened, nothing can be 
independently identified because there is no stable foundation on which to establish 
fixed meaning. Mind, senses and the objects of senses are dependently originated. It is 
more accurate, I maintain, to read nivṛtte in terms of senses being quietened or 
retreated from rather than renounced.107  Later in verse 9 this translation of nivṛtte as 
“quieten” is reinforced by the use of the word sāntam (composed mind). In verse 8 
Nāgārjuna asserts that the Buddha’s teaching about reality should not be forced into 
conceptual constructs, even if the conceptual construct is absolute renunciation of 
relative truth, as Nāgārjuna writes in the MK:
Everything is factual, nonfactual, both factual and not nonfactual.108
Peace of mind is therefore attained in non-projection onto, and full knowledge of, the 
dependent origination of phenomena.  But that does not acknowledge the role of 
imagination and imagined objects in pratītyasamutpāda according to Nāgārjuna. In 
accepting the two-truths formulation within his philosophy of pratītyasamutpāda, he 
acknowledges that what is held to be produced or still to be produced is imagined and 
these vikalpa contribute to what is dependently originated.
4.5 The akasic characteristic of indeterminacy
                                                  
107 I find McCagney’s translation of nivṛtte as “renounce” misleading because it does not make sense to 
renounce something like thought that has no real existence. 
108 MK 18: 8 (in McCagney 1997: 182).
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Nāgārjuna merely presents his reader with the two-truths formulation and explains the 
emergence of saṃvṛti as a consequence of pratītyasamutpāda. But, if his logic is teased 
out, the only way discrimination can take place and thereby produce saṃvṛti is, 
paradoxically, if all things are interrelated. Things, concepts and imaginings therefore 
exist not because of their inherent nature but ― precisely the opposite ― because of 
their lack of substance and their interrelatedness. Nāgārjuna states,
How can that which is evident in terms of self-nature rise 
again?
Therefore, for one who contradicts emptiness (openness), 
there exists no arising.109
The substanceless, interrelated and interdependent processes of vikalpa and prapañca
give rise to fluid variations in qualities that mutually arise from śūnyatā. It is in this sense 
that Nāgārjuna argues that the limit of saṃsāra is nirvāṇa.110 Both saṃsāra and nirvāṇa
are open. While there is the tendency in saṃsāra to superimpose substance on 
dependently originated phenomena, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are equally empty. Therefore 
saṃsāra does not need to be transcended to attain nirvāṇa. Saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are 
merely two ways of viewing what is śūnya.111 It  is, therefore, a mistake to emphasise 
the dual aspect of the two truths. Nāgārjuna wants to show that the two views, while 
different in scope, are views of the same reality of śūnyatā. 
                                                  
109 MK 24: 22.  The same idea is echoed in MK 24: 14 and VV 70, but the latter two verses seem to 
propose a semantic dimension to understanding that MK 24: 22 does not assert.
110 MK 25: 19 (in McCagney 1997: 209).
111 Here I agree with McCagney and disagree with Garfield that a basis in śūnyatā does not prove identity 
between saṃvṛti and paramārtha. 
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Despite the fact that Nāgārjuna borrows from the broad Indic metaphysical structure in 
upholding the Indic twofold nature of reality, his aim is epistemological and not 
metaphysical. He perceives in the dual epistemological structure a possibility to escape 
from its state of confusion, caused by essentialising objects, and realise nirvāṇa. The 
mind can learn from the limited relative view of saṃvṛti about the highest view of reality 
— paramārtha. Knowledge of paramārtha cannot be gained on its own terms. It requires 
the interrelation between saṃvṛti and paramārtha ways of knowing.112 A careful study of 
saṃvṛti allows Nāgārjuna to show how the relative value of saṃvṛti is developed 
dependently. In making this move, he strategically sets up two notions of space:  it is 
infinitely open prior to arising and ceasing, and dependently open as a result of arising 
and ceasing, which he calls nirvāṇa and saṃsāra . Both are inherently empty, but they 
differ in terms of how emptiness is expressed. This move allows him to  escape from 
reliance on absolutes and abstract properties as a way of  establishing meaning. His 
claims cannot be termed metaphysical because even his claim is empty and therefore 
without value. Ignorance leads to the mistaken understanding that existence in the 
universe is shaped by absolute categories including space. Absolute space is a “God’s 
eye view” of any object’s coordinates. Such an idea is impossible to uphold from a 
perspectivist position. Relative space allows individuals to understand space in relation 
to specific coordinates.113 Relative space is dependent on the recognition of objects114
and the construction of  spatial relationships between them.  But, in introducing the 
                                                  
112 This idea is shared by Thakchoë (in Westerhoff et al 2011: 46).
113 MK 5: 1(in McCagney 1997: 148).
114 Swartz (1991: 306-308).
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notion of saṃvṛti (the flow of conditioned openness or ākaśā), Nāgārjuna is able to 
engage with relative space without having to invoke a weak idea of absolute space. He 
espouses a view of space from the view of paramārtha, which logically reveals infinite 
openness without conditions,  as a consequence of showing that saṃvṛti is based on 
śūnyatā through the application of prasaṅga. He is able to show that saṃvṛti presents 
relative and contradictory information through reductio ad absurdum argumentation 
(prasaṅga). Prasaṅga is a method of argument that seeks to establish if there are non-
contradictory grounds for a thing’s existence. The criteria applied to the argument are, 
first: that the thing is known conventionally; second: that there are no other conventional 
cognitions that contradict it and, third: that reason does not contradict its perceived 
existence.115 Nāgārjuna wants to argue that the consequence of this is that meaning 
can only be derived from subjective, relational perspectives in a relative spatial frame. 
By doing so Nāgārjuna is able to introduce the notions of perspective and relative value 
in order to prevent space becoming a substance-imbued abstract property. But, 
significantly, the indiscernible quality of saṃvṛti due to the vagueness of the referent 
allows language to approach a meaningful understanding of paramārtha. For example, 
the statement “all is empty space” is acceptable because all referents in saṃvṛti are 
opaque, contradictory and substanceless. Therefore the vagueness of phenomena 
cannot only be ascribed to their conventionality, in the manner in which Saussure 
argues in terms of the vagueness of the signifier.  For Saussure, the signifier is vague 
because its existence has no foundation across time, space or in relation to other 
                                                  
115 Warder (1970: 468).
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phenomena.116 In Nāgārjuna’s thinking, phenomena can only be explained in terms of 
the flow of interrelated conditioning factors.  
Nāgārjuna’s argument is valid when he explains that there cannot be education about 
śūnyatā or infinite space on its own terms because, in openness, no learning is 
necessary – there is clear awareness of emptiness. The quality of relative space 
established by vikalpa and prapañca allows Nāgārjuna to examine the indiscernible 
nature of concepts and things without recourse to the rigidity of absolute and abstract 
terms.117
5. Indeterminacy, akasic influence and the two truths
The identity of śūnyatā and pratītyasamutpāda suggested by Nāgārjuna implies that it 
is not necessary for a referent to be linked to a concept, but neither does it imply that 
the world of concepts should be shunned.118 Concepts, like dharmas, are constructions 
of the mind due the processes of pratītyasamutpāda: they can be used by the mind but 
ultimately they are open and cannot be grasped. 119 Terms should be used, not 
according to rigid definitions, but rather according a sense of meaning that best suits the 
context – that is, by skilful means. To use words rigidly is to perceive a world that does 
                                                  
116 Culler  (1976: 16).
117 MK 24: 8 (in McCagney 1997: 200).
118 1997: 27.
119 1997: 29.
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not exist. The world should be perceived without settling down and without attachment. 
The following terms in the Dharma describe the indiscernible character of reality:  
tathatā (suchness), dharmatā (reality as it is), dharmadhatu (space or the universe), 
bhutakoti (limit of reality), śūnyatā and visuddhi (purity).120 These terms do not point to 
any transcendent place or teleological goal because there is nothing to aim at. 
McCagney shows support for this view in her translations of emptiness as openness in 
the MK:
MK, 13: 8
The conqueror taught (śūnyatā) openness as the refutation 
of all views
But those who hold (śūnyatā) openness as a view are called 
irremediable121
In the light of this verse, no concept should be reified, and this is particularly relevant to 
terms such as śūnyatā. Nāgārjuna states:
MK 22; 11
I am not saying that śūnya (open) could exist or aśūnya (not 
open) could exist, or both or neither,
They are only for the purpose of teaching. 122
                                                  
120 1997: 30.
121 McCagney (1997: 169).
122 McCagney (1997: 194).
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Although vikalpa is normally translated as “proliferation of separate concepts”, 
McCagney prefers translating vikalpa as ”conceptual play.123 In her analysis, concepts 
become loosely attached to repeated experiences and set in a “range of thought” that 
Nāgārjuna calls cittagocare, the closest he comes to a psychological understanding of 
mind.124 Conditioned things and concepts are constantly changing and are therefore not 
fixed independent entities.  But by examining saṃvṛti and subjecting it to prasaṅga to 
prove the inconsistency of conceptual formulation, the mind is able to stop 
substantialising conventional knowledge and perceive openness as the primary 
condition of objects and consciousness.125 Vagueness and contradiction, rather than 
being an undermining aspect of his philosophy, becomes its determining factor in 
pointing towards the openness of all things. In verse 10 of Chapter 18 he concludes that 
whatever arises dependently cannot be named. Its indiscernibility is marked by its not 
being identifiable and yet not being entirely indistinguishable. All things are aspects of 
the “substanceless process” of dharmatā. Tattva is free of differential entities. 
In contrast, some philosophers, such as rJe Tsong Khapa,126 explain the relationship 
between saṃvṛti and paramārtha by arguing that things, according to Nāgārjuna, exist 
at both the levels of saṃvṛti and paramārtha, therefore things exist both in relative and 
absolute space. Tsong Khapa follows Candrakīrti’s interpretation of MK 24: 8 in arguing 
                                                  
123 McCagney (1997: 20).
124 MK 18: 7 (in McCagney 1997: 182).
125 McCagney points out that Nāgārjuna does not use the term “mind” in any of the texts ascribed to his 
authorship. Instead, he uses phrases such as that are inclusive of mental activity. I argue that Nāgārjuna 
avoids using the concept “mind” because he does not want to essentialise any particular aspect of the 
dependent origination process in saṃvṛti (1997: 43).
126 2006: 485.
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that phenomena have two natures, conventional and ultimate.127 This approach is a 
gross oversimplification of Nāgārjuna’s philosophy of two truths.  William of Ockham 
would raise a finger of objection to Candrakīrti and Tsong Khapa’s interpretation, in that 
there seems to be multiplication of entities beyond need.128. By granting phenomena 
two natures, Nāgārjuna’s view of pratītyasamutpāda is vitiated. The first problem that 
arises is that conventional phenomena acquire an obscurational nature129 somewhat 
akin to māyā in Advaitā Vedānta, even though, in Buddhism, the object is always an 
intentional object because of mental projection, whereas in Advaitā the object is 
inherently illusory. But second and more significantly,  perceiving objects as having two 
natures does not allow for the full import of pratītyasamutpāda to be appreciated. 
Garfield, in following Candrakīrti and Tsongkhapa’s interpretation of the two truths, ”ring 
fences” mutual dependence to saṃvṛti. In this way conventional phenomena also have 
a true nature when seen interdependently as ”mundane conventional truth”. 130 In 
addition, paramārtha is also perceived as possibly having two natures:  conventional 
and ultimate. The obvious flaw  in this approach is that, in order to justify it, it is 
necessary to produce a confusing array of categories. In arguing that conventional 
cognitive objects are partly deceptive it inadvertently grants power to the object. This of 
course is impossible if they are empty of self-nature. Candrakīrti and Tsong Khapa, who 
follows him, fall into the same error that the Abhidharmikas fell into by ascribing a nature 
to an object based on its perceived activity or the experience of that activity. The issue 
is  how to understand intentional objects so that they are not interpreted according to 
                                                  
127 Garfield (in Westerhoff et al 2011: 24 quoting Madyhyamakāvatāra VI. 24).
128 Flew  (1983: 253).
129 Madhyamakāvatāra 6: 23 in Tsong Khapa (2006).
130 Garfield (in Westerhoff et al 2011: 24).
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how they are experienced. I explore  this issue in the next chapter. Here it suffices to 
mention that it is more important to focus on the essence of the intentional object  than 
its function.  It order to achieve this, more emphasis needs to be placed on pramana
than on prameya. In that way the power to deceive that is granted to objects is vitiated 
by awareness of how the object is formulated. For when I engage in an act, such as 
cooking, I do not think of the pots and pans, or even myself as a cook, as  conventional 
truth or as ultimate truth. The experience in its totality is dependently originated. The 
experience of cooking is valuable and meaningful precisely because the conventional 
objects used, the recipe, ingredients, knives, pots and pans are dependently brought 
together to produce a meal. The meal is not inherent in any of the utensils but neither is 
the meal independent of the utensils. Through the act of cooking, cooking makes sense. 
This idea is related to MK 17:14 where Nāgārjuna argues that the force of Karma only 
makes sense in terms of the awareness of emptiness.
But in order to lay the foundations for this exploration I argue that pratītyasamutpāda is 
an all-encompassing notion. This implies that saṃvṛti has an interdependent 
relationship with paramārtha and vice versa, establishing the two-truths framework.  
Nāgārjuna is offering a way to reinterpret living in the world, not with obscured or 
imposed meaning, but with a sense of indeterminacy and fluidity and contextual 
meaning, although I question whether Nāgārjuna’s understanding of pratītyasamutpāda
is clear enough to provide such meaning. Through a clear and all-inclusive 
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understanding of pratītyasamutpāda, concepts that are useful in the world are translated 
to reflect their true nature in śūnyatā when set in relation to the paramārtha view.131
In Chapter 24: 14 of the MK, Nāgārjuna writes:
For him to whom emptiness makes sense,
Everything makes sense.
For him to whom emptiness does not make sense.
Nothing makes sense.
And similarly in VV 70:
For whom there is emptiness, there are all things. For whom there is no 
emptiness there is nothing what so ever.
Perception, in combination with prasaṅga, enables the development of a clear non-
metaphysically projected view of reality. Nāgārjuna’s argument in the MK maintains that 
phenomena in a saṃvṛti view are created by vikalpa and prapañca and only appear to 
be real. But this activity is only revealed when seen against the backdrop of 
pratītyasamutpāda. 132 Thus the mind’s epistemological operations of saṃvṛti and 
paramārtha are understood to be interdependent and integrated. If saṃvṛti is founded 
on openness, it will not seek to define itself in terms of its own categories, values and 
specific time/space co-ordinates but rather in terms of its interdependence with 
paramārtha. But, equally, it will not seek to define itself in terms of paramārtha, because 
that would fall into the trap of establishing nirvāṇa as a fixed referent. Both paramārtha
and nirvāṇa cannot be seen as unconditioned because that would ascribe own-being to 
                                                  
131 I have quoted these two verses previously in the thesis, but they bear repeating here because they are 
the focus of my argument throughout the thesis.
132 MK 24: 40 (in McCagney 1997: 206).
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them. The logical conclusion is for Nāgārjuna to argue that nirvāṇa is both conditioned 
and not conditioned or both or neither. 133 Here Nāgārjuna leads up to his most 
challenging assertion ― that all truth is conventional.134 Both saṃvṛti and paramārtha
must be seen in relation to pratītyasamutpāda. For this reason I maintain that chapter 
26 in the MK is very possibly spurious, because it lays emphasis on an idea of 
pratītyasamutpāda founded on the niddana that lead to conditions and suffering. In this 
schema nirvāṇa would logically have to be unconditioned. 135 Rather, if śūnyatā is 
translated as openness, it suggests that liberation lies in not a mental state projected 
onto reality but in an inclusive awareness of pratītyasamutpāda. This is captured in 
McCagney’s translation of chapter 22: 10-16 of the MK where she translates śūnyatā as 
openness:136
10
And thus the one the one who clings is clinging to what is everywhere 
open.
How is open Tathāgata known by means of what is open?
11
I am not saying ‘what is open’ or what is not open’ could exist or ‘both’ or 
‘neither’. They are said only for the purpose of teaching
13
You are grasped and destroyed by grasping false imaginings that the 
Tathāgata ‘exists’
Or ‘does not exist’. He would be imagined to be the same as one is 
deceased
14
in what is open by nature, this  thought:
‘The Buddha exists or does not exist after death’ does not occur
                                                  
133 MK 25: 3 (in McCagney 1997: 206).
134 MK 22: 11 (in McCagney 1997: 194).
135 McCagney (1997: 94 & 100).
136 McCagney (1997: 193 and 194).
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Nāgārjuna explains the Four Noble Truths in terms of the two-truths structure in Chapter 
24 of the MK. The Four Noble Truths are, in his understanding, a tool to assist the mind 
to integrate the two levels of truth. Once the mind is integrated, saṃvṛti and paramārtha
are understood to be equal in truth but different in scope. Saṃvṛti is local and 
paramārtha is broad.137 The integrated mind has no further need for the Four Noble 
Truths, which are housed in saṃvṛti and they lose their purpose.
Chapter 24: 10 in the MK implies that saṃvṛti has the capacity to communicate the 
sense of paramārtha. But in reading Nāgārjuna’s writings it becomes clear that the 
conceptual explanation of saṃvṛti is fluid. Nāgārjuna asserts in MK 7: 34 that
As illusion, as dream, as an imaginary city in the sky, so have arising, 
endurance and destruction been illustrated.138
Nāgārjuna means by this that concepts have no actual content. But he does not go so 
far as to say they have no existence. Concepts exist in relation to their “nature” in śūnya
as a fluid process (dharmatā) and, in this sense, concepts only make sense if they are 
identified with śūnya. Nāgārjuna describes, for example, different and conflicting views 
on saṃvṛti including:
                                                  
137 McCagney (1997: 87) writes: “Attainment, the one who attains and the path to attainment are open-
ended and so indistinguishable.” Here McCagney equates saṃvṛti with a fixed view, but I disagree with 
her. It is not necessarily the case that local conditioning must lead to fixed views (McCagney 1997: 79). If 
that were the case, then equivalence between nirvāṇa and saṃsāra would not make sense.  I aver that 
dukkha occurs when a local view is taken as fixed and imposed on paramārtha.
138 In McCagney (1997: 157).
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 Acceptance of saṃvṛti as condition of ignorance139
 Acceptance of saṃvṛti as being dependently originated140
 Acceptance of the non-reality of saṃvṛti therefore it need not be 
opposed or negated141
 saṃvṛti needs to be renounced142
 saṃvṛti needs to be quietened but accepted as conditioned143
These contrasting views of saṃvṛti make sense if śūnya is not understood as an 
abstract concept or an entity but rather as a process whose very ”nature” is 
impermanence and indeterminacy. 
Yet Nāgārjuna does not present a single view on the relationship between saṃvṛti and 
paramārtha. The akasic sense of śunyāta is conveyed in his differentiated way of 
interpreting saṃvṛti . Saṃvṛti, therefore, offers a view of śūnya which is limited in scope 
but not limited in terms of its referent – pratītyasamutapāda. Nāgārjuna’s point is that 
meaning does not reside in fixed concepts. Rather, concepts are a consequence of the 
fluid process of interconnected activity. While it is true to argue that phenomena are 
empty due to pratītyasamutapāda, it does not necessarily follow that phenomena will 
make sense because, as I have shown, the result is conceptual indiscernibility. In fact 
pratītyasamutapāda could lead to a multiplicity of meanings resulting in contradiction 
and confusion. This issue will be further explored in the next chapter, where I argue that 
the contradictory meanings that result from fluid processes only make sense if viewed 
against the backdrop of śunyāta. In order to demonstrate this, I will show that the 
                                                  
139 Yukti-shashtikas 37 and 38.
140 MK 1: 12.
141 Yukti shashtikas 3.
142 MK 23: 23.
143 MK 18: 9.
141
relationship between saṃvṛti and paramārtha makes sense if understood in terms of 
metaphoricity since viewing saṃvṛti as a metaphor for  paramārtha resolves the issues 
of indeterminacy in the relationship between the two views.
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Chapter 4
The role of symbolism in the two-truths formulation
1. Introduction
This chapter builds on the argument concerning the indeterminacy of objects that was 
expounded in the previous chapter. In Chapter Three I argued that Nāgārjuna attributes 
the indeterminacy of referents to their dependency on śūnya. I showed how his 
understanding of śūnya was influenced by, first, the PPM’s use of the term to refer to an 
experience that is pervaded by ākāśa, and, second, his identification of śūnya with 
pratītyasamutpāda. I concluded  that Nāgārjuna’s understanding of śūnya needs to be 
interpreted in fluid terms, which emphasise its nature as a process, rather than the more 
common nominative approach, which leads to meaning from saṃvṛti being contextually 
based, multiple, relative and unstable. While this process-orientated view of objects 
explains conventional truth-claims and knowledge, it does not explain how objects make 
sense to us despite the contradictions that arise due to the non-realist leanings of 
saṃvṛti epistemology.
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The present chapter focuses on the sub-problem of how naming terms should be 
interpreted in Nāgārjuna’s works if interpreted along the lines of the akasic influence 
from the PPM, as posited by McCagney and Conze. Nāgārjuna does not take issue with 
meaning arrived at through common sense from the saṃvṛti point of view, where terms 
are perceived to have pragmatic connections to referents, based on consensus. But his 
use of prasaṅga is aimed at exposing the absurdity of reifying things by assuming the 
reality of the connection between words and objects without acknowledging the 
interdependence with paramārtha. This chapter builds on my previous argument by 
exploring the function of the designator in language if words and concepts are 
understood to designate śūnya. 
I argue that designators or nouns have their basis in intentionality and have two distinct 
symbolic functions from the saṃvṛti point of view. They can symbolise the state of 
ignorance, where terms are assumed to refer to substantial objects; or they can 
symbolise a state of wisdom, where terms are understood to refer to the indefinable, 
infinite “nature” of śūnya. I maintain that Nāgārjuna employs prasaṅga to unseat the 
symbolic function of terms in the idiom of ignorance in order to awaken the symbolic 
function of terms in the idiom of wisdom. 
In terms of his intentional paradigm, the challenge that Nāgārjuna has to face is that the 
world (loka) is comprehensible and navigable, despite the contradictions that his 
prasaṅga analysis highlights. Nāgārjuna shows that the common-sense notion of the 
world, which is comprised of separate causal relations, is contradictory if it does not 
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acknowledge its interdependence with paramārtha. In addition, his identification of 
śūnyata with pratītyasamutpāda intimates that there is a correct way of engaging with 
terms within the fluidity of saṃvṛti – that is, to perceive the world of separate nominative 
categories and objects in subjective a posteriori relations — as fundamentally empty 
and causally dependent on emptiness. It is only in this sense that the equivalence 
between nirvāṇa and saṃsāra can be understood. But in order to grasp the nature of 
the equivalence of nirvāṇa and saṃsāra, the symbolic logic used in the PPM to explain 
the nature of Wisdom needs to be recognised in Nāgārjuna’s thought.1
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section distinguishes meaning based 
on pratītyasamutpāda from meaning derived from common sense. The second section 
compares theories of truth: the coherence theory, the correspondence theory and the 
identity theory within the contexts of nihilism and pratītyasamutpāda. The third section 
argues that the identity theory of truth provides the most appropriate explanation for 
how meaning is established by pratītyasamutpāda. The fourth section argues that, 
based on the logic developed in the PPM, where finite objects in the world can be 
reinterpreted to represent the infinite and open character of Wisdom, bare perceptual 
objects, words and concepts are best understood as metaphors for akasic infinity based 
on the southern Indian understanding of śūnyatā.  
                                                          
1 See the references to Rgs in my Chapter 2 and to Chapter 10.11-20 in Conze (1990: 153–161). 
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2. Meaning based on pratītyasamutpāda vs meaning based on 
common sense
From a common-sense point of view, things are perceived to arise due to a set of 
complex contextual and causal relations. Meaning is dependent on the existence of 
what is perceived through common sense. Nāgārjuna is, however, proposing a radical 
change, in fact an inversion of the common-sense way of seeing the world. According to 
him, phenomena, as discrete units, are purely mental in that they are derived from the 
mental process of vikalpa and prapañca. The saṃvṛti view of separate objects produced 
by vikalpa and prapañca is contradictory and only provides pragmatic meaning; it 
should not be confused with the viewpoint of objects from pratītyasamutpāda/śūnyatā.2
The difference between common sense and pratītyasamutpāda is that, from a common-
sense point of view, objects change due to the interrelated physical relations of 
phenomena, whereas in terms of pratītyasamutpāda, change is due to the emptiness of 
the flow of dharmatā.3 Pratītyasamutpāda is not a view of causality, but rather an 
explanation of how causality occurs. In order to live in the conventional world, one 
needs to adopt its conventional categories and concepts.4 Saṃvṛti, however, is shown 
                                                          
2 MK 24: 9 & 10.
3 MK 23: 10-24 and 36-37.
4 Berger asserts that Madhyamaka and Vijñavāda conventional knowledge is understood to be purely 
conventional and hence noun based. He is influenced by Candrakīrti’s position that objects have two 
distinct truths and hence saṃvṛti is only conventional and contextual and represent nothing existing in 
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by Nāgārjuna to be absurd on its own terms in that it contains the contradictory 
elements of change, causality and permanent identity. Phenomena cannot be 
simultaneously permanent and dependently originated, which is why an act of 
intentional decision is required in order to view saṃvṛti from the point of view of śūnyata. 
Saṃvṛti only makes sense if recognised to be equivalent to paramārtha in terms of 
emptiness but not identical to it in terms of breadth of view.5 In this sense 
pratītyasamutpāda/sūnyatā is neither an abstract quality nor a heavenly realm. In fact, it 
is exactly the opposite of these notions’ severance from common reality.  It does not 
invalidate the senses, conceptual categories or the elements because they are all 
produced by pratītyasamutpāda. But their basis in pratītyasamutpāda rids them of any 
metaphysical status obtained through reification, especially in terms of being or non-
being. Nāgārjuna does not deny the apprehension of objects by consciousness. Even if 
perceived objects are illusory, they remain perceptual events.6 Such perceptions do not 
require the perceiver to posit the existence of an ”entity” in the physical object or any 
“bare particulars” about the object, which distinguish it. Rather, the primitive recognition 
of the physical object suffices. This implies that objects emerge due to vikalpa and 
prapañca in saṃvṛti as a consequence of pratītyasamutpāda, prior to being complicated
by metaphysics or analysis. In this respect, Swartz offers a useful insight. According to 
him, perception of the physical object precedes relative space and place.7 Swartz calls 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
realty (2011:8). Such a distinction between saṃvṛti and paramārtha does not fit into Nāgārjuna’s schema 
of the interdependence of saṃvṛti and paramārtha.
5 VV 70.
6 Garfield in Westerhoff et al (2011: 26).
7 While Swartz’s description of primitive concepts shares interesting parity with perceptual events or “bare 
particulars’, Nāgārjuna would disagree that such bare concepts occur prior to the categories of space and 
place.
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such objects primitive concepts – concepts that cannot be explained in terms of derived 
concepts.8
Nāgārjuna is proposing that one should work with the perceptual events, concepts and 
categories that make up the world without giving them any metaphysical or absolute 
status.9 All phenomena are empty/open of substance, according to him. But does his 
argument hold any pragmatic merit? For one thing, it is very difficult to effect an 
inversion in thinking that is required to shift perception onto a purely mental plane, due 
to the sensory qualities of objects. Nevertheless, Nāgārjuna argues that peace depends 
on making this inversion in thinking and perceiving. This is a radical and challenging 
conceptual move, because meaning derived from object relations, as in non-realism, is 
lost when substance (which possesses apprehensible properties) is shown to be a 
mental projection. How can it be meaningful to live in the world of conventional truth 
with the awareness of its fundamental absurdity that would arise from this cognition?10
In order to answer this question, we need to examine what constitutes meaning in the 
(saṃvṛti) conventional view of separate objects. Meaning is derived in Nāgārjuna’s 
system of thought via two approaches: nominal and a posteriori. Nominal meaning is 
attained through the application of appropriate hermeneutics of words and concepts to 
the context. Meaning is derived a posteriori from the interdependent relations of the 
                                                          
8 Swartz (1991: 307-8).
9 VV 70.
10 Garfield and Priest (2003:14) argue that at the root of understanding Nāgārjuna’s epistemology is his 
use of paradox, for example: “the ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truth”.  I argue that paradox is 
not central to understanding why Nāgārjuna claims that understanding śūnyatā makes things meaningful. 
Paradox predominates if the two truths are held to be distinct. My point in this thesis is that if paradoxical 
statements are held to be true, such statements cannot be true and meaningful. If, as Nāgārjuna, argues 
that understanding śūnyatā leads to a clear and immediate understanding of things, then he must be 
asserting a form of thought  that overcomes paradox rather than embracing it.
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lived experience.  From a nominal point of view, statements are meaningful in a context 
where there is agreement on the terms and concepts being used. From an a posteriori
point of view, mental objects and concepts develop meaningful relations around the 
focal point of the subject of the experience. The idea that links nominal and a posteriori
approaches to meaning is the recognition of separate objects that can be enumerated 
distinctly. Such recognition does not require the employment of any ontological 
categories. They are mere objects in the perceiver’s consciousness.11 But, significantly 
for Nāgārjuna, the act of recognising and enumerating distinct objects of consciousness 
is due to their fundamental, shared value of śūnyatā/pratītyasamutpāda, which allows 
for the emergence of dependently originated but distinct characteristics.12 For example, 
Chapter Five of the MK is devoted to a discussion of space. It is clear from the opening 
verse that Nāgārjuna wants to dispel any notion of metaphysical identity:
Space does not occur prior to some characteristics of space.
If it would exist prior to having a characteristic, it follows that there would 
be space without a characteristic.13
If one considers other chapters in the MK, such as Chapter Nineteen on time, one can 
glean Nāgārjuna’s basic response to all aspects of saṃvṛti. Nāgārjuna wants to show 
that the tendency of the mind is to give mental objects a substantial status, which does 
not make logical sense under scrutiny.  In Chapter Nineteen he argues that none of the 
three aspects of time (past, present or future) can be essential. If, for example, the 
present and the future are dependent on the past, then the present and the future 
                                                          
11 Schwartz (1991: 181 and 267).
12 MK 18 and 19. 
13 MK 5: 1 (in McCagney 1997: 148).
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should exist in the past. The absurdity of this statement lays bare the erroneous 
assumptions of past, present and future being substantial concepts. None of the three 
aspects of time, therefore, can exist.  It is, rather, dependent origination that gives rise 
to the apparent existence of past, present and future. Similarly, space cannot be a 
stable or absolute structure. It has to be seen as arising through dependent origination. 
Space, from the saṃvṛti view, is a consequence of a continuous process of multiplying, 
separating, dividing, conferring and imposing the relative value of forms onto each 
other. Therefore space cannot be separated from its constituents, and neither can one 
constituent be isolated as a separate entity.14 Nāgārjuna’s affirmation of the śūnyatā of 
all phenomena is critical in understanding the equivalence of saṃvṛti and paramārtha. 
The difficulty meaning faces from the saṃvṛti view is that there is an inevitable conflict 
between consistency and hermeneutic confusion (which highlights the inevitable 
relativity of phenomena). Consistency and confusion are, obviously, mutually exclusive. 
If, according to Nāgārjuna, dukkha is a consequence of a confusion of imposing a stable 
value on saṃvṛti, then his understanding of the cure for dukkha would require an 
attentive intention to attain clear, logical thought to correct the misconceptions in 
saṃvṛti. If thought seeks clarity and consistency, the mind must reject the assumption 
that conceptual knowledge makes sense due to common-sense epistemologies or 
those that are non-realist-based. For example, when I see Denzil, my colleague, in the 
common room I recognise him to be the same colleague I had lunch with yesterday. 
                                                          
14 Siderits argues (in Westerhoff et al 2011: 170) that causes and conditions are not all connected:  but, in 
my view, the notion of space as articulated by Nāgārjuna provides a conduit for all causes and conditions 
to be connected. .
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Common sense informs me that, despite the fact that our conversations expressed 
completely different points of view on the two days, I can achieve this dexterous act of 
recognition because I hold a commonly held concept of him. Yet Nāgārjuna argues that 
holding a fixed view of my colleague in my mind contributes to my dukkha, despite its 
obvious pragmatic advantages. According to him, my recognition of my colleague is due 
to his emergent characteristics, which are dependently originated. Wood offers a way to 
interpret my changing experiences of my colleague. He argues that statements in 
saṃvṛti are indeterminate and, the more we are open to indeterminacy, the less dukkha
we will experience.15 Denzil may hold different views on different days without causing 
confusion if identity is understood as a consequence of śūnya. If one applies the 
catuṣkoṭi16 to this experience of indeterminacy it would look like this (I will discuss the 
catuṣkoṭi in more detail later in this chapter):
This is the same Denzil I had lunch with yesterday.
This not the same Denzil I had lunch with yesterday.
This is both the same Denzil and not the same Denzil I had lunch with 
yesterday.
This is neither the same Denzil nor not the same Denzil I had lunch with 
yesterday.
Wood, however, argues that such arguments make Nāgārjuna a nihilist.17  He refers to 
VV 22 and 23 to prove his point: 
                                                          
15 Wood (1994: 114). He is referring to VV 70 and 66 here: all things exist dependently and therefore 
“cannot be found within the totality of causes and conditions”.
16 1. Is p
2. not P
3. both P and not P
4. neither P nor not P
17 (1994: 109).
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22
The dependent existence of things is said to be emptiness, for what is 
dependently existent is lacking substance.
23
Suppose one artificial being were to hinder another artificial being, or an 
illusory man would hinder one brought about by his own illusory powers. 
This negation would be just like that.18
Nāgārjuna argues that it is only possible to recognise my colleague in different contexts 
over time if I base my view of him on śūnya (i.e. openness and indeterminacy). 
Therefore I recognise particular nominal and a posteriori characteristics paradoxically 
because of śūnya.19 I cannot provide evidence for the substantiality of my colleague
beyond my dependently originated experience of him, but, at the same time, I need not 
allow my view of him to collapse into nihilism. I can choose to see him as infinitely open 
without fixed conceptual constraints. Does the awareness of śūnya necessarily indicate 
nihilism or does śūnya, for Nāgārjuna, provide a basis for knowledge as opposed to 
ignorance, which is based on fixity of views?
The idea of a split between knowledge (vidyā) and ignorance (avidyā) is firmly 
established in Indian philosophy. The concept of adhyāsa in Advaitā Vedānta describes 
the process whereby the mind superimposes false perceptions and attributes onto 
Reality, producing the state of ignorance. The earliest Indian philosophy to articulate a
                                                          
18 Westerhoff et al (2011: 27).
19 McCagney argues that Nāgārjuna is critical of the catuṣkoṭi and the law of exclusion by asserting “not 
differentiated and not identical” in MK 1 (Dedication) which seems to issue a criticism of the fourth step in 
the argument, but is closer to the third stage (1997: 111 and 137). I agree with McCagney’s argument 
here, but in asserting that identity can be both identical and differentiated, she needs to draw on other 
linguistic techniques in order to make her use of symbolism meaningful in such an ostensibly 
contradictory assertion. 
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split between knowledge and ignorance is Sāṃkhya. Importantly, there is no external 
creator (Īśvara) or God in this system.  According to its purported and mythical founder, 
the sage Kapila, a disturbance in Spirit (puruśa) causes the dormant state of matter, or 
prakṛti, to become active. It sub-divides into the values (gunas) of purity (sattva), 
maintenance (rajas) and chaos (tamas). These three values are in a state of conflict 
with each other and for the attention of Spirit. Each value predominates for a time until it 
is superseded by another value. The fluctuating periods of dominance amongst the 
gunas gives rise to the cycles of nature. After the initial disturbance in Spirit, Spirit 
enters a state of confusion and forgets its own nature. In the quest to re-cognise its own 
identity it mistakenly identifies with prakṛti and its various values.20
Richard Garbe argues that Kapila’s system of Sāṃkhya philosophy influenced
Buddhism21 in four important ways:
1. Its atheism. There is no Creator God or explanation for the existence of 
prakṛti or puruśa.
2. The activation of ignorance through engagement with the senses.
3. The causal chain of ignorance causing entrapment in ignorance.
4. Identification with spirit or a sense of undifferentiated wideness.
The origin and nature of the idea of ignorance in Vedic thought is unclear. The concept 
was developed in Buddhist philosophy into an idea that resembled the Western idea of 
the unconscious, in that what is created by the mind is projected onto an ”external 
                                                          
20 Raju (1986: 304-36).
21 De Jong (1997: 34 and 35) and Garbe (1897: 46).
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reality”’.22 It is therefore important to see Nāgārjuna’s understanding of ignorance from 
within the Buddhist mindset. The Samyutta Nikāya 3.142 reads:
All form is comparable to foam; all feelings to bubbles, all sensations are 
like mirages; dispositions are like the plantain trunk, consciousness is but 
an illusion.23
In Samyutta Nikāya 1.135 The Buddha refers to the role causality plays in producing a
false sense of self. The metaphor of the chariot is used to describe how the various 
parts contribute to a false sense of the whole.24  The five skandhas produce a false 
sense of continuous self and a dysfunctional attachment to the objects of perception. 
The causal processes that give rise to a false sense of self are unconscious and remain 
unconscious to consciousness or vinnana, which is the illusory product of the causal 
relatedness of the skandhas.25.
For Nāgārjuna, sense objects are a consequence of causality or pratītyasamutpāda, 
but are not seen as a consequence of ignorance in his philosophy. Rather, it is because 
they appear distinct that they are deceptive.26 The intention with which they are 
observed can cause liberation from dukkha. If sense objects are substantialised, dukkha
results. But if they are viewed as inherently empty or open, nirvāṇa is experienced.27 As 
Wood argues, concepts are used only as a means to communicate; but, in thinking 
                                                          
22 Raju (1986: 140 & 150).
23 Kalupahana (1975: 86). 
24 Kalupahana (1975: 78).
25Krüger (1995: 95-98).
26MK 13: 1 & 2.
27MK 14: 3-8 (in McCagney,1997: 170).
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about concepts, we use conventions that cannot capture the flux of mental impressions. 
Language contains two contradictory possibilities: its structure can imply the concept of 
substance through attachment to sensory referents, but language can also refer to 
śūnya or openness if it is used with the awareness that it is pointing to a reality beyond 
itself. Language is not contradictory when it refers to emptiness.28 In VV 57 Nāgārjuna 
argues:
Where someone said “a name has a referent,” one would say then 
substance exists. You have to assert “we do not assert a name of this 
kind.”29
In this sense, since the name of a thing refers to something that is insubstantial, the 
name must also be insubstantial “because its emptiness is non-referring”.30 This 
statement replies to Nāgārjuna’s opponent’s statement in verse 9:
And if there is no substance, there would also not even be the name 
“insubstantiality of things” for there is no name without a referent. 31
For Nāgārjuna, both the term and the object referred to are śūnya and they need to be 
understood as such if wisdom is to prevail.  This renders the catuṣkoṭI, or the law of the 
excluded middle, invalid in that all is śūnyatā and therefore contradiction does not apply.
Nāgārjuna’s understanding of pratītyasamutpāda recognises the unconscious element 
of ignorance, but differs from the Buddha’s understanding of causality (see Assutavā 
                                                          
28 Wood (1994: 111).
29 In Westerhoff et al (2011: 37).
30 Westerhoff (2010: 106).
31 Westerhoff (2011: 24).
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Sutta). For Nāgārjuna, causality is not the root of ignorance, whereas the Buddha firmly 
held it to be so. Nāgārjuna believes that ignorance occurs when causality is 
misinterpreted as links between causal networks, rather than being a result of 
dependently originated characteristics. He uses the idea of superimposition, which he 
terms samāropa32, to explain how the false sense of substantiality is perpetuated in the 
saṃvṛti view. The state of delusion occurs when raw, conditioned, momentary states in 
saṃvṛti are erroneously seen to be meaningful without their dependence on śūnya. 
Therefore perceptions are a consequence of dependent origination and not of common-
sense objects in physical relationship with each other. 
But how is the mind to heal its split nature between knowledge and ignorance (fixed 
views) in terms of Nāgārjuna’s arguments if its tools (objects and concepts) are flawed 
and subject to deception by unconscious tendencies that cause ignorance? Or, to put 
the question another way, if Nāgārjuna’s central aim in the MK is to show that the use of 
fixed concepts is illogical if viewed from the perspective of reductio ad absurdum 
(prasaṅga), how then can the conceptual view, saṃvṛti, be used to realise 
knowledge?33 Nāgārjuna argues that the only way to approach saṃvṛti is from the 
inverted standpoint of pratītyasamutpāda where phenomena make sense because of 
                                                          
32 MK 16:10
33 Siderits argues (in Westerhoff et al 2011: 171) that paramārtha can only make sense conventionally.  
But, surely, according to Nāgārjuna, conventional objects do not make sense when subjected to prasaṅga
and therefore they may be true conventionally within a limited understanding of truth. Siderits defends his 
argument of defending Nyāya epistemology which is object related (Westerhoff et al 2011: 178). 
However, such a view ignores the importance of role śūnyatā plays in Nāgārjuna’s thought to explain 
change, including change in knowledge. Siderits’s account of development in knowledge does not include 
Nāgārjuna’s view of śūnyatā, which is a crucial element of the occurrence of change (Westerhoff et al 
2011: 180).  See, for example, MK 13: 3-8, MK 15: 8, MK 15: 11, MK 16: 1, Rt 66-70,  SS: 30, Vaidalya-
prakana: 59, MK 7: 33-34 and MK 13: 3.
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their interdependence as opposed to the commonly held position that phenomena make 
sense because they are perceived.  This, I argue, implies an inclusive philosophy. 
Saṃvṛti should be approached from an awareness of total inclusivity, where what is 
denoted is indeterminate and not, as it appears to common sense, as determinate.  In 
this way it conveys the same sense of ākāśa as expressed in the PPM. By implication, 
what is held as a fixed determinate (through the reification of perception and 
phenomena) is untrue and what is viewed in an indeterminate capacity is true.34
Indeterminacy is the result of awareness of both the conscious (saṃvṛti) and 
unconscious processes of knowledge (paramārtha). This position incorporates the 
conventional processes of cognition with the unconscious processes of cognition. The 
unconscious processes of cognition are the unperceived causal forces that bring about 
the objects and flow of perception.35 The production of a fixed concept is, then, a result 
of the mind splitting its unconscious from its conscious aspect.36
2. Theories of truth
Western philosophy appeals to one or more of three theories of truth when determining 
the truth of a statement:  the coherence theory, the correspondence theory and the 
                                                          
34 Note that that the author makes a distinction between the truth of a statement and its meaning. If a 
statement is true it is not necessarily meaningful.
35 See MK 17: 14. Here Nāgārjuna displays an inclusive approach when he argues that causality follow a 
karmic continuum in combination with an unspecified substance or nature.  In addition, verses 9 and 10 
stipulate that the continuum emerges from mind, which incorporates both actions, fruits and unconscious 
nature.
36 This aspect of Nāgārjuna’s thought seems to prefigure Henri Bergson’s thought in ”Memory and matter” 
(1911). Bergson draws a distinction between automatic memory, which is habitual, unreflective and 
stimulus-driven, and conscious memory.  Conscious memory incorporates the spirit (unconscious) with 
the mechanical (conscious) memory of the body.
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identity theory.  These have all been used throughout Western philosophy as arbiters of
meaning and truth, but also have relevance to the way Nāgārjuna establishes the 
validity of his argument in that these theories of truth relate to reasoning strategies in 
Eastern darśana, namely, Nyāya and prasaṅga.
When meaning is established purely from the view of saṃvṛti, it operates according to a 
coherence theory of truth; it is founded on the idea that language establishes meaning 
through the logical interrelation between concepts. In this theory, language cannot point 
beyond concepts to material things. Such a theory holds that a round square is not 
meaningful because the two concepts do not correlate, but the statement, ‘a peaceful 
sleep’ is meaningful because of the correlation between the two concepts. But a unicorn 
or a Pegasus is meaningful, not because of their logical possibility in the world, but 
because they exist as acceptable concepts in our frame of reference. It is important to 
recognise, in terms of the coherence theory of truth, that concepts are invented, not 
discovered. This implies that the world of saṃvṛti is created by the mind.
Correspondence theories of truth, such as that propounded by the Nyāya school, 
assume that “language must correspond or ‘link up with the world at some fundamental 
level via a denotation relation”.37 This means that various properties, such as “hornness” 
and ”horseness”, must denote a meaningful relation in the real world for the statement 
to be meaningful, in the case of a unicorn. If this is not possible the statement is 
nonsensical. 
                                                          
37 Westerhoff (2009: 57). 
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In my view, Nāgārjuna is appealing to what Western philosophy would call an identity 
theory of truth. The identity theory of truth holds that the truth of the statement is 
identical to the referent. This theory of truth aims to overcome the problem of the 
correspondence theory where a statement only approximates the truth. But if a 
proposition can be proven to be true via logical argument, then the fact is identical to the 
statement. He is arguing that, for statements to be meaningful, they need be identified 
with pratītyasamutpāda. But this can only obtain if through an idea resembling the
identity notion of truth where concepts and objects are viewed as symbols of 
pratītyasamutpāda. It is therefore misleading to argue that the objects are identical to 
pratītyasamutpāda. This is why I maintain in Chapter Three that saṃsāra is equivalent 
to nirvāṇa, and not identical. In my understanding of the identity theory of truth, the use 
of objects, symbols, sentences or truth-bearers can be identical to objects or truth-
makers.  Identity theory does not necessarily need to refer to an idea of reality as 
unifying the sensor with that which is sensed, as Bradley uses it.38 My use of the identity 
theory of truth explains Nāgārjuna’s belief that objects and concepts are śūnyata and 
therefore inexpressible. The identity theory of truth allows concepts and objects to be 
viewed as symbols to point to their true value as śūnya. Nāgārjuna does not follow the 
Nyāya method of reasoning. For him truth does not need to establish a connection to 
real object. Any phenomena or concept, even “unicorn”, is a symbol of 
                                                          
38Flew (1983: 48).  Recently Trenton Merricks has also used the identity theory of knowledge to argue for 
the meaningfulness of the Christian trinity of three divine persons and one God (in Crisp, Davidson and 
Van der Laan 2006: 299).
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pratītyasamutpāda in that any concept or phenomenon is a consequence of dependent 
origination.
The inclusive approach is clearly elucidated through a study of Nāgārjuna’s response to 
his critics in the Vigrahavyāvartanī (VV), and particularly via Wood’s and Westerhoff’s 
interpretations of the text. Nāgārjuna had to devote a large portion of the 
Vigrahavyāvartanī (VV) to defend his position on truth against the Abhidharmikas. The 
challenge he faces from his opponents in this text is:  if he claims that there is no own-
being, it is nonsensical to negate that which does not exist. His opponent’s logic is 
encapsulated in verses 9 to 12. 
9. And if there was no substance, there would also not even be the name 
“insubstantiality of things,” for there is no name without a referent.
10. Rather, substance exists, yet the substance of things does not exist. It 
has to be explained to what this thingless substance belongs.
11. To the extent to which the negation ”there is a pot in the house” is 
precisely a negation of an existent, your negation is a negation of an 
existing substance.
12. Now as this substance does not exist, what is negated by the 
statement of yours? For the negation of a non-existent is accomplished 
without words.39
Wood’s40 and Westerhoff’s41 interpretations of Nāgārjuna’s answer to this objection – to 
the possibility of a negation of a false perception ― agree about which philosophical 
school Nāgārjuna was responding to in the Vigrahavyāvartanī. Wood and Westerhoff 
                                                          
39 Westerhoff (2011: 24).
40 Wood 1994.
41 Westerhoff 2009.  
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maintain that Nāgārjuna’s critic was an Abhidharmika’42 who subscribed to Nyāya
logic.43
Wood and Westerhoff differ significantly on the question of whether Nāgārjuna was a 
nihilist or not. Wood argues that Nāgārjuna does not dispute the charge of nihilism 
which his opponent levels against him, but rather, counter-argues that his opponent 
does not appreciate that his understanding of nihilism is total, which includes the 
statement “all is empty”. Any statement, even one denying any own-being, does not 
contradict the statement, if statements only operate at a “magical” level.44 Westerhoff, 
by contrast, introduces a more nuanced perspective on the mind of the perceiver than 
Wood is using. He argues, following Candrakīrti,45 that as long as we assume that the 
object of perception and the object of negation are all dependently arisen objects rather 
than entities existing in their own right, we can deny their existence without antecedently 
having to regard them as real.46
Wood’s position is that, despite the fact that the world is, in his terms, a 
phantasmagoria, the processes of cognition, i.e. pratītyasamutpāda, do occur in an 
illusory capacity. Westerhoff, however, argues that, when Nāgārjuna argues for 
negation, it means he is arguing against the perception of conceptual and independent 
                                                          
42 Wood  (1994: 108).
43 Westerhoff (2009: 54).
44 Wood (1994: 109).The argument is based on verse 23, where  Nāgārjuna argues that his 
understanding of negation is not contradictory because it takes place by one illusory person negating 
another illusory person of his or her own making.
45 Although I am critical of Candrakīrti’s argument, which separates objects into two categories 
(paramārtha and saṃvṛti), I agree with his argument regarding the śūnyatā value of all objects.
46 Westerhoff (2009: 63).
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objects of consciousness. The word used for perception in verse 65 is graham, which 
means to grasp. In the present sense it means to reify concepts and independent 
objects. These, he argues, are imposed (samāropa) on the flow of pratītyasamutpāda in 
the saṃvṛti view.47 The only way for saṃvṛti to be meaningful and have consistency in 
meaning is, paradoxically, if names do not have fixed referents in the world and if it 
identifies with pratītyasamutpāda as in my rendition of the identity theory of truth, which 
utilises concepts and objects as symbols for śūnyatā. Rather, Nāgārjuna asserts that by 
naming anything, even śūnyatā, the illusory world is established (prasiddha).48  If 
meaning is determined by the processes of perception from the saṃvṛti view, then 
meaning will always be conflictual, established competitively between dominant and 
less dominant properties and qualities. Meaning in the latter scenario is therefore 
established by comparison, contrast and by degrees (that is, via the Correspondence 
and Coherence theories of Truth).
I am in more agreement with Westerhoff than with Wood. Westerhoff’s suggestion, that 
pratītyasamutpāda occurs in isolation from the mental processes of reification. is closer 
to my argument than Wood’s contention that pratītyasamutpāda occurs in an illusory 
capacity. Nevertheless, I differ from Westerhoff in that I maintain that the objects of 
consciousness that emerge as a consequence of vikalpa and prapañca are not 
necessarily the result of reification. Raw objects of consciousness emerge as an effect 
of emergent characteristics from pratītyasamutpāda, since vikalpa and prapañca are 
included within the processes of pratītyasamutpāda. But how can meaning be 
                                                          
47 Westerhoff (2009: 48).
48 VV 59.
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established in identification with pratītyasamutpāda? For Wood, nihilism is the only 
alternative to a competitive meaning structure: all phenomena are unreal and hence 
meaningless.49 But does this imply that meaning is conditional? It does if I perceive 
myself as an empty form in the saṃvṛti view, because the only meaning I could derive 
would be from the meaning I give to the objects and myself in my experience. For 
Westerhoff, pratītyasamutpāda occurs in processes of cognition and gives rise to our 
understanding of objects as experiential events.  If I apply the identity theory of truth to 
pratītyasamutpāda, terms and objects connect directly with Reality:  that is, they identify 
with the broad, non-specific, indeterminacy of reality. Nāgārjuna asserts that inclusive 
phrases such as “all is śūnyata” are meaningful despite their inherent indeterminacy. 
This statement is meaningful because my experience is inclusive of causality and the 
indeterminacy of impermanent things.50  For example, if my wife leaves the armchair 
where she was sitting to retire to bed, it makes no sense to describe my experience by 
fixed, non-causal statements, as follows:
- Wife seated in armchair
- Armchair minus wife (armchair ~ wife). 
- Wife in bed
In this situation, only the set of indeterminacies and casual interrelations gives meaning 
to the event: my wife sat in the armchair in the lounge, was alert and engaged with me, 
grew tired and was no longer alert, stood up from the armchair and left the lounge to 
climb into bed. This experience would not be possible if I held substantialising views 
about my wife, the armchair, lounge and bed. This observation occurs from a saṃvṛti
                                                          
49 Wood (1994: 112).
50 VV 70.
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point of view where arising and ceasing of phenomena takes place. But from the highest 
”view” of paramārtha, nothing happens because all phenomena simply continue in their 
essentially fluid and open conditions.51 The occurrence of arising and ceasing is 
meaningful if held from the vantage point of paramārtha, because it allows for the fluidity 
of phenomena without causing conceptual contradictions to appear in my reasoning. 
Common sense interprets the event through the lens of transformation, but Nāgārjuna 
shows in MK 13: 4-5 that transformation implies an absurd notion of causality, where a 
substantial identity changes into a totally different substantial identity. Indeed, the only 
view that is meaningful is if the entire perceptual event is empty and the concepts used 
refer to indeterminate categories.52
The statement “all is empty of own-being” is shown by Nāgārjuna to be meaningful if 
read as inclusive of saṃvṛti and paramārtha epistemologies, rather than merely object-
discerning epistemologies from the saṃvṛti view. I take Nāgārjuna’s defence of his 
position on the negation of own-being in the VV as a negation of what does not exist 
and therefore not as a negation at all.53 Read in this light, that statement links to MK 22: 
11 and 24: 18, where Nāgārjuna indicates a state of affairs without making a 
metaphysical statement. To argue that a phenomenon is śūnya is not to argue, 
nihilistically, that it is not there or does not exist.  To say that it is natureless does not 
mean that it is not real; in this, I differ from Wood’s view that there is nothing but unreal 
                                                          
51 The sense of elevated view is erroneous. It is corrected by understanding śūnyatā as space where 
paramārtha is seen as offering a broader view, rather than an elevated one.
52 See also MK 24: 37.
53 VV 62–63.
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appearances54 in the saṃvṛti view.55 Instead, Nāgārjuna’s assertions in VV 70, MK 24: 
40, MK 24: 36 and 24: 18 are founded on including the conscious (intentional actions)
and unconscious processes (unintentional and processes such as breathing, blood 
circulation or subtle forms of interdependent causality that occur outside of the realm of 
cognitive awareness) of cognition that take place of cognition.
3. The validity of identity theory
If pratītyasamutpāda is the basis of Nāgārjuna’s philosophy, then the two notions of 
truth, saṃvṛtisatya and paramārthasatya, are not distinct categories. The two-truths 
formulation that Nāgārjuna puts forward is not dualistic, as shown in verses like MK 24:
10. Therefore a relation between the two categories exists. But what can be deduced 
about this relationship? First, by definition, paramārtha is wider than saṃvṛti truth. Jones 
suggests that chapter 26 in the MK was not authored by Nāgārjuna because its logic is 
out of character with the rest of the document in establishing pratītyasamutpāda as the 
cause of ignorance. If we accept this, then Nāgārjuna did not intend saṃvṛti to be 
negated by paramārtha (niddāna negated by nirvāṇa).56 Second, but paradoxically, the 
idioms of the two truths are separate and distinct.  Saṃvṛtisatya is concerned with 
distinct objects and concepts, whereas paramārthasatya is concerned with truth beyond 
                                                          
54 Wood (1994: 116).
55 See Garfield (in Westerhoff et al 2011: 29).
56 Jones (2010: Kindle ebook location 2330 –3522). Jones, however, argues that, while it is plausible that 
Nāgārjuna did not write Chapter 26 due to its logic contradicting the logic in the rest of the MK, it is also 
possible that pratītyasamutpāda sets up the conditions for ignorance but is in itself equal to śūnyatā. I will 
discuss this argument later in the chapter. 
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concepts. The last verse of Chapter 25 (verse 24) and the arguments made in Chapter 
27 concur that there are no views or concepts, even leading to the radical implication 
that the Buddha’s teaching did not occur, whereas saṃvṛti is based on concepts. But in 
clarifying the relation between paramārtha and saṃvṛti Nāgārjuna makes his most 
radical philosophical move, echoing the assertion in Prajnaparāmita hridaya that “form 
is emptiness/emptiness is form”.57 Nāgārjuna asserts a similar relation between 
saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. One of Nāgārjuna’s most enigmatic formulations in Chapter 25: 
19 of the MK reads:
There is no distinction whatever between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa
There is no distinction whatever between nirvāṇa and saṃsāra.58
This statement develops from the previous chapter, where Nāgārjuna states in 24: 10:
Higher truth is not taught independently of common practice. 
Liberation is not accomplished by the unattainable higher truth.59
These verses allude to two facets in Nāgārjuna’s position on the meaning of the relation 
between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. First, he establishes that an interdependent relation 
exists between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa; and second, he argues that no distinction can be 
made between these two conditions. The above two statements reveal that the relation 
between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa is not dualistic. But, due to their interdependent status, 
                                                          
57 Nāgārjuna extends the idea of emptiness beyond that found in the Heart Sutra when he argues that 
emptiness is derived from pratītyasamutpāda.
58 McCagney (1997: 209).
59 McCagney (1997: 201). McCagney’s translation of this verse may be misleading in that her translation 
could be read as saying ultimate truth is unattainable. Kalupahana (1986) translate this line more 
accurately, “without understanding the ultimate fruit, freedom is not attained” (p 333)
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neither is it monistic. So which theory of truth can be used to make sense of 
Nāgārjuna’s claims? The correspondence theory and the coherence theory of truth both 
function in terms of the relation between statement and form:  that is, statements refer 
either to accepted concepts or objects. Therefore the correspondence theory of truth 
cannot be applied to this relationship, due to the claim that two different objects of 
knowledge are equivalent (along the same lines as an apple cannot be a pear) and the 
coherence theory cannot be applied because of the contradictory claims of the two 
conditions regarding objects, that is, in the samvrti paradigm, objects do “exist” and from 
a paramārtha view objects do not exist. Ultimately the notion of existence of form does 
not make sense in terms of the notion of pratītyasamutpāda in Madhyamaka. 60
The problem with both the coherence and correspondence theories of truth is that they 
operate within a structure of meaning being ascribed to a particular form. What is 
required for meaning to make sense in the framework of pratītyasamutpāda is a non-
referential meaning structure. In my view, the only way to make sense of Nāgārjuna’s 
argument concerning the relationship between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa is in terms of 
identity theory. Nāgārjuna’s view of the relation between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa is 
explained in terms of pratītyasamutpāda. Both saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are embedded in 
the “causal” processes of pratītyasamutpāda. In identifying with pratītyasamutpāda, 
meaning is no longer dependent on form, but rather on śūnyatā. 
                                                          
60 MK 9: 12.
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Before considering the meaning of saṃsāra in relation to nirvāṇa, it is important to 
understand the processes of pratītyasamutpāda that give rise to conditions in saṃvṛti. 
Saṃsāra is the experience of the phenomenal world from the view of saṃvṛti. But how 
does this experience take place? Chapter Four in the MK is focused on the skhandas. 
Nāgārjuna’s argument in verse one is aimed at establishing the identity of 
pratītyasamutpāda with material form:
Material form separated from the cause of material form is not obtained.
And the cause of the material form separated from material form is not 
seen.
In verse 7 Nagarjuna continues the same argument for the other Skandhas:
Feelings, thoughts, perceptions, and dispositions in general, as well as the 
totality of beings follow the same rule as material form.61
Nāgārjuna establishes the identity of pratītyasamutpāda and all the Skandhas, including 
the interdependence of the processes of cognition in the Skandhas. Pratītyasamutpāda 
cannot be separate from the world of form, but for fixed concepts to form, a further 
reification process needs to occur, with the added causal ingredients of thirst and 
grasping. 
By establishing the centrality of pratītyasamutpāda in the production of saṃvṛti and the 
identity of saṃvṛti to that which has no conditions, nirvāṇa, Nāgārjuna discounts 
                                                          
61 In McCagney (1997:146-147).
167
dualism or any correlative way of thinking about causality. Therefore the equivalence 
between saṃvṛti and paramārtha is that they are both śūnyatā and therefore are 
identical to to pratītyasamutpāda. 
It is now necessary to explore the origins and derivation of pratītyasamutpāda itself.   
Nāgārjuna explains in Chapter 1: 4 of the MK that it can only be described as 
indeterminate:
Causal efficacy is not associated with conditions, causal efficacy is not 
associated with non-conditions, conditions are not associated with causal 
efficacy or non efficacy.62
It is important to remember that, by identity, Nāgārjuna does not mean equality. 
Nāgārjuna’s understanding of pratītyasamutpāda is of process, not of discrete entities 
interacting. It therefore makes no sense to separate cause and effect.63 But the cause is 
not identical with the effect. This leads us to enquire to what extent propositions can be 
meaningful regarding pratītyasamutpāda. Some examples are: the cause of the river 
flowing is the flowing river and not the flowing river; or the cause of pratītyasamutpāda is 
and is not pratītyasamutpāda.64 Nāgārjuna seems to side with an identity theory of truth 
in that the truth of the statement is identical to the state of affairs, rather than accepting 
the contradictions arising from either a correspondence theory of truth, which embraces 
substantial form and change, or coherence theory, which embraces conceptual 
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consistency.65 Despite its vagueness, pratītyasamutpāda is Nāgārjuna’s denoting 
referent, which brings consistency to his logic purely on the grounds that nothing is 
being asserted and therefore the argument cannot be contradicted or denied.  
Nāgārjuna argues that, for there to be meaning, there must be consistency in the 
denoting referent. It is not enough to see the referent as an illusion that obscures a real, 
abstract truth. The truth is the experienced event. His point is that pratītyasamutpāda
provides consistency in terms of the equivalence between saṃvṛti and paramārtha. If all 
denoting referents are equal in their śūnyata status, meaning can be applied equally in 
all contexts and situations. 
The argument for the universal applicability of meaning requires a closer examination of 
semantics. It is important, here, to understand Nāgārjuna’s sense of śūnyatā. According 
to Nāgārjuna, śūnyatā must be understood from the standpoint of pratītyasamutpāda. 
All space, time and phenomena are subject to dependent origination. 
Pratītyasamutpāda is all-inclusive. This also applies to the experience of nirvāṇa. 
Therefore Nāgārjuna does not go along with the Abhidhamma view that nirvāṇa is the 
only unconditioned experience. If pratītyasamutpāda is universal in its applicability, then 
nirvāṇa logically must stand on an equal footing with saṃsāra in their conditioned 
status. His critics in the VV argue that this argument is contradictory because it is 
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illogical to have a name without a referent.66 But Nāgārjuna removes the absolute status 
from nirvāṇa and paramārtha. He explains in VV 48-51 that the object (prameya) cannot 
be separated from the means of knowledge (pramāna). Both have their basis in śūnya. 
It is now necessary to explore what Nāgārjuna understands by terms and objects, and 
this is the focus of the next section.
4. Metaphoricity
Nāgārjuna saw his philosophy as an orthodox account of the Buddha’s Dharma. But the 
central tenets of his thought differed from the earlier tradition of Buddhist thought. 
Where saṃsāra and nirvāṇa were seen by the earlier tradition as opposites, Nāgārjuna
saw them as equivalents based on pratītyasamutpāda. Where pratītyasamutpāda and 
śūnyatā were seen as opposites, he saw them as identical. The two-truths formulation 
was based on an early Buddhist view, posited in Samyutta Nikāya, where words should 
not presume to present a meaning beyond their conventional denotational meaning.67
This distinction was later developed in commentaries on the Tripitaka into two terms ― 
nītatha (higher) and neyyattha (conceptual) terms were developed in later 
commentaries on the Anguttara Nikāya and the Kathāvatthu. These refer to two kinds of 
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discourse, rather than two kinds of truth.68 The premise here is that knowledge is 
determined by discourse. 
Nāgārjuna’s formulation of two truths seems to have been influenced by the assumption 
that saṃvṛti is not invalidated by paramārtha: it is merely a limited or wider view.69
Nāgārjuna’s formulation of pratītyasamutpāda as interdependence between the two 
truths is not a cyclical conceptual trap of 12 nidānnas established through perception 
(graha), as established in the Buddha’s Dharma.70 In the Majjhima Nikāya of the Sutta 
Nipata, nibanna is a psychological state – the highest, unconditioned experience and 
the cessation of consciousness.71 Such a state is directly opposite to paticca 
samutpada, saṃsāra or the human condition. The goal was to break the chain of 
paticca samutpada in order to eliminate suffering.72 Instead of following this argument, 
Nāgārjuna equates nirvāṇa and saṃsāra.73  For Nāgārjuna, pratītyasamutpāda shows 
the absurdity of holding phenomena as having svabhāva and affirms the peaceful 
experience of treating arising and ceasing as dependently originated.  
Pratītyasamutpāda, for Nāgārjuna, is, therefore, not a foundation for dukkha. Rather, it 
is a philosophical and soteriological idea that foregrounds the recognition of 
interdependence and process, but does not reduce recognition to sameness.74 In the 
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72 McCagney (1997: 57).
73 MK 24: 19.
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opening verse of the MK, Nāgārjuna lays the foundation for describing the enlightened 
state:
I greet the best of teachers, that Awakened one, who taught liberation, the 
quieting of phenomena, interdependent origination which is non-ceasing 
and non-arising, non-momentary and non-permanent, non-identical and 
non differentiated, not come and not gone.75
Nāgārjuna’s understanding of pratītyasamutpāda shares far more with the akasic
understanding of śūnyata expressed in the PPM than with agamic Buddhism. This idea 
is substantiated by the akasic sense with which Nāgārjuna invests pratītyasamutpāda in 
MK1: 1. Nāgārjuna’s statement in MK 1: 1 is significant for what is to follow in the text 
because it provides a succinct framework for his philosophy:  he proposes to explore
the limits of the Buddha’s teaching on anattā. In showing himself to be a devotee of the 
Buddha’s Dharma, Nāgārjuna wants his reader to be reassured of where his 
commitments lie. But in his explication of pratītyasamutpāda he immediately shifts the 
notion away from the framework of the 12 (nidānna) linked causal chain of suffering and 
points to the new direction that he intends to follow the MK.76 Based on this statement, 
no categorical statement about pratītyasamutpāda can be made. It is entirely akasic in 
nature. Concepts are fluid, absurd and contradictory (as prasaṅga reveals). It is 
important, therefore, to understand what saṃvṛti is. The external world exists as a 
condition, but not in a reified form. Nāgārjuna states in MK 23: 8:
                                                          
75 McCagney (1997: 137).
76 MK, 24:13. Nāgārjuna argues that that the twelve-fold causal chain does not apply to his notion of 
śūnyatā, which is identified with pratītyasamutpāda.
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Physical form, sound taste touch smell and events are all made up of
imaginary cities in the sky, like dreams and mirages.77
This statement needs to be seen in relation to MK 24: 14, where Nāgārjuna states:
Because openness works, therefore everything works.78
In Nāgārjuna’s philosophy, the perceived world (loka) is not merely an illusion, as in 
Advaitā Vedānta (although sometimes in Advaitā Vedānta the perceived world is 
distinguished from illusions). It occurs due to the flow of dharmatā.79 Form, therefore, 
does not dictate meaning.  Using this logic, Nāgārjuna turns the tables on the 
arguments by his opponent in the VV, where words and concepts are seen to refer 
unproblematically to objects. Nāgārjuna points out that this argument implies that 
svabhāva and pratītyasamutpāda can coexist.80 According to Nāgārjuna, meaning is 
dependent on pratītyasamutpāda, or an indeterminate view of reality. 
Pratītyasamutpāda is based on the understanding of the interdependency of saṃvṛti
and paramārtha.  The indeterminacy of pratītyasamutpāda makes the referent 
necessarily ambivalent and contradictory.81 From the higher truth, or wider view, the 
arising and ceasing of perceptual objects does not take place. But at the lower truth, or 
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79 MK 21: 1 and 2.
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81 McCagney (1997:113).
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narrower view, objects are true until they are analysed into fixed concepts. They are 
“real” in relation to their non-fixed, akasic “nature” and cannot be seen as real once their 
utility has ceased. Knowledge of reality is, therefore, knowledge of pratītyasamutpāda.
Nāgārjuna argues that it is contradictory to argue simultaneously for svabhāva and 
impermanence while, from the view of saṃvṛti, meaning is sustained despite 
impermanence and absence of identity. To return to the example of my wife leaving the 
lounge and retiring to bed, the sequence of events makes sense to me if I hold a set of 
contradictory assertions equally in my mind. My experience of her is non-momentary, 
otherwise I would doubt my sanity.  Yet it is also non-permanent, otherwise she could 
not grow tired.  The person who is now in the bedroom is non-differentiated from the 
person who was in the lounge and yet is non-identical, due to the fact that she was alert 
and now is sleepy. In thinking along these lines, Nāgārjuna is not a nihilist because 
knowledge does not correspond to something formal or categorizable. Knowledge of 
pratītyasamutpāda is ākāśa-inspired descriptions of indiscernible conditions that 
resemble śūnyatā in the PPM.  These are: apratīhistita (not settling down), anālaya
(nothing to settle in) and anāgrahā (nothing to grasp).82 In the early sections of the PPM 
śūnyatā is likened to akāśa, particularly in the Aṣṭasāhasrikā (Aṣṭa), Ratnakūta (Rt) and 
the Ratnagunasamcayagātha (Rgs) sutras.83
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I aver that Nāgārjuna presents a framework for the Buddha’s Dharma that is 
simultaneously inclusive of both paramārtha and saṃvṛti.84 Nirvāṇa cannot be separate 
from saṃsāra. Despite this, very recent publications still make the mistake of separating 
samvrti from paramārtha. Jones, for example, answers the question, “Does the table 
exist?” by saying:  “It depends on the context, conventionally but not ultimately.”85 The 
problem with this answer is that it is not consistent with Nāgārjuna’s understanding of 
pratītyasamutpāda. First, there is no separate context for paramārtha. Second, saṃvṛti
cannot be separated from paramārtha. Nāgārjuna is an empiricist, always concerned 
with what is presented to his senses. The bare particulars or characteristics of sensory 
objects are recognisable, not in themselves, but due to the fluid process of 
pratītyasamutpāda. The world is negotiable and comprehensible because saṃvṛti and 
paramārtha are inseparable:  they are two sides of the same coin. Nāgārjuna does not 
argue that the presentation of the table is an illusion. His point is that, in recognising 
phenomena against the backdrop of pratītyasamutpāda, reification is falsified. But 
Nāgārjuna does not argue that conditioning or the emergence of bare particulars is 
falsified by paramārtha. Rather, conditioning is a characteristic of saṃvṛtisatya that 
occurs in relation to paramārtha.86 His concern is that the view of conditioning must not 
be fixed or reified.87 Knowledge of pratītyasamutpāda is the inclusive awareness of 
saṃvṛti and paramārtha. It is my contention that such inclusive awareness of saṃvṛti
and paramārtha is meaningful if understood from the vantage point of the akasic
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86 VV 70.
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description of forms of knowledge i.e “nothing to settle in” (anālayu) and ”nothing to 
grasp” (anāgrahā).
Nāgārjuna sets up a contradictory set of assertions in MK 28: 8 to show that paramārtha
is not absolute (because it is still a concept) and neither does paramārtha falsify 
saṃvṛti.  The limited view of saṃvṛti seems to challenge its equality with paramārtha. 
But if the referent for both paramārtha and saṃvṛti is pratītyasamutpāda, then their 
equality rests on both being śūnya (or open). It may seem that saṃvṛti is relative truth 
and paramārtha ultimate truth and, for conceptual reasons, such a division is pragmatic. 
But it is a mistake to view saṃvṛti as separate from paramārtha. Saṃvṛti makes sense 
because of paramārtha and understanding saṃvṛti also provides conceptual tools for an 
accurate grasp of nirvāṇa. But learning cannot be guided by concepts and forms that 
extend beyond their context: words and meaning only have contextual applicability and 
need to be approached from the standpoint of pratītyasamutpāda and not from a 
position that imposes fixed meaning. Therefore, from the saṃvṛti view, contradiction 
seems to occur due to the focus of characteristics and bare particulars, but they are 
only apparent if viewed from the standpoint of pratītyasamutpāda. Surprisingly, such a 
“‘view” from the standpoint of pratītyasamutpāda resembles common sense more than a 
rarefied mystical or spiritual view. Spirituality is superadded when the recognition of 
pratītyasamutpāda is linked with not holding fixed views or making judgements.88 If 
contradictions are perceived due to grasping and fixed views, then ignorance has 
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supplanted knowledge.89 Nāgārjuna maintains that, where śūnyatā is perceived, nothing 
is asserted or projected, including contradictions.90 No arising and ceasing exists if there 
is no svabhāva. But that does not mean that there is an empty void. Indeterminacy 
precludes higher truth from being separate from saṃvṛti.91 Things are true in a 
conventional sense until they are analysed as things in and of themselves. Their 
meaning resides in their akasic nature informed by pratītyasamutpāda. Nāgārjuna 
applies the catuṣkoṭi to describe the akasic meaning of events in MK 18: 8: 
All events are really so, not really so, both really so and not really so, 
neither really so nor not really so.92
But significantly for my argument, the catuṣkoṭi is not used by Nāgārjuna to assert 
contradictory truths. Rather, he uses a logical form to illustrate the indeterminate nature 
of referential statements.93 The indeterminacy in phenomena points to the 
interdependence of events. Nāgārjuna does not reject the four statements of 
differentiation, non-differentiation, identity and non-identity, but neither does he accept 
them. What occurs is indeterminate. Śūnyata, according to Nāgārjuna, is a positionless 
position, with nothing to grasp and nothing to project.
Words and phenomena, therefore, do not have a fixed term of reference and attempts 
by the mind to project fixed meaning will cause the mind to suffer. Each phenomenon 
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needs to be treated as a condition that is meaningful in that instance. Each moment is 
understood in the instant of the unfolding of pratītyasamutpāda.  Śūnyata is becoming: 
therefore, things and phenomena do not have existence apart from the view of 
dependent origination.
It is significant that Nāgārjuna argues that saṃsāra is the same in every way as nirvāṇa, 
because he implies that conventional truth, despite its tendency (through ignorance) to 
produce reified forms, is identical to paramārtha in terms of pratītyasamutpāda. From 
the standpoint of pratītyasamutpāda there can be no exclusion, because no statement 
holds categorically. The absence of foreclosure implies inclusion. If there is thirst, 
grasping arises and identification results. Separation leads to exclusion. This sets up 
Nāgārjuna’s critique of own-being because, if all is pratītyasamutpāda, there cannot be 
a separate independent being that is without cause, permanent and unchanging. 
Sūnyata is becoming; svabhāva is existence. This implies that there is no view of 
paramārtha separate from saṃvṛti because they are interdependent. In other words, 
neither realism nor anti-realism obtains in relation to phenomena because both forms of 
knowledge foreclose on understading.
This type of logic presented by Nāgārjuna stands in direct contrast to accepted Indian 
logic as articulated in Nyāya and which resembles the correspondence theory of truth, 
which maintains that reasoning must be rooted in an empirical object.94 Statements can 
relate to physical objects either as simple or complex designators. Either a statement 
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combines elements of reality which accord truthfully with the world, for example, “the 
man and the woman live as a married couple in the house,” or statements stand in an 
erroneous relation to the world, for example, “the man and the frog live as a married 
couple in a mushroom”.95  But both true and erroneous statements must be built from 
denoting terms that relate to the world. Therefore, as Westerhoff maintains, “simple 
designators will always refer to the world but complex designators may or may not do 
so.”96  But, by introducing saṃvṛti as a form of reality, Nāgārjuna places all statements 
into the non-denoting category. Westerhoff argues pertinently “that concepts are 
established by way of convention,” and “There is no ready made world of simple 
denoting terms.”97
It is still possible to use simple designators in Nāgārjuna’s argument, as long as they 
are understood not to be independent but rather appearing along with a set of 
“dependence relations at the same time”.98   As Westerhoff argues:
The Madhyamika thinks that an unreal entity such as water in a mirage or 
the appearance of svabhāva can very well be the object of an erroneous 
cognitive state and also be able to be referred to in a true sentence 
because it has become the object of a cognitive state, the source of the 
error is not located exclusively in the erroneous combination of individually 
existing properties mirage is a simple yet erroneous perception. As long as 
we assume that the object of perception and the object of negation are all 
dependently arisen objects rather than entities existing in their own right, 
we can deny their existence without antecedently having to regard them as 
real. Even though the term ‘water in the mirage’ is non-denoting, since 
there is water in the mirage, there is still something created by the interplay 
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of our senses, light, and heat on which the presence of water is 
superimposed, which we can subsequently deny. Similarly our language 
and general cognitive habits can, the Mādhyamika argues, create the 
unreal superimposition (samāropa) of svabhāva which Nāgārjuna’s 
arguments set out to refute.99
A statement, then, need not apply to anything actual to be intelligible. The statement, 
“The unicorn frolicked in the meadow” is intelligible in a fantasy idiom due to the fact 
that unicorns are accepted fantasy creatures. Similarly, propositional statements may 
seem unintelligible, given the meaning of words, but the referent may be an unknown 
context. For example, the statement, “the priest was fondly remembered as being a 
good husband” is not necessarily nonsensical. Based on the set of propositions 
informing the statement, it would appear that the statement is nonsensical. But should 
the statement be set within a different set of propositions, for example, it could describe 
a priest who lived before Pope Leo’s I declaration, in the late 4th century, that priests 
may not marry. Other possibilities include: there may be a priest in the future who is 
renowned for being a great family man; or the statement may refer to an Anglican priest.
The meaning of statements is neither purely propositional nor purely based on 
correspondence. Rather, meaning is derived from more complex relational factors, 
which an awareness of pratītyasamutpāda allows for. Nāgārjuna’s point is that the 
properties of phenomena are rooted in certain conditions and the processes of 
understanding are equally dependent on those conditions. But, significantly, all 
conditions and epistemological categories are rooted in pratītyasamutpāda. Due to the 
fact that pratītyasamutpāda is all-inclusive, it is important to bear in mind that any
condition is interconnected with a host of other conditions and, therefore, the 
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propositions that hold in one condition probably hold for a number of other conditions.100  
But a Naiyāyika could argue that the refutation of the existence of such a priest does not 
make sense because he does not exist based on a combination of the coherence and 
correspondence theories of truth, despite the possibility that the statement is empirically 
verifiable. By contrast, the proposition, “the priest was fondly remembered as a good 
husband” could be accepted as meaningful within a pratītyasamutpāda framework of 
meaning because the conditions for it to make sense would be understood to be 
dependently originated and not fixed to  definite simple designators.101
It remains important to remember that naming concepts is a process of cognition. 
Concepts are invented, not discovered.102 There is no way to prove that a concept 
denotes anything in the actual world.103 Empiricists always find difficulty in providing 
incontrovertible proof for the existence of an external world. This presents definite 
epistemological problems for nouns and noun-favouring statements. For example, what 
does the noun phrase ”married priest” refer to? Nouns are therefore necessarily 
indeterminate. Equally, a verb- or process-orientated statement, such as “it is raining” is 
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181
also indeterminate because while rain is happening, the function of “it” in the statement 
is indeterminate. 
The indeterminacy of nouns and verbs in statements presents problems for 
understanding and navigating the world. Nevertheless, people are very proficient at 
understanding and getting about in the world.  Nāgārjuna explains our dexterity in the 
world in terms of his two-truths formulation. He works with a radical form of empiricism 
in that he denies the existence of properties and yet recognises that they occur due to 
pratītyasamutpāda in relation to particular conditions. In my view, Nāgārjuna is arguing 
for a form of nominalism and a posteriori epistemology that is not founded on an 
objective world, but rather on dependently originated conditions. For example, meranti 
is known to carpenters as a durable wood that is suitable for exterior light construction. 
However, meranti grows uncultivated in the temperate rain forests of Malaysia. 
Therefore, the carpenter’s choice of meranti is dependent on the climate he/she is 
building in. If the climate is temperate, the structure will have a longer life and be less 
susceptible to marine borers than if the climate is wetter or drier.  So, while the 
hardness of meranti to withstand inclement weather is understood by carpenters, its
”hardness” is understood differently in different contexts. It is necessary, by extension,
that we live with a fairly well-grounded sense of concepts’ meanings; but those 
meanings must not be mistaken as applying to a real substance. 
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Even if the property of a thing is shown to differ according to conditions, however, there 
is still a case for arguing that we are operating with a loose sense of metaphysics. Even 
if Nāgārjuna argues for dynamic interdependence, which invalidates any belief in 
inherent properties, if a set of conditions remains relatively stable, that allows for 
predictability in naming properties.104 But Nāgārjuna’s point is that such naming must 
always be cognizant of dependent factors originating from pratītyasamutpāda. For 
example, fire occurs with heat but curdled milk is not inherent in milk.105
Nāgārjuna argues that even śūnyatā is not an absolute term, similar to the contingent 
qualities of any phenomenon.106  It obtains due to its interdependence with saṃvṛti, in 
the same way as saṃvṛti obtains due to its interdependence with śūnyata. What defines 
śūnyatā is its openness and indeterminacy. It is no one thing, and possesses no 
particular nature. Nāgārjuna wants to avoid all metaphysics. But is indeterminacy a 
strong enough argument against metaphysics? Certainly it does guard against dogmatic 
thinking. However, there is a danger that the statement “all things are empty of own-
being” may lead to an uncritical, non-interrogatory approach to the properties of 
phenomena. Science convincingly demonstrates the merit in experimentation through 
trial and error in coming to an understanding of the ”nature”, loosely formulated, of our 
world and the objects that comprise it. Conversely, even if, as Nāgārjuna argues, the 
                                                          
104 Siderits argues that “the denial that anything bears the intrinsic nature of a means of knowledge is not 
tantamount to the denial that we are justified in taking ourselves to know certain things. It is one thing to 
deny that justification can be context-invariant; it is quite another to deny that anything ever justifies a 
belief” (2003: 150). He makes this argument to affirm that there are justifiable conventional means of 
knowledge.  
105 MK 10 and MK 13: 6.
106 Even if it is argued that śūnyatā is absolute in the sense that is the nature of all phenomena without 
exception it is not an absolute because that understanding of śūnyatā is contingent indeterminacy.
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world is a result of the mind’s ability to fragment the dharmatā into conceptual bits and 
then perceive something “real” in those invented bits, it is still surprising that the mind 
can negotiate this mere collection of ”mirages and phantasms”. 
Plato grappled with the same dilemma of the relation between things and their 
metaphysical status. He posed the question, “Could there be two identical objects?” 
because, according to his logic, each object would be developed from a particular 
form.107 Plato argued that qualitative identity was possible without numerical identity on 
the basis that representation is reproducible. He, therefore, would not shift from the 
realism that informed his thinking.
Similarly, Nāgārjuna’s thought is informed by the non-realism of the Buddha’s 
teachings. Nāgārjuna introduced the concepts of interdependent two-truths formulation 
and dependent origination, which are rooted in the Buddha’s understanding of causality, 
into Buddhist discourse about the nature of reality. Therefore it is not through access to 
metaphysical truths that we understand the world but, rather, by way of interrelated 
meanings and consensus formation. Interrelatedness implies that there are no discrete 
phenomena and that all is in constant flux.108 It is true that phenomena are 
inexpressible, not discrete but not entirely non-apparent from the saṃvṛti view. It is also 
true that phenomena are produced by the mind via pratītyasamutpāda. So in terms of 
the two-truths formulation, what is the function of bare objects or, to put the question
                                                          
107 Plato (1974: 596 a-d).).
108 It could be argued that this is a metaphysical statement but I follow Nāgārjuna’s defense in the VV by 
arguing that a statement that affirms no substance is not a proposition.
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another way, what is the difference between the mind producing mere bare objects and 
creating meaning from them or imposing own-being onto them?
If terms, for Nāgārjuna, do not refer to metaphysical realities or to clearly distinguishable 
things in the world, then, in terms of the two-truths formulation, I argue that their function 
is to act as symbols for pratītyasamutpāda. Symbols are signs that point to an 
inexpressible truth and function as tools to communicate about that which defies 
language.109The indeterminacy of signs refers to the akasic nature of śūnyata. The mind 
produces bare objects, which are characterised by indeterminacy. However, they have 
discernible characteristics, which enable us to comprehend and relate to them. But this 
does not imply that they have a metaphysical status. Nāgārjuna’s argument shows that 
the mind’s productions are empty of own-being. At the paramārtha level, no phenomena 
arise. At the same time, Nāgārjuna does not want to suggest that the truth is that 
nothing occurs. MK 7: 33 suggests that while, from the paramārtha view, no 
conditioning exists, conditioning does occur from the saṃvṛti view as a necessary 
component of pratītyasamutpāda. I suggest that the relationship between saṃvṛti and 
paramārtha is best understood as saṃvṛti being symbolic of paramārtha based on the 
experience of saṃvṛti’s indeterminacy. This is the only way to escape the problem of 
metaphysics that Nāgārjuna faces is his claim that all phenomena are empty. Words, 
                                                          
109 In replying to the criticism that I have just made a statement that  is inexpressible, my response, 
though insufficient, must be, while language points non-referentially to inexpressible truth, I am working 
with a conventionally accepted version of both language and truth even as I remain aware of its 
limitations.
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concepts, statements and the world are best interpreted as metaphors for 
pratītyasamutpāda. While the mind produces bare objects through the processes of 
vikalpa and prapañca, the two-truths formulation gives these mental productions the 
function of referring to reality in symbolic form. This logic follows from the logic in the 
PPM, where finite objects are reinterpreted to represent the infinite character of 
Wisdom. It is important to note that such logic does not produce multiple concepts of 
different types of metaphysical knowledge as in Gnostic hierarchy of secret knowledge. 
Rather, objects, terms and concepts are the sole material Nāgārjuna works with.
Westerhoff et al wrote Moonshadows: conventional truth in Buddhist philosophy (2011) 
in order to grapple with four questions relating to saṃvṛti:
 What is conventional truth?
 What is true about conventional truth?
 How flexible is conventional truth? How much can it be revised?
 What are the implications of all this for how we lives our lives?
They derive these questions from Candrakīrti’s understanding of conventional 
knowledge110. My thesis offers a critique of their starting point on Candrakīrti’s view that 
objects have two natures — ultimate and conventional. Each nature is apprehended by 
corresponding cognitive processes. The implication is that objects are understood 
differently according to the level at which they are apperceived. But this contradicts the 
assertion in VV 70 and MK 24: 14 that the same cognitive processes that understand 
emptiness underpin the clear cognition of all objects. The point pursued in this thesis is 
that while it is true that knowledge cannot be conceived in substantialist terms, 
                                                          
110 (Madhyamakāvatara vi: 23, see Tsong khapa,  2006).
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Nagarjuna’s claim that objects are meaningful due to their rootedness in 
pratītyasamutpāda requires further exploration and explanation. Candrakīrti’s attempted 
explanation falls into contradiction in his assertion that objects have two natures when 
he maintains that conventional phenomena are understood as ultimate when their 
essence is seen as emptiness.111
In order to explore Nāgārjuna’s proposition in VV 70 and MK 24: 14, the two-truths 
concept needs close scrutiny. If saṃvṛti is understood accurately, it is comprised of bare 
perceptual objects, which neither exist nor do not exist.112 The erroneous imposition of 
svabhāva onto perceived objects occurs because of the false idea of personal 
consciousness or ego, which emerges as the last of the skandhas as an imposition on 
the ‘flow of consciousness’. The false sense of personal substance is then projected 
onto other objects. Projection is a modern idea, introduced as recently as the twentieth 
century, related to the idea of the mind being split between the conscious and 
unconscious mind in Freudian psychoanalysis. The formation of ego-consciousness in 
Buddhism is also an unconscious process, simply because there is no conscious 
awareness of the process. The processes of cognition are therefore split off from 
meaning, which is either false or true, therefore, due to unconscious projection onto 
bare perceived objects. In dividing objects into two natures, Candrakīrti perpetuates the 
splitting off of processes of cognition from the act of cognition (i.e. the ego). In effect, 
                                                          
111 Tsong Khapa (2006: 484).
112 Westerhoff (2009: 35-38). I make a distinction between the notion of the bare particular, which 
Nāgārjuna rejects because that would mean the existence of mind-independent objects (as Westerhoff 
points out) and bare perceptual objects, which are a crucial aspect of a meditative observation of 
dharmatā.
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arguing for objects’ dual natures is a consequence of a split mind because it 
perpetuates an absurd belief that objects have two natures, conceptual and non-
conceptual. 
In order to grasp the assertion made in VV 70 and MK 24: 14 the two truths need to 
reflect the whole mind, as expressed in the meditative experience of ākāśa, and not a 
split mind. Such a meditative experience is observant of mental objects, but is not 
attached or agitated by them.  At the same time it neither rejects nor suppresses them. 
My argument is that this akasic experience of mind is best conceived philosophically 
through a metaphorical interpretation of the identity theory of truth. From the standpoint 
of pratītyasamutpāda, meaning is established by viewing objects, terms and concepts 
as symbols of openness and emptiness in that they are produced by the mind whose 
nature is openness and emptiness. Conversely, if objects are viewed as having two 
natures, objects symbolise a mind that is split and ignorant of its own nature. 
Nāgārjuna’s argument, which follows the view of śūnyatā in the PPM, is that the 
Wisdom that lies beyond is attained through acknowledgement with and reinterpretation 
of words, concepts and objects in the world into alignment with an experience of the 
whole mind.113 But that does not mean that ultimately saṃvṛti is transcended. Rather, 
reality is experienced by participating in a non-attached fashion in saṃvṛti or, to put it 
more succinctly: in order to understand reality there needs to be engagement in 
dependently-originated process reality. Understanding reality needs to be approached 
via conceptual tools, but the production of these tools needs to be viewed as pointing to 
                                                          
113 MK 24:1-10
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the dependently-originated processes that gave rise to them. I argue, therefore, that the 
only way to understand the relationship between saṃvṛti and paramārtha is to see the 
relationship through the lens of metaphoricity where saṃvṛti is symbolic of and “points 
to” paramārtha. If the equivalence of parmārtha and saṃvṛti is correctly understood in 
the process of engaging with the flow of pratītyasamatpāda in a non-attached fashion, 
then there is awareness of right knowledge. In this regard it is easier to conceive of the 
relation between saṃvṛti and paramārtha when saṃvṛti is viewed as symbolic of the 
indeterminacy as paramārtha. This means that saṃvṛti is engaged in a creative and 
open manner, without judgement or limitation.
The symbolic relationship between paramārtha and saṃvṛti is apparent when MK 16: 10 
is compared MK 26: 10. MK 16: 10 reads:
Na nirvāṇasamāropo na samsārāpakasaņaṃ/
Yatra kas tatra samsāro nirvāṇaṃ kiṃ vikalpyate/114
But MK 16: 10 needs to be read in the light of MK 26: 10: 
Saṃsāramūlān saṃskārān avidvān saṃskaroty atah/
Avidvān kārakas tasmān na vidvāṃs tattvadarśanāt//115
Samskaroty in the above lines means “to put together” or “to compose”. This indicates 
that Nāgārjuna is not arguing for superimposition in the same sense as a constructed 
                                                          
114 McCagney (1997: 174).
115 McCagney (1997: 212).
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map is imposed on terrain. Rather, in his view, an incorrect interpretation of events is 
transposed onto dependent origination. From the perspective of the identity theory of 
truth, the processes of pratītyasamutpāda are inherent in the terms, concepts and 
objects produced in the saṃvṛti view, therefore the projection of meaning is 
unnecessary. Saṃvṛti naturally refers to and resonates with paramārtha: neither view is 
rejected or constructed, as MK 16: 10 succinctly states:
Neither is nirvāṇa only saṃsāra nor is saṃsāra removed away. Where 
there is nirvāṇa, there is saṃsāra. Which is falsely discriminated from 
which?
Both nirvāṇa and saṃsāra occur to the observant mind due to pratītyasamutpāda.116
Liberation is experienced through the natural reinterpretation of terms and objects as 
symbols for their natural empty state along the lines of their natural state pointing to the 
inexpressible empty silence. Nāgārjuna’s assertion that nirvāṇa is the same as 
saṃsāra117 must be understood from the starting point of an understanding of their 
reality as śūnyatā. At the level of perspective it does not make sense to assert identity 
between the two views purely in terms of the ambit of their differing views because this 
would viciate the ‘nature’ of the view. However, the equivalence of the two views allows 
                                                          
116 Garfield makes a similar suggestion but does not explore the matter in enough depth when he states,: 
“through addressing the question of the potential existence of an event in its conditions, Nāgārjuna hints 
at this concealed relation between praxis and reality” (in Garfield 1994: 5). Garfield does not  venture into 
exploring whether Nāgārjuna wants to advocate experience as meaningful. He argues, instead, that, 
“dependent origination simply is the explicability and coherence of the universe. Its emptiness is the fact 
that there is no more to it than that” (1994: 8). It is interesting  that Garfield does not discuss Chapter 17 
of the MK, which, as I argued in Chapters 2 and 3, requires a combination of both cognitive and non-
cognitive facets of the mind.  
117 MK 25: 19.
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for a metaphorical relationship where the indiscernibility of saṃvṛti objects are seen as 
instances of the inexpressible truth of śūnyatā.
Invoking Chapter 26 may contradict my previous suggestion of a different authorship to 
this chapter in that the idea of the Twelve Chain understanding of pratītyasamutpāda
contradicts Nāgārjuna’s assertion of the equivalence of Nāgārjuna pratītyasamutpāda
and śūnyatā. But this point is overridden by Jones’ argument that in equating 
pratītyasamutpāda with śūnyatā, pratītyasamutpāda from the saṃvṛti perspective offers 
the condition for desire but it is not the cause of desire.118 He notes that Nāgārjuna 
makes the distinction between cause (hetu) and conditions (pratyayā) in MK 1: 2.119
Desire begins in an active “misapprehension of reality”.120 If emptiness is equated with
pratītyasamutpāda, what arises cannot be affirmed but neither can it be denied – “it is a 
matter of dependency and a process of becoming”.121 The mistake occurs when what
arises is seen as distinct and independent122. But speaking of what arises without falling 
into misapprehension of reality requires an alternate use of language, one that creates 
the conditions for meaning and, ultimately, for Wisdom.123
                                                          
118 Jones (2010: Kindle ebook location 2338-3522).
119  Jones (2010: Kindle ebook location 2338-3522).
120  Jones (2010: Kindle ebook location 2338-3522).
121  Jones (2010: Kindle ebook location 2338-3522).
122 See fn 55.
123 Garfield explains the difference between hetu and prataya in Nāgārjuna’s usage as follows: 
When Nāgārjuna uses the word “cause” (hetu), he has in mind an event or state that has in it a 
power (kriya) to bring about its effect, and has the power as part of its essence or nature 
(svabhava0. When he uses the term “condition”, on the other hand (prataya), he has in mind an 
event, state or process that can be appealed to in explaining another event, state or process, 
without any metaphysical commitment to any occult connection between explanandum and 
explanans” (1994:4). 
While this distinction is useful,l I think Garfield does not take the distinction between  between hetu and 
pratayā far enough  to fully grasp Nāgārjuna’s intention in Chapter 1 of the MK.
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Reading MK16: 10 in connection with MK 26: 10 reveals the antecedent influence of the 
PPM’s use of metaphors in Nāgārjuna’s thought. In MK 16: 10 the inseparability of 
nirvāṇa and saṃsāra is affirmed. In MK 26: 10 the wise are described as not 
manufacturing separate identities for objects but, rather, seeing objects as instances of 
inexpressible reality that require no further mental construction other than being 
dependently originated expressions of śūnyatā. 
Hence the ignorant compose dispositions, roots of saṃsāra.
Therefore, the ignorant create while the wise, seeing reality, do not.
Given the logic contained in MK16: 10 and MK 26: 10, MK 24: 14 and VV 70 affirm that 
nirvāṇa and saṃsāra work because śūnyata works.124 This means that the defining 
properties of concepts and objects make sense because of śūnyatā/pratītyasamutpāda. 
It is my contention that Nāgarjuna’s claim in MK 24: 14 and VV70 that concepts and 
objects  are meaningful due to their śūnyatā/pratītyasamutpāda status can only obtain if 
saṃvṛti has a metaphorical relationship with paramārtha. There is no other way 
properties can be held without their either having realist/metaphysical properties or non-
realist, contextually imposed properties. But if properties refer to 
śūnyatā/pratītyasamutpāda, then they are seen as ”conditions” that make sense 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
124 McCagney (1997: 201).
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because they are conditionless.125 Their identifiable conditions can only be symbols for 
their true śūnya reality.126
5. Conclusion
In this chapter I have probed the manner in which Nāgārjuna argues for complete 
absence of own-being and metaphysics. This is the key to his radical innovation in 
philosophy. The absence of own-being is best understood in terms of 
pratītyasamutpāda. The equivalence between saṃvṛti and paramārtha makes sense in 
terms of the logic of pratītyasamutpāda, which, I have argued, derives from the 
conception of ākāśa and metaphor in the PPM. Identification with pratītyasamutpāda 
has several very important implications. First, it implies that no aspects of 
pratītyasamutpāda can be excluded or denied since saṃsāra is equivalent to nirvāṇa in 
that both derive their identity from pratītyasamutpāda.   Second, Nāgarjuna’s two-truths 
framework is “flat” rather than hierarchical, therefore reality is equally shared and 
equally open.127 Experience refers to no metaphysical or contextually derived 
properties. Instead, it refers meaningfully to the awareness of emptiness or dependent 
origination. Only in the state of ignorance does grasping occur and inequality places 
                                                          
125 In MK 1: 5 Nāgārjuna does not deny the ”existence” of conditions as experiential objects, but he 
denies their substantial existence. The ineffable nature of experience cannot be explained by 
metaphysical categories or by contextual causality.
126 I see similarities between my argument for a symbolic connection between saṃvṛti and paramārtha
and Priest’s argument that the structure of śūnyatā can be mathematically described as the totality of 
well-founded sets within in which all other sets are relationally embedded. In this way he argues that the 
problematic notion of indeterminacy is overcome because all conditions or relational sets participate in 
the determinative structure of śūnyatā (2009: 9-13).
127I do not mean by ‘flat’ to imply a non realist notion of truth. Rather, I mean that truth makers are arrived at via 
the understanding of dependent origination that allows all things to be understood.
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conflicting meaning onto representations, such as when objects are seen to have dual 
natures. Third, the idea of knowledge inferred in pratītyasamutpāda, as open, non-fixed, 
insubstantial and non-referential makes sense if objects in and of the world are 
metaphors of an akasic, non-verbal emptiness. While being pragmatic, we can 
negotiate a world that substantially does not and cannot exist and yet makes sense 
from the vantage point of an inexpressible silence.  This chapter has demonstrated that 
the equivalence between saṃvṛti and paramārtha makes sense if viewed from a lens of 
metaphoricity where saṃvṛti is understood to symbolise the openness and 
indeterminacy that is characteristic of śūnyata. 
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Conclusion
This thesis focuses on Nāgārjuna the philosopher, and, in particular, the aspects of his 
thought that deal with the nature of things and their meaning. The majority of 
Nāgārjuna’s writings are devoted to deconstructions, using the prasaṅga method of 
argumentation, of his opponents’ views – the Sarvāstivādin and Sautrāntika positions 
that uphold some form of substantialism. As a result, research into Nāgārjuna’s writings 
tends to focus on analysing pratītyasamutpāda or the relationship between saṃvṛti and 
paramārtha. By contrast, the main part of my thesis does not focus on Nāgārjuna’s  
debates with his opponents. My concern is to make sense of his thought, and 
specifically to focus on a neglected area in Nāgārjuna scholarship, namely the 
consequences of his thought for our understanding of meaning, particularly because he 
indicates in MK 24: 14 and VV 70 that the application of his thought is experiential 
meaning. 
Although Nāgārjuna does not make many assertive propositions regarding his 
philosophical position, he does assert that all phenomena are empty and that 
phenomena are meaningful because śūnyatā provides a sense of being engaged with 
them (yujyate)1 and the experience of them is immediate or manifest (prabhavati).2
Phenomena, therefore, according to Nāgārjuna, only make sense if viewed from the 
standpoint of śūnya. In this regard he makes two crucial assertions: first, that śūnyatā is 
                                                          
1 MK 24: 14. 
2 VV 70.
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identical to pratītyasamutpāda and second, that there is “no distinction between 
saṃsāra and nirvāṇa”.3 While he devotes much of his writing to applying the prasaṅga 
method to prove the necessity of recognising that all phenomena are śūnya and thereby 
asserting that causality needs to be based on emptiness by deconstructing views of 
phenomena based on substance, he does not give much attention to explaining his 
second claim, namely that phenomena make sense due to śūnyatā. This thesis, 
therefore, grapples with the latter issue – that Nāgārjuna does not provide adequate 
supporting argument to prove that phenomena are meaningful due to their śūnyatā. 
Reality, for Nāgārjuna, is opposite from the materialist, stoical position, where 
phenomena and events stand as sobering correctives to mental impositions. But he is 
also not an idealist or a monist in that, for him, events or conditions are both real and 
not real. He is adamant that saṃvṛti, if seen on its own terms, i.e. from the point of view 
of paramārtha, is not substantially real. My argument in this thesis is that if saṃvṛti in 
itself is nothing, it therefore “is” as it is interpreted and susceptible to interpretations 
based on ignorance. However, saṃvṛti, Nāgārjuna avers, is most accurately understood 
in terms of paramārtha. So while saṃvṛti is not identical to paramārtha, there is a 
relationship of equivalence between the two of them. This relationship of equivalence is 
best described in terms of metaphoric logic where saṃvṛti points to paramārtha. While 
phenomena appear unsolicited on the mental landscape, due to vikalpa and prapañca, 
they may be reinterpreted, ignorantly, as substantial objects or as metaphors for 
ultimate reality or śūnyatā.
                                                          
3 MK 25: 19 (in McCagney 1997: 209).
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I explored three subsidiary problems in search of a  solution to the problem of 
understanding the claim that Nāgārjuna does not explain, namely  why the experience 
of phenomena are meaningful when śūnyatā is properly understood.  These are: 
 Under what conditions does a clear understanding of śūnyatā emerge?
 What does śūnyatā as a meditational experience of openness, as expressed in the 
Prajñāpāramitāsūtras as ākāśa, mean in Madhyamaka philosophy?
 How does the experience of pratītyasamutpāda make phenomena philosophically 
meaningful?
The solution to the first subsidiary problem is that a clear understanding of śūnyatā
emerges with an experience of meditational objects as akasically indeterminate and 
open. The solution to the second sub-problem was that phenomena in Madhyamaka
philosophy are indeterminate and contextually meaningful. But this solution, I maintain, 
is insufficient in terms of the claims that Nāgārjuna makes regarding phenomena 
making sense if understood in terms of śūnyatā. While it is understood that Nāgārjuna
wants to stipulate that phenomena can only make sense in terms of immediacy and 
engagement in the present, such an understanding of the present requires an 
unbounded experience of the processes of pratītyasamutpāda as expressed in MK 17:  
20:
Openness (śūnyatā) is not disruption, and saṃsāra is not permanence. 
The imperishability of the two actions is the teaching elucidated by the 
Buddha.4
                                                          
4 In McCagney (1997:178).
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Phenomena are, therefore, not to be experienced in their immediacy in a limited 
contextual fashion; but neither are they to be discounted as inconsequential for them to 
be experienced as meaningful. Pratītyasamutpāda is all-inclusive. The argument for the 
universal applicability of meaning requires a closer examination of semantics. It is 
important, here, to understand Nāgārjuna’s sense of śūnyatā. According to Nāgārjuna, 
śūnyatā must be understood from the standpoint of pratītyasamutpāda. All space, time 
and phenomena are subject to dependent origination. . Meaning is, therefore, not 
derived in terms of coherence with its contextual coordinates, but rather via an identity 
theory of truth that identifies phenomena with an open and all-encompassing sense of 
conditioning. The understanding of meaning that Nāgārjuna is proposing, along the lines 
of engagement (yujyate) and immediacy (prabhavati), occurs within the context of time 
and space being conditionally existent. But this view does not lead him to pessimism. 
The meaning of circumstance and phenomena seems to reside in terms of his 
understanding of causality, which is not defined in terms of nature or activity, but rather 
by a form of metaphoric logic that, at every instance, points to infinite or boundless 
conditioning. In this sense every immediate instance of engagement with phenomena 
sheds light on the boundless nature of reality when śūnyatā is understood.
In Chapter Two I argued that Nāgārjuna’s logic displays striking similarities to the logic 
in the Prajnaparāmita Sūtras (PPM). Such an assertion seems to give weight to Edward 
Conze’s argument that Nāgārjuna’s writings, particularly in the Mūlamadhyamikakārikā, 
are a restatement of the PPM. But I do not go so far as to aver that my findings 
corroborate Conze’s position because there is very little historical evidence that links 
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Nāgārjuna’s thought to the PPM, although useful future study could  closely analyse and 
compare the linguistic and logical features of the MK and the Aṣṭa. This kind of study 
would be pertinent based on the findings of this thesis, namely that the logic used in the 
PPM leads to a form of metaphoricity which, I argued, is reflected in Nāgārjuna’s 
assertion that “everything makes sense, for him to whom śūnya is clear” and ”because 
śūnyatā interpreted as openness is engaging, everything is engaging” (or so we can 
roughly paraphrase VV 70 and MK 24: 14). This thesis never set out to establish a 
historical derivation for the logic utilized by Nāgārjuna in these two verses. Rather its 
method was philosophical, to examine the similarities between the metaphoric logic in 
the PPM and compare it with Nāgārjuna’s logic in MK 24:14 and VV70. The basis of this 
logic lies in the interpretation of śūnya as openness, along the lines of ākāśa rather than 
emptiness. In this regard I defer to Nancy McCagney’s work, where she explores the 
associations of ākāśa (boundlessness, wideness and openness) with śūnyatā in the 
PPM.5 As with Conze’s claims about the relation between the PPM and Nāgārjuna’s 
writings, it is difficult to prove the connection; but my thesis shows that interpreting
ākāśa with śūnyatā significantly enriches our reading of Nāgārjuna’s thought based on 
the recognition of the similarities of logic between the PPM and Nāgārjuna.  This leads 
to the realisation that Nāgārjuna is not merely engaging in logical argumentation with an 
opponent in his writings. He also bases his thought on a deeper meditational experience 
of infinity and spaciousness akin to that described in the PPM and grafting that 
experience onto his logic with the assistance of metaphoricity.
                                                          
5 McCagney 1997.
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In Chapter Three I argued that saṃvṛti is indiscernible due to its emptiness, and that 
saṃvṛtisatya cannot be corroborated on its own terms. I was, and remain, critical of 
scholars who apply Candrakīrti’s interpretation of the two-truths formulation, which 
grants both paramārtha and saṃvṛti their distinctive truths. The consequence of this 
approach is the need to prove the distinctive veracity of saṃvṛti and paramārtha in each 
object. But this schema does not explain how seeing phenomena as empty makes them 
meaningful in the sense of yujyate and prabhavati. In Chapters Two and  Four I sought 
to offer an explanation for what Nāgārjuna means when he asserts that saṃvṛti makes 
sense when paramārtha is understood according to his criteria of “engaging” and 
”immediate”. 
If Nāgārjuna wants to maintain that understanding śūnyatā makes things meaningful, he 
needs to move beyond the problem of relativity, which I raise in Chapter Three, namely 
if meaning is contextually situated, it is not a sufficiently stable  foundation to support his
claim for clarity of understanding phenomena. Nāgārjuna is a philosopher and therefore 
he is not content merely to rest on the notion that one’s experience of meditational 
objects provides clarity of meaning, as I show in Chapter Three:  relative truth does not 
offer the  certainty for meaning to obtain, despite the fact that the realisation of relativity 
is grounded on the awareness of phenomena’s emptiness. Crucially, Nāgārjuna needs 
to proffer a logical explanation for why śūnyatā provides phenomena with clear 
meaning. I showed in Chapter Two that Nāgārjuna is not consistent with his own 
definitions of saṃvṛti. So, despite his assertion that phenomena are clearly understood 
when śūnyatā is understood, he appears to not be consistent in his own exploration of 
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this idea. But in identifying śūnyatā with pratītyasamutpāda and intrinsically associating 
nirvāṇa with saṃsāra, he suggests a stable foundation for understanding phenomena, 
but he is, unfortunately, not explicit about how such a stable foundation is obtained.  In 
Chapter Four an explanation for how phenomena are meaningful, both in terms of 
engagement and immediacy, due to their emptiness, was provided in the PPM’s use of 
metaphoricity. In terms of Nāgārjuna’s writings, rather than seeing the two truths as 
distinctive, I maintain that saṃvṛtisatya and parāmārthasatya both make sense in terms 
of their  metaphorical relationship in that they are both śūnyatā and that phenomena 
point to or are metaphors for the all-inclusive śūnyatā of reality. Nāgārjuna’s two best 
examples of his assertion that phenomena make sense due to their emptiness are,
All things prevail for him whom prevails this voidness. Nothing prevails for 
him for whom voidness does not prevail.6
sarvaṃ ca tasya śūnyatā yasya yujyate/
sarvaṃ na yujyate tasya śūnyaṃ yasya na yujyate//
And
For whom there is emptiness, there is [the clarity of] all things. For whom 
there is no emptiness there is nothing whatsoever.7
Prabhavati ca śūnyatéyam peabhavanti tasya sarvāthāh/
Prabhavati na tasya kiṃcin na prabhavati śūnyatā yasya//
The point of this thesis has been to emphasise the importance of the claims to meaning 
and understanding made in MK 24: 14 and VV 70 in Nāgārjuna’s philosophy. His 
philosophy is neither nihilistic nor positivistic (as recent writings suggest in focusing on 
                                                          
6 VV 70 in Westerhoff (2010: 41).
7 MK 24:14 in McCagney, (1997: 201).
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the role of saṃvṛti8). But if he is neither nihilistic nor positivistic, his assertion of 
meaningful engagement with phenomena when śūnyatā is grasped needs to be 
understood, I aver, within the metaphoric logic embedded in the Prajñāpāramita sūtras.  
Such an approach has wider implications for the entire field of Nāgārjuna scholarship 
and Buddhist philosophy.  If Nāgārjuna’s philosophy is to be understood within the 
framework of metaphoric logic it suggests intriguing psychological elements in his 
thought that point to his understanding of how knowledge and ignorance are produced. 
Moreover, if this thesis concerning Nāgārjuna’s understanding of knowledge and 
Wisdom being grounded in the all-inclusive thought of metaphoric logic can be shown to
obtain logically and psychologically, then such thought could assist to bringing  a useful 
Buddhist contribution to global challenges that require complex human rights 
interventions.
                                                          
8 Westerhoff, 2011, for example Chapter 2 and Chapter 12. 
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